Court Of Appeal Summaries (September 8 – 12, 2025)

Following are our summaries of the civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario for the week of September 8, 2025.

In Gayle v. Cambridge Mercantile Corp., the Court dismissed an appeal of the dismissal of a professional negligence claim against the appellant's former lawyers for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and negligence in a settlement she made with her former employer in a wrongful dismissal case. The Court agreed with the motion judge and found there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

In Shaulov v. Law Society of Ontario, the appellant sued the LSO and others as a result of his failure to obtain his law licence after failing the barrister's bar exam four times. His claim against the non-LSO defendants was struck as disclosing no cause of action, with no leave to amend. He then moved to add the non-LSO defendants as necessary parties to the outstanding claim against the LSO, and to amend his claim to plead negligence against the non-LSO defendants. The Court held that the motion judge correctly found the issue of whether the non-LSO defendants could be added as necessary parties had been "finally determined" in the prior motion that struck the claim against them (and that the attempt to add them again was therefore an abuse of process), and that the proposed negligence claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

Rodriguez-Vergara v. Lamoureux was a priority/coverage dispute between motor vehicle insurers where there was an accident involving an underinsured driver.

In Happy v. Narouz, the Court dismissed an appeal in a fact-specific family law case.

Lee v. Chang was a breach of contract and deceit case. The plaintiffs lost at trial and on appeal. A transcript of a recording they relied upon was excluded as unreliable because it had not been prepared by an accredited translator.

Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. R.E. was a child protection case.

Other topics covered included extension of time to appeal.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

CIVIL DECISIONS

Gayle v. Cambridge Mercantile Corp., 2025 ONCA 612

[Sossin, Favreau and Wilson JJ.A.]

Counsel:

W. Kerr, as agent for the appellant

L. Ritacca and O. Eng, for the respondents

Keywords: Contracts, Employment, Wrongful Dismissal, Torts, Professional Negligence, Lawyers, Conspiracy, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Evidence, Expert Evidence, Foreign Law, Krawchuk v. Scherbak, 2011 ONCA 352, Formosa v. Persaud, 2020 ONCA 368

facts:

The appellant, S.G., brought a wrongful dismissal action against Cambridge Mercantile Corp. ("Cambridge"), claiming, among other things, unpaid compensation for work on Jewish holidays. Her counsel, J.S. and R.S., with input from M.F., represented her. After mediation, the parties settled, with the appellant's spouse, W.K., receiving $500,000 and a full mutual release signed. Over a year later, S.G. sued her former lawyers and Lerners LLP for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and negligence, alleging they conspired with Cambridge and induced her to accept an improvident settlement. The respondents moved for summary judgment, which was granted. The motion judge found no genuine issue for trial and no merit to S.G.'s claims.

issue:

Did the appellant's claim against the respondents raise a genuine issue for trial?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

No. At the oral hearing, S.G.'s primary argument was that the motion judge misinterpreted a provision in the memorandum of agreement, submitting that section 6(b) entitled her to all profits Cambridge made on Jewish holidays and that her interpretation was consistent with Jewish law. The Court saw no merit to this argument, highlighting it was not the task of the motion judge to reach a correct interpretation of the memorandum of agreement, but, rather, to determine whether there was a genuine issue for trial that the advice the respondents gave the appellant leading to the settlement was unreasonable and fell below the standard of care. The Court saw no error in the motion judge's determination, finding his explanation well supported by the record and concluding that the respondents gave reasonable advice to S.G. The motion judge specifically addressed the interpretation of section 6(b) and found that S.G. reached a reasonable settlement in the circumstances of her case.

The appellant also submitted that it was an error for the motion judge to decide the motion in the respondents' favour in the absence of expert evidence on Jewish law and on the standard of care. The Court disagreed, stating that the memorandum of agreement was to be interpreted in accordance with Ontario law and that whether Jewish law prohibited religious observers from earning profits on holidays would not determine the terms of the agreement. The Court found no error in the motion judge's analysis, noting that the extensive evidentiary record allowed the motion judge to find there was no genuine issue for trial regarding the claims of collusion or improvident settlement. The Court held that the appellant failed to put her best foot forward in responding to the motion for summary judgment and saw no errors in the motion judge's analysis.

