Court Of Appeal Summaries (October 20 – 24, 2025)

Following are our summaries of the civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario for the week of October 20, 2025.

Congratulations to Blaneys' very own Reeva Finkel and Steve Kelly for the outcome they achieved for our client in Financial Services Regulatory Authority v. First Swiss Mortgage Corp. The Court upheld the lower court's decision discharging a mortgage after finding that a mortgage corporation had acted as an agent when it accepted borrowers' payout funds. Notwithstanding the failure of the agent to forward the money to the assignee of the mortgage, the Court ruled that the borrowers had properly paid off their loan, since they reasonably relied on the agent's authority.

Aizic v. Natcan Trust Company addressed the interpretation of a certification order that required leave to commence "any other proceeding relating to the subject matter" of the certified class actions. The motion judge held that the leave requirements applied only to parties and class members of the certified actions, not to non-class members bringing different proposed class actions. The Court agreed and dismissed the appeal. Applying the text-context-purpose framework, the Court concluded that the orders were aimed at delineating the single class action that may proceed for the certified class, and that any ambiguity should be resolved narrowly to preserve a party's right to sue.

In Richard v. Canada (Attorney General), the Court dismissed Canada's appeal from a certification order in a proposed class action that challenged the CBSA's use of provincial prisons to temporarily house immigration detainees. Applying the Class Proceedings Act framework and the "plain and obvious/bound to fail" standard to whether the claim discloses a reasonable cause of action, the Court upheld the certification of Charter claims under ss. 7, 9, 12, and 15, as well as a systemic negligence claim.

In Canadian Tire Corporation, Limited v. Eaton Equipment Ltd., the Court of Appeal largely upheld the summary judgment finding against Eaton Equipment, S.M., and related entities liable for a sophisticated civil fraud scheme that used falsified repair invoices routed through an intermediary administrator to extract over $3.2 million from Canadian Tire. However, the Court did set aside the judgment against C.M. for insufficient evidence of her knowledge of the fraud.

Amiri v. Nazer concerned an appeal from the trial judge's final order following the parties' family law trial. The Court dismissed the appeal, and upheld all findings in favour of the respondent, concluding that the trial judge acted fairly and within her discretion.

In Brady v. Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care the Court dismissed the appeal from the motion judge's order, holding that the wrongful dismissal claim was commenced outside the two-year limitation period.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

Financial Services Regulatory Authority of Ontario v. First Swiss Mortgage Corp.,2025 ONCA 731

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Agency, Bare Trustees, Actual and Apparent Authority, Monachino v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.), 1196303 Inc. v. Glen Grove Suites Inc., 2015 ONCA 580, Trident Holdings Ltd. v. Danand Investments Ltd. (1988), 64 O.R. (2d) 65 (C.A.), Paragon Development Corporation v. Sonka Properties Inc., 2011 ONCA 30, Stikeman Elliott LLP v 2083878 Alberta Ltd., 2019 ABCA 274

Aizic v. Natcan Trust Company,2025 ONCA 719

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Class Proceedings, Certification, Orders, Interpretation, Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c 45, s. 106, Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6., ss. 5, 8, 12, 13, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 1.04, 6.01(1), Frayce v. BMO Investor Line Inc. et al, 2023 ONSC 16, Gilani v. BMO Investments Inc., 2021 ONSC 3589, Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 ONCA 688, Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation v. South Bruce Peninsula (Town), 2024 ONCA 884, Auer v. Auer, 2024 SCC 36, Koroluk v. KPMG Inc., 2022 SKCA 57,Warde v Slatter Holdings Ltd., 2016 BCCA 63, Kuang v. Young, 2023 ONSC 2429, Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43, Berardinelli v. Ontario Housing Corp, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 275, Garland v. Consumers' Gas Co.(2001), 57 O.R. (3d) 127 (C.A.), Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis Society of Essex v. Windsor (City), 2015 ONCA 572, Ciardullo v. 1832 Asset Management L.P., et al., 2023 ONSC 4466, R. v. Hutchinson, 2014 SCC 19

