In a landmark judgment, in Baishakhi Bhattacharyya v. Binod Kumar1 (Fox & Mandal team comprising Debanjan Mandal, Managing Partner, Sandip Dasgupta, Partner, and Mahima Cholera, Senior Associate, represented the contemnor No. 1), the Calcutta High Court expounded on a key constitutional question – whether the doctrine of merger can curtail the High Court's contempt powers under Article 215 of the Constitution – and held that once a High Court's order merges into a Supreme Court judgment, the High Court loses jurisdiction to entertain contempt proceedings to enforce the original order, unless expressly authorised by the Supreme Court.
As explained in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala,2 the doctrine of merger holds that once a superior court entertains an appeal, revision, or review, the order of the lower court is subsumed in its decision, regardless of whether it affirms, modifies, or reverses the original ruling. The lower court's order thereby loses all independent existence as it effectively 'merges' with the superior court's judgment, which becomes the sole binding, operative, and enforceable directive, as held in Gojer Bros Pvt Ltd v. Ratan Lal Singh.3
The applicability of the doctrine lies in determining which order is final and enforceable in any multi-tiered judicial process. By ensuring that only the superior court's decision prevails, the doctrine preserves judicial hierarchy, prevents the coexistence of conflicting or overlapping directives, and also guides parties on the appropriate forum for enforcement or further challenge. In the context of Special Leave Petitions, when the Supreme Court grants leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution and pronounces its judgment, the High Court's order is wholly subsumed and can no longer be enforced in its own right. However, the applicability of the doctrine to contempt jurisdiction has remained somewhat unsettled, given that contempt is often treated as a distinct proceeding between the court and the contemnor, as held in Rajinder Kumar Malhotra v. Paresh Biharilal Vyas.4
In Baishakhi Bhattacharyya v. Binod Kumar (supra), the Calcutta High Court had passed an order on April 22, 2024 cancelling numerous fraudulently obtained school appointments and directing remedial actions. Subsequently, on April 3, 2025, the Supreme Court substantially affirmed the High Court's directions, with some modifications.5 The original petitioners filed a contempt petition before the High Court, alleging deliberate non-implementation of its directions passed in 2024. The other respondents objected, arguing that the High Court's order had merged into the Supreme Court's judgment, thereby depriving the High Court of its jurisdiction to enforce the said order by way of contempt proceedings. The High Court dismissed the contempt petition holding that once the doctrine of merger is triggered by an appellate review, it extinguishes not only the original judgment's legal force but also any associated enforcement powers – which includes the power to punish for contempt of the original order. After a superior court has adjudicated a matter, the lower court's decision is effectively subsumed and has no independent existence capable of enforcement.
The petitioners contended that Article 215 of the Constitution – which designates High Courts as courts of record with power to punish for contempt of their own orders – endowed the Calcutta High Court to act against disobedience of its 2024 order, even after it had merged with the Supreme Court's judgment. The Court rejected this proposition, emphasising that the doctrine of merger is not just a procedural formality as the loss of independent legal existence has a jurisdictional consequence. While contempt proceedings function as a mode of execution for writ orders (because civil-execution mechanisms under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are generally unavailable for writ enforcement), with the merger, the 'ultimate writ' (final operative directions) emanated from the Supreme Court rather than the High Court and the authority to execute or enforce the judgment transferred entirely to the Supreme Court. Consequently, any act of disobedience amounted to contempt of the Supreme Court's mandate.
Article 215 cannot be read to let a High Court punish contempt of Supreme Court orders, because Article 129 vests the Supreme Court with exclusive, plenary contempt power to ensure compliance with its own judgments. Just as the High Court cannot review an order once it has merged into a Supreme Court decree, it likewise cannot entertain a contempt action based on that order. After merger, any contempt proceeding must be brought before the court whose order remains operative – in this case, the Supreme Court. Reinforcing its position, the Calcutta High Court categorically declined to follow earlier decisions that had allowed contempt to proceed despite the application of the doctrine of merger, concluding that such reasoning cannot survive once the Supreme Court's decree has subsumed the High Court's order.
The only exception to this limitation arises when the Supreme Court specifically empowers the High Court to initiate such action. In Dineshan KK v. RK Singh,6 the Supreme Court had expressly authorised the High Court to act against disobedience of its orders, underscoring that in the absence of such authorisation, a High Court cannot assume jurisdiction to entertain contempt proceedings for violation of a Supreme Court judgment.
By drawing this jurisdictional line – that once an order merges, only the Supreme Court may supervise or enforce compliance unless it expressly delegates that power – the ruling prevents conflicting or duplicative enforcement actions, affirms the constitutional hierarchy and finality of Supreme Court decisions, and guarantees a single operative order governing the parties' obligations. It also preserves the Supreme Court's ability to oversee implementation of its judgments, particularly in complex cases where it retains seisin.
Footnotes
1 2025 SCC OnLine Cal 3984
2 2000 (6) SCC 359
3 (1974) 2 SCC 453
4 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 89
5 State of West Bengal v. Baishakhi Bhattacharyya, Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 9586 of 2024
6 Dineshan KK vs RK Singh & Anr, 2014 (16) SCC 88.
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