Shaulov v. Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONCA 613

[Sossin, Favreau and Wilson JJ.A.]

Counsel:

A.S., acting in person

S. Aylward and S. Fooks for the respondents

Keywords: Regulated Professions, Lawyers, Civil Procedure, Abuse of Process, Civil Procedure, Amending Pleadings; Adding Parties, Necessary Parties, Striking Pleadings, Abuse of Process, Limitation Periods, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sch. B., Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 5, r. 26.02, Shaulov v. Law Society of Ontario, 2022 ONSC 2732, Shaulov v. Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONCA 95, Saskatchewan (Environment) v. Métis Nation – Saskatchewan, 2025 SCC 4, Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29, Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, Mancinelli v. Royal Bank of Canada, 2018 ONCA 544, Aba-Alkhail v. University of Ottawa, 2013 ONCA 633, Winter v. Sherman Estate, 2018 ONCA 703, The Catalyst Capital Group Inc. v. VimpelCom Ltd., 2019 ONCA 354

facts:

The appellant applied for a licence to practise law in October 2017, after completing the LSO's Law Practice Program. While he passed his solicitor examination, he failed the barrister examination four times. In accordance with the LSO's bylaws, his application for a licence was deemed abandoned.

The appellant issued the statement of claim in this proceeding against the LSO and three other defendants: Performance Assessment Group Inc., JB and MW (collectively, "the non-LSO defendants"). The non-LSO defendants were consultants involved in the design of the LSO's licensing exam. In the original statement of claim, the Appellant alleged violations of the Human Rights Code against the non-LSO defendants.

The defendants to the appellant's original action brought a motion to strike the claim. Vermette J. struck the claims against the non-LSO defendants without leave to amend, and also struck part of the LSO claims, with leave to amend. The appellant appealed that decision to this Court, and the Court upheld the dismissal of the non-LSO claims but sent part of the LSO claim back to the Superior Court.

The appellant sought to amend his statement of claim to plead negligence against the non-LSO defendants and argued they were necessary parties to the claim against the LSO under r. 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Vermette J. ruled the non-LSO defendants were not necessary parties, and that negligence could only be pleaded with leave under r. 26.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellant brought a motion under rr. 5 and 26.02 and pleaded negligence.

Brownstone J., the motion judge, dismissed the motion, finding the action against the non-LSO defendants had already been rejected in a previous decision. She found that the appellant's attempt to add the non-LSO defendants was an abuse of process and that the negligence claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's order.

issues:

1. Whether the motion judge erred in ruling that the appellant's motion to add the non-LSO defendants under r. 5 was already decided and therefore constituted an abuse of process?
2. Whether the motion judge misapplied the Limitations Act, 2002 in concluding that the appellant's claim of negligence against the non-LSO defendants was statute-barred?
3. Whether the motion judge erred in not granting the appellant leave to amend his pleadings to add the negligence claim against the non-LSO defendants under r. 26.02?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The Court found no error in the motion judge's ruling. The doctrine of abuse of process is rooted in a court's inherent and residual discretion to prevent misuse of its procedures: Saskatchewan (Environment) v. Métis Nation – Saskatchewan. The motion judge held that the question of whether the non-LSO defendants could be added as necessary parties had been determined in earlier rulings by Vermette J. and by the Court. The appellant's different characterization of the scope of the prior rulings did not alter the fact that the record showed the issue had been "finally determined". The Court saw no basis to interfere with this conclusion.
2. No. The Court held that the motion judge did not misapply the Limitations Act, 2002. The appellant argued that discoverability extended the limitation period because he only recently learned the facts necessary to plead negligence. The motion judge rejected these submissions. The Court affirmed that in a motion for leave to amend, it is open to the judge to assess whether the plaintiff could reasonably have discovered the claim earlier. The finding of actual knowledge was entitled to deference. The Court was not persuaded by the appellant's submissions.
3. No. The Court found no error in the motion judge's refusal to grant leave under r. 26.02. The Court upheld the motion judge's conclusion that, since the action against the non-LSO defendants had been dismissed, the negligence amendment constituted a new claim and was statute-barred. Furthermore, the Court agreed with the non-LSO defendants that the negligence claim was itself an abuse of process, as it could have been raised in the original statement of claim. The doctrine of abuse of process applies not only to claims actually made, but also to those that could have been made in a prior proceeding: Aba-Alkhail v. University of Ottawa, 2013 ONCA 633, at para. 12; Winter v. Sherman Estate, 2018 ONCA 703, at para. 7; The Catalyst Capital Group Inc. v. VimpelCom Ltd., 2019 ONCA 354, at para. 67.