Richard v. Canada (Attorney General), 2025 ONCA 713

Keywords: Torts, Institutional Negligence, Crown Liability, Immigration and Refugee Law, Constitutional Law, Charter Claims, Right to Life, Liberty and Security of the Person, Right to Freedom from Arbitrary Detention, Right to Freedom from Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Equality Rights, Civil Procedure, Class Proceedings, Certification, Reasonable Cause of Action, Common Issues, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 6(1), 7, 9, 12, 15(1), 24(1), Class Proceedings Act, S.O. 1992, c. 6, ss. 5, 24(1), Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 3(3), Part 1, Division 6, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 21.01(1)(b), Leroux v. Ontario, 2023 ONCA 314, Stolove v. Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care, 2025 ONCA 376, Lilleyman v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 2024 ONCA 606, Atlantic Lottery Corp. Inc. v. Babstock, 2020 SCC 19, Davis v. Amazon Canada Fulfillment Services, 2025 ONCA 421, Brown v. Canada, 2020 FCA 130, R. v. Wust, 2000 SCC 18, R v. Jean, 2008 BCCA 465, Ogiamien v. Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2017 ONCA 667, R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9, Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711, Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, Owsianik v. Equifax Canada Co., 2022 ONCA 813, MacLean v. R., [1973] S.C.R. 2, Brazeau v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 ONCA 184, Rice v. New Brunswick, 2002 SCC 13, Vancouver (City) v. Ward, 2010 SCC 27, Francis v. Ontario, 2021 ONCA 197, Carcillo v. Ontario Major Junior Hockey League, 2025 ONCA 652, Palmer v. Teva Canada Ltd., 2024 ONCA 220, Hollick v. Toronto (City), 2001 SCC 68, Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Dutton, 2001 SCC 46, Hodge v. Neinstein, 2017 ONCA 494, Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. v. Microsoft Corporation, 2013 SCC 57, Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Dutton, 2001 SCC 46, Good v. Toronto (Police Services Board), 2016 ONCA 250, Rumley v. British Columbia, 2001 SCC 69, Cloud v. Canada (Attorney General), 73 O.R. (3d) 401 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused, Cirillo v. Ontario, 2021 ONCA 353, Johnson v. Ontario, 2016 ONSC 5314

Canadian Tire Corporation, Limited v. Eaton Equipment Ltd., 2025 ONCA 720

Keywords: Torts, Fraud, Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Conversion, Unjust Enrichment, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgement, Bruno Appliance and Furniture Inc. v. Hryniak, 2014 SCC 8, HSBC v. Guido, 2025 ONCA 684

Amiri v. Nazer, 2025 ONCA 726

Keywords: Family Law, Property, Marriage Contracts, Dowry, Support, Imputing Income, Remedies, Resulting Trust, Constructive Trust, Equalization of Net Family Property, Civil Procedure, Evidence, Credibility, Procedural and Natural Justice, Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, Costs, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3., ss. 4 and 5, Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99

Brady v. Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care, 2025 ONCA 722

Keywords: Contracts, Employment and Labour, Wrongful Dismissal, Civil Procedure, Striking Pleadings, Jurisdiction, Limitation Periods, Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sched. A, s. 48(1), Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B. s. 4, Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.9, s. 7.1(6), Reopening Ontario (A Flexible Response to COVID-19) Act, 2020, S.O. 2020, c. 17, Weber v. Ontario Hydro, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929, McAuley v. Canada Post Corporation, 2021 ONSC 4528, Joseph v. Paramount Canada's Wonderland, 2008 ONCA 469, Strathan Corporation v. Khan, 2019 ONCA 418

Short Civil Decisions

Meffe v. Toronto (City), 2025 ONCA 716

Keywords: Real Property, Municipal Law, Land Use Planning, Public Law, Municipal Liability, Civil Procedure, Striking Pleadings, No Reasonable Cause of Action, Abuse of Process, Collateral Attack, Self-Represented Litigants, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 21, Salasel v. Cuthbertson, 2015 ONCA 115, Mitchell v. Lewis, 2016 ONCA 903

Scanga v. Balena, 2025 ONCA 727

Keywords: Contracts, Referral Fees, Regulated Professions, Lawyers, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Limitations Periods, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, ss. 15 and 4, Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. v. Shapiro, Cohen, Andrews, Finlayson (1998), 38 O.R. (3d) 257 (C.A.), Pickering Square Inc. v. Trillium College Inc., 2016 ONCA 179

Kakoutis v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2025 ONCA 715

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Judgments, Enforcement, Writs of Possession, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 43, ss. 17(a), 19(1)(c), 134(3)

S.S. v. S.R.A., 2025 ONCA 724

Keywords: Family Law, Support, Parenting, Civil Procedure, Orders, Enforcement, Appeals, Abuse of Process, Vexatious Litigants, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 134(3), Abu-Saud v. Abu-Saud, 2020 ONCA 824, Consentino v. Consentino, 2017 ONCA 593, Lamothe v. Ellis, 2022 789, Talwar v. Grand River Hospital, 2025 ONCA 35, J.J.W. v. K.F., 2024 ONCA 362

Gloger v. Evans, 2025 ONCA 730

Keywords: Wills and Estates, Contracts, Real Property, Civil Procedure, Settlements, Enforcement

124020 Ontario Limited v. Hike Metal Products Limited, 2025 ONCA 735

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Final or Interlocutory

CIVIL DECISIONS

Financial Services Regulatory Authority of Ontario v. First Swiss Mortgage Corp., 2025 ONCA 731

[Paccioco, Zarnett and Favreau JJ.A.]

Counsel:

D. Szirmak and A. Tacy, for the appellant Olympia Trust Company

B. Rabinovitch and E. Thompson, for the appellant WL

Reeva M. Finkel and Steven Kelly, for the respondents CS and CR

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Agency, Bare Trustees, Actual and Apparent Authority, Monachino v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.), 1196303 Inc. v. Glen Grove Suites Inc., 2015 ONCA 580, Trident Holdings Ltd. v. Danand Investments Ltd. (1988), 64 O.R. (2d) 65 (C.A.), Paragon Development Corporation v. Sonka Properties Inc., 2011 ONCA 30, Stikeman Elliott LLP v 2083878 Alberta Ltd., 2019 ABCA 274

facts:

In 2019, the respondents borrowed $107,990 from First Swiss Mortgage Corp., secured by a one-year second mortgage on their property. Five days after registering the mortgage, First Swiss assigned it to Olympia, which held it as a bare trustee for two investors, including WL.

The respondents were never notified of this assignment and continued making their monthly payments to First Swiss. Before the mortgage matured, the respondents refinanced their property and obtained a new loan to pay off both their first and second mortgages. During refinancing, the title insurer discovered that the mortgage had been assigned to Olympia but First Swiss assured everyone it was related to Olympia and would handle the payout. The respondents relied on First Swiss's payout statement and sent the discharge funds to First Swiss as instructed. There had been a 2014 mortgage from First Swiss to the respondents which had been assigned to Olympia wherein First Swiss provided the payout statement and also signed the discharge registered on title.

In 2020, despite receiving the funds, First Swiss failed to forward those funds to Olympia or register a discharge of the mortgage on title. Instead, it continued sending Olympia monthly payments that falsely represented the respondents were still paying on the now matured mortgage. In March 2023, First Swiss went bankrupt, and a court-appointed receiver began investigating its misappropriation of funds. Soon after, Olympia claimed the mortgage was in default, and the respondents learned their payout had never reached Olympia. The respondents brought a motion to have the mortgage discharged, which the judge granted, finding that First Swiss had acted as Olympia's agent for receiving the payout. Olympia and WL brought this appeal, arguing First Swiss lacked authority to do so.

issue:

Did the motion judge err in finding that First Swiss was acting as Olympia's agent for the purpose of receiving the mortgage payout and discharging the mortgage?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

No. The Court found no legal error in the motion judge's application of the law of agency. The following principles are relevant to the circumstances relating to the agency analysis:

The Court determined that the motion judge correctly articulated and applied the law of agency in finding that First Swiss's authority to act on Olympia's behalf flowed from the terms of two agreements between First Swiss and WL and from the course of conduct between the parties. The motion judge was correct in finding that First Swiss had both actual and apparent authority to act on Olympia's behalf for the purpose of receiving payment for the mortgage discharge.

Additionally, the Court found no error in the motion judge's reliance on the Mortgage Loan Servicing Agreement and the Trust and Beneficial Ownership Agreement between First Swiss and WL in support of his finding that First Swiss had actual authority to Act on Olympia's behalf.

Olympia was only a bare trustee for WL, meaning it had no independent power to manage or interfere with how the mortgage was handled. The agreements between WL and First Swiss expressly authorized First Swiss to act on WL's behalf in dealing with all documents and actions related to the mortgage. First Swiss had the resulting clear authority to issue the payout statement and receive discharge funds for the mortgage on behalf of Olympia and WL.

The Court also saw no error in the motion judge's reliance on the course of dealings between the parties as a representation that First Swiss had authority to act on Olympia's behalf, therefore having apparent authority to act as Olympia's agent. Significantly, the respondents were not notified that the mortgage had been transferred to Olympia, and they continued to make mortgage payments to First Swiss that was secured by the mortgage. Olympia did not notify the respondents that payouts should be made to them.