Rodriguez-Vergara v. Lamoureux, 2025 ONCA 620

[Lauwers, Nordheimer and Wilson JJ.A.]

Counsel:

P. Yoo, for the appellant

E.A. Argentino, for the respondents

Keywords: Contracts, Insurance, Automobile, Coverage, Underinsured Motorist, Priority Dispute, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Standard of Review, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 21, 29.01(c), Insurance Act, ss.277(1), Housen v. Nikolaisen 2002 SCC 33, Keelty v. Bernique, 2002, 57 O.R. (3d) 803 (C.A.), Smith v. Taylor 2024 ONCA 223, Benson v. Walt, 2018 ONCA 172

facts:

The plaintiff MRV was struck by a vehicle owned by the defendant MD and driven by her daughter the defendant RL ("Defendants"). As a result, MRV suffered injuries and commenced a lawsuit seeking damages. The Defendants' vehicle was insured by Certas under a standard automobile policy with liability limits of $300,000. Certas also insured the Defendants' vehicle under a personal umbrella liability policy ("PLUP") that had limits of $1 million.

Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company of Canada ("RSA") insured MRV under a standard automobile policy that had liability limits of $1 million. Attached to MRV's Standard Automobile Policy was a Family Protection Endorsement, OPCF 44R, which provided, among other things, coverage if the insured was involved in an accident with an underinsured motorist. There was no dispute that the assessment of the damages of MRV exceeded the limits of the policy and thus, the Defendants were inadequately insured motorists. The parties agreed that the Defendants' automobile policy's third-party liability limits of $300,000 was primary and would respond first to the plaintiff's claims. After that, however, they disagreed about whether the Defendants' PLUP or MRV's OPCF 44R responded next in priority to the claims of the plaintiff.

issues:

1. Did the motion judge err in finding that the OPCF 44R stands in priority to the PLUP?
2. Did the motion judge err in finding that RSA could not deduct the PLUP policy limit from payments under MRV's OPCF 44R?
3. Did the motion judge err in finding that RSA could not issue a third-party claim, and in finding that RSA could not subrogate for the amounts paid under MRV's OPCF 44R?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The Court held that the motion judge correctly interpreted MRV's OPCF 44R in its full legal context. Issues surrounding the interpretation of insurance policies were pure questions of law. The standard of review was one of correctness. On a correctness standard, an appellate court was free to replace the first instance judge's conclusions with its own, however, the Court here found no reason to do so. The Court concurred that the issues to be determined must be assessed in the context of the nature of the automobile insurance legislation in Ontario, which was highly regulated under the Act. The Court agreed with the interpretation of the motion judge that s. 7 of the OPCF 44R referred to matters covered in the automobile regulations or motor vehicle liability policies. The language of s. 7 made it clear that amounts available to the claimant from "insurers of the inadequately insured motorist" meant amounts from the total motor vehicle liability insurance or funds in lieu of insurance, not any and all types of insurance such as a PLUP.

2. No. The Court held that the motion judge was correct in his determination that the OPCF 44R insurer, RSA, could not reduce its limits by or deduct from its payment any amounts paid under the Defendants' PLUP. S. 7(a) of the OPCF 44R referred to motor vehicle liability insurance policies. The PLUP was not such a policy and therefore could not be deducted by the OPCF 44R.

3. No. The Court found RSA had no cause of action in tort or in contract against Certas, as the motion judge correctly observed. There was no merit to RSA's submission that it could subrogate against Certas or issue a third-party claim for payments made under its policy. The motion judge made no error in dismissing this submission.