Finally, the Court rejected the appellants' argument of industry standards. It found that the industry standards argument was irrelevant once it was established that First Swiss was acting as Olympia's agent.

Aizic v. Natcan Trust Company, 2025 ONCA 719

[Zarnett, Sossin and Pomerance JJ.A.]

Counsel:

I.C. Matthews and A. Pel, for the appellant BMO Investments Inc.

B. Kirkham and E. Young, for the appellants Natcan Trust Company and National Bank Investments Inc.

P. Guy, S. Kalloghlian and G. Myers, for the respondents

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Class Proceedings, Certification, Orders, Interpretation, Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c 45, s. 106, Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6., ss. 5, 8, 12, 13, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 1.04, 6.01(1), Frayce v. BMO Investor Line Inc. et al, 2023 ONSC 16, Gilani v. BMO Investments Inc., 2021 ONSC 3589, Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 ONCA 688, Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation v. South Bruce Peninsula (Town), 2024 ONCA 884, Auer v. Auer, 2024 SCC 36, Koroluk v. KPMG Inc., 2022 SKCA 57, Warde v Slatter Holdings Ltd., 2016 BCCA 63, Kuang v. Young, 2023 ONSC 2429, Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43, Berardinelli v. Ontario Housing Corp, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 275, Garland v. Consumers' Gas Co. (2001), 57 O.R. (3d) 127 (C.A.), Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis Society of Essex v. Windsor (City), 2015 ONCA 572, Ciardullo v. 1832 Asset Management L.P., et al., 2023 ONSC 4466, R. v. Hutchinson, 2014 SCC 19

facts:

At issue were two 2018 class action certification orders (the "Gilani" and "Pozgaj" actions), which both contained a provision stating that no other proceeding relating to the subject matter of the certified class action may be commenced without leave. The motion judge interpreted this provision as requiring only those who were part of these certified class actions to seek leave to commence another action, meaning it did not bar the proposed class actions commenced by the respondents on behalf of a different class, none of whom were class members in the certified class actions. The appellants argued the provision should have been interpreted as requiring the respondents to seek leave because the subject matter of their new proposed class actions is related to the subject matter of the certified class actions and thus subject to the leave requirement in the certification orders.

The motion judge considered the proper interpretation of the certification orders in the 2018 actions and instructed herself that the orders were to be interpreted purposively, in their context, and in light of the statutory scheme of the Class Proceedings Act (CPA). She stated that, to proceed as a class action, a proceeding must be certified, and that there were not two or more certified class actions in the same jurisdiction representing the same class in relation to the same claim. In the motion judge's view, leave was not required for the 2022 actions because the plaintiffs and the classes they proposed to represent were not members of the classes in either of the 2018 actions, and she reasoned that some certification orders include a provision requiring leave to bring a proceeding relating to the subject matter of the action, but this term was not required. The reasons underlying the certification orders did not identify or discuss a need for non-class members to seek leave to commence an action arising out of the same factual matrix, and there was no reason in the statutory scheme, or the language, or context of the orders, to conclude that the leave provision was meant to extend to a non-class member.

issue:

Did the motion judge properly interpret and apply the leave provisions in the certification orders?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

No.

The principles of interpreting court orders

The motion judge stated that the parties agreed on the principles of interpretation for a court order and instructed herself to consider the text, context and purpose of the order, based on the express language of the order, the purpose of the terms of the order, the authority to make the order, the broader context within which the order was granted, and resolving apparent inconsistencies. The Court agreed that these were applicable principles and added that a reviewing court must apply accepted principles of statutory and contractual interpretation to ascertain the intent of the ordering judge. This meant using the text as the anchor of the interpretive exercise. However, it did not mean focusing on sometimes ambiguous text to the exclusion of context and purpose. Where a holistic consideration of text, context, and purpose nevertheless yields ambiguity, court orders, like statutes, should be interpreted in a manner that preserves a party's right to sue.

The principles applied

The issuing judges' reasons

The first question the Court considered in applying the interpretive principles was whether the judges issuing the orders provided an explanation for its inclusion. The Gilani certification order did not provide any explanation, and the Pozgaj action was certified on consent and without reasons. Therefore, the Court proceeded to consider the text, surrounding context and purpose of the orders to determine their intent.

The text

The appellants' argument was clear and straightforward – that the text of the leave requirement in the orders plainly encompassed the 2022 actions and that the absence of limiting language gave rise to a plain meaning that encompassed the 2022 actions relating to the subject matter of trailing commissions paid to discount brokers. The respondents rejected the characterization on the basis that the phrase "relating to the subject-matter of this action" was specific to the class in the 2018 actions, was ambiguous, and needed to be read in light of the context of the certification orders. They asserted it be informed by the principle that ambiguous terms should be interpreted narrowly to preserve a party's access to justice. The motion judge rejected the appellants' arguments and concluded that the statutory context made clear that the leave requirement at issue applied only to class members, and explained that a plain reading coupled with the "same subject matter" would be an absurd interpretation of the orders. The Court agreed with the motion judge.

The context

The appellants argued that the motion judge erred in her contextual analysis. The respondents argued that the motion judge appropriately grappled with the relevant contextual dynamics informing the leave requirement, especially the CPA, and that this statutory context lent support to the view that the phrase "relating to the subject matter of this action" was a way of capturing actions by the class. The appellants also pointed to the language of the leave requirement in the Gilani action and submitted that the exception would have been unnecessary, and the respondents conceded there was no easy answer. The motion judge did not address the exemption, explained that leave requirements were not mandated by the CPA nor included in the model certification order, and the Court agreed that a consideration of the purpose of the leave requirement within that context was necessary.

The purpose

The appellants provided two rationales to the purpose of the leave requirement. First, that it facilitated the orderly case management of complex class actions, and second, that it permitted "front-end" issues to be raised, and the example cited by appellants' counsel was that of limitation defences. The motion judge rejected this submission, observing that those defendants would have the opportunity to raise their concerns with the case management judge. The Court saw no error in this reasoning. The Court believed the motion judge's consideration of the orders' purpose was appropriately rooted in the statutory context and concluded that the purpose of a certification order was to define the class. The Court also accepted that the stay and leave provisions were intended to ensure that only one action on behalf of the class may proceed and found that there was no reason to conclude that the leave provision was meant to extend to a non-class member.

Richard v. Canada (Attorney General), 2025 ONCA 713

[Lauwers, Miller and George JJ.A.]

Counsel:

N. Hashemi, S. Stewart, R. Bhimji, N. Kaneira and J. Fix, for the appellant

J. Lisus, Z. Naqi, J. Foreman, C. Wanless, S. Bharati, J. Metrailler, A. Legate-Wolfe and A. Babiak, for the respondents

Keywords: Torts, Institutional Negligence, Crown Liability, Immigration and Refugee Law, Constitutional Law, Charter Claims, Right to Life, Liberty and Security of the Person, Right to Freedom from Arbitrary Detention, Right to Freedom from Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Equality Rights, Civil Procedure, Class Proceedings, Certification, Reasonable Cause of Action, Common Issues, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 6(1), 7, 9, 12, 15(1), 24(1), Class Proceedings Act, S.O. 1992, c. 6, ss. 5, 24(1), Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 3(3), Part 1, Division 6, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 21.01(1)(b), Leroux v. Ontario, 2023 ONCA 314, Stolove v. Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care, 2025 ONCA 376, Lilleyman v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 2024 ONCA 606, Atlantic Lottery Corp. Inc. v. Babstock, 2020 SCC 19, Davis v. Amazon Canada Fulfillment Services, 2025 ONCA 421, Brown v. Canada, 2020 FCA 130, R. v. Wust, 2000 SCC 18, R v. Jean, 2008 BCCA 465, Ogiamien v. Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2017 ONCA 667, R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9, Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711, Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, Owsianik v. Equifax Canada Co., 2022 ONCA 813, MacLean v. R., [1973] S.C.R. 2, Brazeau v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 ONCA 184, Rice v. New Brunswick, 2002 SCC 13, Vancouver (City) v. Ward, 2010 SCC 27, Francis v. Ontario, 2021 ONCA 197, Carcillo v. Ontario Major Junior Hockey League, 2025 ONCA 652, Palmer v. Teva Canada Ltd., 2024 ONCA 220, Hollick v. Toronto (City), 2001 SCC 68, Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Dutton, 2001 SCC 46, Hodge v. Neinstein, 2017 ONCA 494, Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. v. Microsoft Corporation, 2013 SCC 57, Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Dutton, 2001 SCC 46, Good v. Toronto (Police Services Board), 2016 ONCA 250, Rumley v. British Columbia, 2001 SCC 69, Cloud v. Canada (Attorney General), 73 O.R. (3d) 401 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused, Cirillo v. Ontario, 2021 ONCA 353, Johnson v. Ontario, 2016 ONSC 5314

facts:

Between May 15, 2016, and July 18, 2023, the Canada Border Services Agency ("CBSA"), under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act ("IRPA"), placed immigration detainees in provincial prisons rather than Immigration Holding Centers ("IHCs"). The CBSA entered into agreements with provinces and territories to house these detainees at a daily rate. A total of 8,360 immigration detainees were held in 87 provincial and territorial prisons across the country.