Happy v. Narouz, 2025 ONCA 634

[Thorburn, Copeland and Gomery JJ.A.]

Counsel:

W. N., acting in person

J. Gravelle, for the respondent

Keywords: Family Law, Divorce, Spousal Support, Property Division, Equalization of Net Family Property, Unequal Division, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 4(2)3, Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church of Canada St. Mary Cathedral c. Aga, 2021 CSC 22, 1061590 Ontario Ltd. v. Ontario Jockey Club (1995), 21 O.R. (3d) 547 (C.A.)., Palmer v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759

facts:

The parties married in 1991. In 2003, the appellant suffered a work-related accident. He lost his job and received a settlement of $167,381. The respondent is the sole owner of an online marketing business, Happy Marketing Group. The parties separated on May 9, 2016, and the respondent left the matrimonial home. With the consent of the parties, the matrimonial home was transferred to the appellant in September 2020, following a payment by the appellant to the respondent. The respondent brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a divorce decree and equalization of the parties' net family property. The appellant sought spousal support and an unequal division of the family property.

The motion judge ordered that: (1) neither party owes spousal support to the other, (2) the appellant must pay an equalization payment of $46,180 to the respondent, (3) the appellant continues to be required to pay an additional $8,500 to the respondent as ordered by Justice McEachern in July 2020, and (4) the appellant is required to pay the final amount of $54,680 ($46,180 + $8,500) within 60 days, failing which the matrimonial home will be put up for sale and the amount owed to the respondent will be paid directly to her from the proceeds of sale. The appellant appealed the decision on seven separate issues.

issues:

1. Did the motion judge err in granting summary judgment in a case involving complex facts?
2. Did the motion judge err in deciding that the respondent did not have $43,000 in his bank account on the date of marriage?
3. Did the motion judge err in dismissing the claim concerning the respondent's appropriation of jewelry?
4. Did the motion judge err in dismissing the appellant's position regarding the value of the respondent's business, Happy Marketing Group?
5. Did the motion judge err in rejecting the appellant's claims that the respondent withdrew $13,000 from the appellant's RRSP account and $5,488.32 from a joint account at TD Wealth, in addition to misappropriating nearly $139,000 from various accounts to finance her business?
6. Did the motion judge err by including the amount of settlement for the appellant's bodily injury in the net family property, rather than treating it as excluded property?
7. Did the motion judge err by dismissing the appellant's claim for spousal support?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The motion judge did not err. The Court noted that in the absence of significant factual disagreements requiring an assessment of credibility, the motion judge's decision to proceed by summary judgment was appropriate, well-founded on the evidence, and consistent with the law. The Court noted that since much of the appellant's evidence was still missing, additional time would not allow for the filing of better or additional evidence.
2. No. The motion judge did not err in rejecting the appellant's claim that he had $43,000 in a bank account in Egypt on the day of his marriage. The Court noted that the appellant provided no information on this subject other than a copy-and-paste of an illegible document written in Arabic, despite the order to provide bank statements dated at the time of the marriage, in English, indicating the name of the bank, the account number, the account holder and other information.
3. No. The Court found that the motion judge rightly rejected the appellant's allegation that the respondent changed the combination of the parties' safe and took jewelry when she left the matrimonial home.
4. No. The motion judge did not err. A few days before the motion hearing, the appellant raised for the first time his argument that the respondent's interest in Happy Marketing Group was worth $90,000. The Court noted the appellant's considerable and unjustified delay and did not accept the additional documents he was requesting to file in support of his allegations of misappropriation of funds during the marriage. For these reasons, the Court concluded that the appellant did not establish the merits of his application to produce new evidence.
5. No. The motion judge did not err. The Court noted that the appellant did not provide any evidence to support his argument that, during the marriage, the respondent emptied her RRSP in 2014, which contained $13,000, and their joint TD account, which contained $5,488. The respondent explained that the money in the TD account was intended for the children's education and had been transferred to their daughter, which was confirmed by the parties' financial advisor. For these reasons, the Court found the motion judge rightly concluded that the appellant had not established the merits of the claim for an unequal division of the parties' net family property.
6. No. The motion judge did not err in including the amount of a settlement in the net family property. The Court noted that the appellant requested that the entire amount of his settlement with Desjardins Financial be excluded from his net family property, alleging that the settlement consisted solely of damages for bodily injury. The appellant did not produce any evidence to support his assertion.
7. No. The motion judge did not err in dismissing the appellant's claim for spousal support. The appellant claimed to have no income and to be surviving solely on loans from friends and family. Despite numerous requests to disclose his financial information, the appellant did not provide the necessary documents. The Court noted that the motion judge had good reason to conclude "that the husband's income is at least equal to, if not greater than, that of the wife since their separation," such that the respondent owed no support to the appellant.