The respondents brought a motion to certify a class action under s. 5 of the Class Proceedings Act ("CPA"). The respondents do not challenge the lawfulness of the IRPA detention regime. They challenge the CBSA's use of provincial prisons to effect detention under the IRPA, arguing that it violated the Charter and negligently harmed detainees.

The motion judge certified the proposed class action. He held that the Charter and negligence claims were based on adequately pleaded facts and that it was not "plain and obvious" that the claims would fail under s. 5(1)(a) of the CPA as disclosing no cause of action. He found further that there was an identifiable class as required by s. 5(1)(b) of the CPA and that there was 'some basis in fact' for the proposed common issues ("PCIs").

Canada appealed the motion judge's certification order.

issues:

1. Did the motion judge err by finding that it is not plain and obvious that the causes of action alleging breaches of ss. 7, 9, 12 and 15 of the Charter would fail?
2. Did the motion judge err by finding that it is not plain and obvious that the cause of action in negligence would fail?
3. Did the motion judge err in finding that the claims of the class members raise common issues?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1.No. The motion judge had applied the correct legal test under s. 5(1)(a) of the CPA, which mirrored the r. 21.01(1)(b) "plain and obvious" standard, and his determination that the pleaded Charter causes of action were not bound to fail was entitled to deference. The pleadings advanced material facts capable of sustaining claims under ss. 7, 9, 12 and 15. However, the appellant's reliance on Brown v. Canada was misplaced: which upheld the constitutionality of the IRPA detention scheme itself. It did not address the separate issues raised regarding the location and conditions of detention, which were driven by CBSA policies and provincial arrangements rather than by the statute.

As to s. 7, the motion judge had correctly recognized the administrative purpose of immigration detention yet accepted, for the certification threshold, that the pleaded punitive conditions in provincial prisons could be found overbroad or grossly disproportionate to that purpose. Whether the detention was, in fact, administrative or punitive was a merits question requiring an evidentiary record, and neither Ogiamien nor criminal pre-trial detention jurisprudence foreclosed the pleaded theory. Accordingly, there was no basis to disturb the motion judge's certification of the respondents' s. 7 claim.

On s. 9, the analysis cohered with R v. Grant: detention was arbitrary when not authorized by law. The IRPA's silence on prison placement, coupled with its mandate to conform to the Charter and international law, provided a tenable basis for arguing that the placement was arbitrary.

Regarding s. 12, the motion judge had correctly acknowledged the stringent standard but concluded it was not "plain and obvious" that the claim would fail. Authorities cited by the appellant primarily concerned detention length or discrete lockdown circumstances and did not preclude the pleaded conditions-based claim.

On s. 15, the motion judge reasonably found a viable claim on citizenship grounds. The pleadings supported an argument that exposing non-citizens to incarceration in penal institutions for administrative immigration purposes reinforced and perpetuated pre-existing disadvantage. Charkaoui confirmed that while differential deportation treatment was permissible, equality challenges might lie where detention became detached from deportation's administrative objective. The recognition of citizenship as an analogous ground and the particular vulnerabilities pleaded further sustained justiciability at that stage. There was no basis to disturb the motion judge's certification of the respondents' s. 15 claim.

2.No. The motion judge applied the correct "plain and obvious" standard and was entitled to conclude that the pleaded negligence claim was capable of success. On the facts, the appellant may have owed a duty of care in the administration of immigration detention, and it was alleged that it had breached that duty by placing immigration detainees in provincial prisons and thereby causing reasonably foreseeable harm. Whether a duty existed and whether it was violated were fact‑intensive determinations reserved for the merits, not certification.