Lee v. Chang, 2025 ONCA 632

[Miller, Paciocco and Coroza JJ.A.]

Counsel:

S.J. Bae, for the appellants

S.S. Hong and J.Z. Chen, for the respondent

Keywords: Breach of Contract, Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Unjust Enrichment, Fraudulent Conveyances, Civil Procedures, Limitation Periods, Evidence, Admissibility, Hearsay, Recordings, Transcripts, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, s. 13, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. B.3., Garland v. Consumers Gas Co., 2004 SCC 25

facts:

The appellants, residents of Seoul, Korea, met the respondents, M.J.C. and K.E.C., in 1998. When the respondents immigrated to Canada in 2000, the appellants sent their daughter to live with the respondents for schooling, providing her with room and board for about eleven years. Between 1999 and 2010, the appellants wire transferred a total of $213,000 to the respondents, including $30,000 for repayment of a credit card loan. The appellants claimed that some of these transfers were loans and investments, specifically alleging that $100,000 was for a joint real estate investment in a property later sold for a significant profit (the "Cummer House"). The respondents, however, maintained that the funds were payments for the daughter's living expenses, art lessons, and transportation.

At trial, the appellants sought damages in the amount of $533,000 for breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, deceit, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent conveyance. The appellants also sought an order for equitable relief and a declaration that the proceeds of the sale of the Cummer House were held in constructive trust for the appellants. They claimed aggravated and exemplary damages in the amount of $200,000, punitive damages in the amount of $200,000, and unspecified special damages. The trial judge dismissed all their claims and ordered them to pay the respondents' costs.

issues:

1. Did the trial judge err by excluding an important transcript of a recording?
2. Did the trial judge err in dismissing the claim in unjust enrichment?
3. Did the trial judge err in her application of the Limitations Act, 2002?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The appellants submitted that the trial judge erred in neglecting to admit a transcript of a recorded conversation between the appellant, K.H.L., and the respondent, M.J.C., asserting that M.J.C. admitted an obligation to repay the debt upon the sale of the Cummer House. The trial judge had concerns about the reliability of the translation and concluded that the translation was not reliable, relevant, nor probative of any issues. The trial judge noted the parties disputed the accuracy of the translation, there was no evidence that the translator was an accredited translator or that he had listened to the recording and therefore concluded that the transcripts were not reliable. The trial judge found that the content of the transcript was ambiguous and that the words used by M.J.C. did not amount to an admission of the debts claimed in the action, concluding that "even though the evidence was adduced at trial, it is not probative as to the existence of the impugned loans and investment." The Court saw no reversible error in her treatment of this evidence.

2. No. The appellants argued that once the trial judge found no contract existed, there was no juristic reason for the enrichment and recovery should not have been denied. The Court rejected this submission, stating it was the appellant's burden to establish enrichment, deprivation, and the absence of a juristic reason. The Court did not accept that the trial judge found no contract. Instead, she found there was an agreement that the appellants would pay the respondents for the daughter's homestay expenses, though she was not able to ascertain the precise terms. The Court read the trial judge's reasons as a finding that the appellants (1) had not established that the payments enriched the respondents and (2) failed to show an absence of a juristic reason to deny recovery.