The appellant's reliance on Brazeauv. Canada (Attorney General) was misplaced. Brazeau turned on the way the claim was pleaded, principally as policy-level negligence immunized from tort liability. By contrast, the present claim was pleaded like Francis v. Ontario. It challenged a single, class-wide operational practice, the placement of immigration detainees in provincial prisons, said to cause the same type of harm across the class. As in Francis, that framing supported a tenable class-wide duty and standard of care at that stage.

Properly characterized, the impugned conduct concerned operational administration of detention, not core policy choices. The motion judge's conclusion that the allegations were "pregnant with" operational negligence accorded with the governing principles and did not disclose reviewable error. In these circumstances, it could not be said that the negligence claim was bound to fail.

3.No. Applying the "some basis in fact" test under s. 5(1)(c) of the CPA, the motion judge reasonably concluded that the proposed common issues were capable of resolution in common and would materially advance the litigation. He correctly recognized that, even where individualized issues remained, questions that were a substantial ingredient of each class member's claim might be certified if their resolution avoided duplicative fact-finding or legal analysis and was capable of extrapolation across the class. His commonality determinations were questions of mixed fact and law and attracted deference absent palpable and overriding error, which had not been shown.

The appellant's contention that the PCIs inevitably fractured into individual inquiries was properly rejected. The motion judge found there was "some basis in fact" that CBSA decisions were guided by common instruments and practices (including the NRAD and capacity constraints) and that detainees experienced a "core" set of prison conditions distinct from IHCs. Those findings supported the proposition that liability issues under the Charter and negligence, as well as aggregate damages, could be determined in common, even if some individualized inquiries might follow.

Consistent with governing authorities, the certified issues were suitable for common resolution and would promote judicial economy and access to justice. There was no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's analysis, and no basis to interfere with his finding that the class members' claims raised common issues.

Canadian Tire Corporation, Limited v. Eaton Equipment Ltd., 2025 ONCA 720

[Rouleau, Favreau and Pomerance JJ.A.]

Counsel:

S.M., C.M., T.R., S.R. and L.T., acting in person

S.M., acting in person for Eaton Equipment Ltd., Citrus Grove MortgageCo. Ltd., Intellectual Inventive Inc., Appslack Ltd., Appakiss Ltd. and Appnatty Ltd.

C. Pendrith and J. Kuredjian, for the respondents

Keywords: Torts, Fraud, Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Conversion, Unjust Enrichment, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgement, Bruno Appliance and Furniture Inc. v. Hryniak, 2014 SCC 8, HSBC v. Guido, 2025 ONCA 684

facts:

The appeal was from an order for summary judgment against the appellants holding them liable to the respondent for civil fraud. The action arose out of a scheme whereby S.M's company, Eaton Equipment Ltd. ("Eaton"), claimed to have repaired products purchased from the respondent, Canadian Tire Corporation, Limited ("CTC") as part of a warranty program. CTC paid for the repairs. However, most of the invoices and receipts Eaton submitted were falsified. The customers were not real customers, the products were not real products, and the repairs were not performed.

In 2008, CTC contracted with Servantage Dixie Sales Canada Inc. ("Dixie") to administer its warranty repair program. In 2009, Dixie appointed Eaton to repair defective products brought to it by CTC customers. S.M. was the sole shareholder, director and officer of Eaton. The program contemplated that customers would not pay for repairs. Rather, they would provide proof of purchase to Eaton and Eaton would invoice Dixie for the cost of the repair work. Dixie would, in turn, invoice CTC who would pay Dixie, with the intention that payment be remitted to Eaton.

The scheme was sophisticated. Among other things, Eaton hired a graphic designer to electronically falsify receipts, using customer information – names and other details – that had been scraped from the internet.

In 2018, Dixie and CTC became concerned about irregularities in Eaton's invoices. Once the investigation began, the scheme unraveled, and the fraud was quickly exposed. CTC moved for summary judgment. Various appellants brought their own motions for summary judgment based on their counterclaims against CTC, a crossclaim against Dixie, and third-party claims against persons associated with Dixie.

The motion judge granted summary judgment in favour of CTC, finding that the evidence amply established the requisite elements of civil fraud. On that basis, it was held that there was no genuine issue for trial. In particular, the motion judge found that the appellants, through Eaton: (1) falsely represented that they were performing repair work; (2) had full knowledge of the fraud they were committing; (3) caused CTC to pay them through Dixie based on the false invoices; and (4) these actions caused CTC's loss of $3.2 million.