3. No. The trial judge found the appellants had knowledge of the facts by February 2011 or December 2015, and the Statement of Claim was not filed until January 2018. The trial judge found that the appellants failed to rebut the presumption that the claims were discovered on the day the act or omission took place. Regarding a credit card loan from Hyundai, the appellant M.J.C. made an assignment into bankruptcy in September 2017, so the appellants' claim was stayed pursuant to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. The trial judge rejected arguments that a forbearance agreement or acknowledgements of debt suspended or restarted the limitation period, and found the appellants did not act with due diligence. The Court viewed this as an attempt to relitigate factual findings and, finding no palpable and overriding error, rejected this ground of appeal. The Court also saw no merit in the costs appeal, finding no basis to disturb the trial judge's discretionary costs order.

Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. R.E., 2025 ONCA 623

[Sossin, Favreau and Wilson JJ.A.]

Counsel:

S.P. Kirby, for the appellant

F. Husain, for the respondent Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto

S.B., acting in person

J. Hyndman, appearing as amicus curiae

Keywords: Family Law, Child Protection, Best Interests of the Child, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Fresh Evidence, Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1, s. 121(6), s. 1(1), s. 122(1)(a), Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 134(1), Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22, Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. V. L., 2012 ONCA 890, New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. C. (G. C.), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1073, Vento Motorcycles, Inc. v. Mexico, 2025 ONCA 82, leave to appeal requested, [2025] S.C.C.A. No. 125, Jones v. Quinn, 2024 ONCA 315, Union Building Corporation of Canada v. Markham Woodmills Development Inc., 2018 ONCA 401, Slawter v. Bellefontaine, 2012 NSCA 48

facts:

The appellant is the mother of a five-year-old child. The child was taken into care by the Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto (the "Society") in January 2021. On April 6, 2023, the Ontario Court of Justice granted an extended society care order. This permitted the Society to pursue adoption planning and grant the mother access at least once a month as an "access recipient".

The mother appealed to the Superior Court, which upheld the extended society care order but found the trial judge had misapplied the statutory test and breached the mother's right to procedural fairness in designating her an access recipient. The order was varied to make the mother an "access holder".

The mother appealed to the Court. She sought admission of fresh evidence respecting her post-trial circumstances and sought an order setting aside the appeal judge's disposition and directing a new trial on all issues. She contended that the procedural unfairness required the matter to be retried.

Similarly, the Society brought a motion to file fresh evidence of the mother's recent supervised visits. They did not object to the appeal judge's decision to make the mother an access holder. However, they submitted that the mother's appeal should be dismissed.

issues:

1. Should the fresh evidence proffered by both parties be admitted on the appeal?
2. Did the appeal judge err in not ordering a new trial?
3. Did the appeal judge err in upholding the extended society care order?

holding:

Motions granted. Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. Yes. The Court was satisfied that the fresh evidence from both parties met the criteria for admission under s. 121(6) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, and the Palmer criteria as flexibly interpreted in Barendregt v. Grebliunas. The Court held that the evidence from the mother and the Society was not available at the time of the hearing before the trial judge, and it was relevant for understanding the current circumstances of the child and the mother.

2. No. The appeal judge did not err, as there was no basis for ordering a new trial. Section 134(1) of the Courts of Justice Act empowers an appellate court to make any order or decision that ought to or could have been made by the Court below, without necessarily ordering a new trial: see Jones v. Quinn at para. 93; Union Building Corporation of Canada v. Markham Woodmills Development Inc. at paras. 15-16. Whether an appeal court should order a new trial or decide the issue itself depends on the circumstances of the case. The Court found that the breach of procedural fairness was limited to the discrete issue of the mother's access status. Accordingly, there would have been no basis for ordering a whole new trial on all matters. The appeal judge had a complete evidentiary record and was satisfied that the evidence did not support a finding that the mother would interfere with the child's future opportunities for adoption. Furthermore, the mother's reliance on Vento Motorcycles, Inc. v. Mexico was misplaced, as the procedural defect here was limited and correctable on appeal, not a fundamental flaw requiring a new hearing.

3. No. The appeal judge did not err. This Court was not convinced that the new evidence should alter the outcome of the proceedings. The appeal judge correctly deferred to the trial judge's factual findings that the mother could not presently provide a safe, stable home and that returning the child would place her at risk of harm. On review, the fresh evidence did not demonstrate a material change; instead, it confirmed ongoing instability, mental-health concerns, substance use, and volatile relations with the father.

Talpade v. AMJ Campbell Company Toronto East, 2025 ONCA 615

[Sossin, Favreau and Wilson JJ.A]

Counsel:

V.T., acting in person

No one appearing for the moving party, T.T.

J.D. Biasi, for the responding parties

Keywords: Contracts, Property, Repair and Storage Liens, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Administrative Dismissal for Delay, Extension of Time, Repair and Storage Liens Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. R.25, s. 15(1), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 61.16(6), De Jesus v. Linamar Holdings Inc., 2017 ONCA 384, Asghar v. Toronto (Police Services Board), 2021 ONCA 338, Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. v. Froese, 2013 ONCA 131, Hillmount Capital Inc. v. Pizale, 2021 ONCA 364, Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2021 ONCA 931

facts:

This motion arose in the context of an appeal of a decision dismissing a motion for an interlocutory injunction against the responding parties in relation to a dispute over unpaid storage costs. The moving parties unsuccessfully sought to restrain the responding parties from selling the stored property under the Repair and Storage Liens Act (RSLA). The moving parties appealed. The moving parties then filed a motion for an extension of time to perfect their appeal, as well as a stay of the decision. Pepall J.A. granted the extension. The motion for a stay was dismissed based on the responding parties' representation that they would preserve the property while the appeal was pending. Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed for delay by the Registrar.

The responding party then served a notice of intention to auction the appellants' stored property pursuant to s. 15(1) of the RSLA. The moving parties subsequently filed another motion and sought to set aside the Registrar's dismissal order, requested an extension of time to file a motion to review Pepall J.A.'s order, requested an extension of time to perfect their underlying appeal, and requested a stay of the auction pending the appeal. Coroza J.A. dismissed the moving parties' motion to set aside the Registrar's dismissal order. Because this decision terminated the appeal, all other relief requested was also denied. The moving parties then sought a panel review of the decision of Coroza J.A., but did not file their materials within the time required. They next brought a motion seeking an extension of time to perfect their materials for the panel review of Coroza J.A.'s decision. The motion judge declined to grant the extension of time.

issues:

Did the motion judge err in declining to grant the moving party's extension of time?

holding:

Motion dismissed.

reasoning:

No. The Court held that a motion judge's decision to grant or deny a motion to extend time was discretionary and was entitled to deference on review. It should not be disturbed absent legal error, a demonstrated error in principle or misapprehension of material evidence. The question was whether the motion judge, in denying the moving parties' motion, applied the appropriate factors and governing principles. The moving parties did not point to an error by the motion judge in her analysis or the application of the Enbridge factors. The Court found no reversible error in the motion judge's exercise of her discretion. The appeal underlying the motion was moot, which added further support to the conclusion that the interests of justice did not warrant further extensions of time.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Hura v. Kaur, 2025 ONCA 616

[Miller, Zarnett and Madsen JJ.A.]

Counsel:

N.K., acting in person

S. Eaton, for the respondent

Keywords: Family Law, Parenting, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, s. 22(1)(a), s. 73(2), Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 110

2660519 Ontario Inc. v. McWhinnie, 2025 ONCA 622

[Miller, Zarnett and Madsen JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. Marrie and S. Zucchi, for the appellant

J. Friedman and J. Hutchinson, for the respondent

Keywords: Real Property, Easements

Farid v Brunt, 2025 ONCA 617

[Thorburn, Copeland and Gomery JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. F. and N.F., acting in person

R. Macdonald and A. Evangelista, for the respondent

Keywords: Torts, Professional Negligence, Lawyers, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 19(1.2)(d), Sandu v. Fairmont Hotels Inc., 2015 ONCA 611, Saleh v. Nebel, 2016 ONCA 948, Tomec v. Economical Mutual Insurance Company, 2019 ONCA 839, leave to appeal refused [2020] S.C.C.A. No. 7

McLean v. Connell, 2025 ONCA 635

[Miller, Zarnett and Madsen JJ.A.]

Counsel:

S.P.C., acting in person

L. Graham, for the respondent

Keywords: Family Law, Civil Procedure, Self-Represented Litigants, Abuse of Process, Appeals, Mootness, Costs, McLean v. Connell, 2025 ONCA 495

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