The motion judge found that the evidence of fraud was clear and uncontroverted, and that the other appellants, relatives and associates of S.M., were complicit in the scheme, helping to run Eaton and the other corporate entities through which funds were funneled. The appellants were found jointly and severally liable for damages and costs on a partial indemnity basis. The motion judge also ordered punitive damages personally against S.M.

The appellants challenged the summary judgment order based on whether the correct test for civil fraud was used and whether the third element was satisfied.

issues:

1. Did the motion judge apply the correct test for civil fraud?
2. Did the motion judge err in finding that the third element of the test for civil fraud was satisfied?

holding:

Appeal allowed in part.

reasoning:

1. Yes. The Court found that the motion judge applied the correct test for civil fraud, which requires that the following be established: (1) a false representation made by the defendant; (2) some level of knowledge of the falsehood of the representation on the part of the defendant (whether through knowledge or recklessness); (3) that the false representation caused the plaintiff to act; and (4) that the plaintiff's actions resulted in a loss.
2. No. The motion judge did not err in finding that the third element of the test for civil fraud was satisfied. The appellants argued that the positioning of Dixie as an intermediary between CTC and Eaton prevented a finding of civil fraud. They argued that CTC was not acting on the representations of Eaton, but rather, on the representations of Dixie. Therefore, Eaton could not be held liable to CTC. The Court did not agree, finding that it was clear from the evidence that Dixie was merely a conduit through which representations and payments flowed between CTC and Eaton. The Court similarly saw no merit in the other arguments advanced by the appellants except one. The motion judge concluded that C.M. was "deeply imbedded in various aspects of the Fraudulent Scheme" and that she was a knowing and willing participant. However, the Court found that the reasons of the motion judge did not adequately explain the basis for the conclusion. The Court found that the motion judge inferred from these financial dealings that C.M. was aware "of her own culpability", but the reasons did not substantiate the logic behind this inference. The Court outlined that it did not follow that C.M. knew the funds to be proceeds of fraud. The Court stated that the receipt and managing of funds from a parent did not, standing alone, imply knowledge of that parent's fraudulent acts. The Court accordingly set aside summary judgment against C.M. The Court dismissed the appeal as it related to the individuals and the corporate appellants and allowed the appeal as it related to C.M.

Amiri v. Nazer, 2025 ONCA 726

[Gillese, Favreau, Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

A. Amiri, acting in person

A. Muia, for the respondent

Keywords: Family Law, Property, Marriage Contracts, Dowry, Support, Imputing Income, Remedies, Resulting Trust, Constructive Trust, Equalization of Net Family Property, Civil Procedure, Evidence, Credibility, Procedural and Natural Justice, Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, Costs, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3., ss. 4 and 5, Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99

facts:

The appellant and respondent had a religious marriage ceremony (Nikah) in 2017 and a civil marriage ceremony in 2019. Their only child was born in 2018. The parties separated in 2020 when the appellant was charged with assaulting the respondent and left the matrimonial home. The parties' family litigation resulted in several appearances and interim orders, mostly related to parenting. The litigation came to an end in 2023.

The trial judge found that the appellant was not credible, deciding all the issues in favour of the respondent, except her request to relocate with their child. The appellant did not appeal the trial judge's orders related to decision-making, parenting time, or the child's primary residence. His appeal related only to the issues involving money and property turning largely on the trial judge's finding that the appellant was not credible.

issues:

1. Did the trial judge make palpable and overriding errors in her interpretation of key evidence related to the matrimonial home and deny the appellant natural justice?
2. Did the trial judge make palpable and overriding errors of fact and misapprehend evidence by imputing the appellant's annual income for the years 2020 to 2023?
3. Did the trial judge commit an error of mixed fact and law in awarding the respondent the $20,000 Mehr (Marriage Dowry) payment?
4. Did the trial judge create a reasonable apprehension of bias?
5. Was the trial judge's costs award unreasonable?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1.No. The Court found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's determinations. The trial judge concluded that "because of the numerous deficiencies in the appellant's evidence and his financial statements," combined with her concerns about his credibility, she was unable to determine his debts and assets. Having rejected the appellant's evidence regarding his financial contributions to the matrimonial home, and in the absence of any evidence of unjust enrichment on the part of the respondent, the appellant's claims for a resulting or constructive trust and for equalization were dismissed. The trial judge did not deny the appellant natural justice in considering inconsistent financial disclosure. The appellant himself submitted the inconsistent financial statements and was cross-examined on them.

2.No. The Court rejected the appellant's submission that the trial judge erred in imputing his annual income. The trial judge was rightly concerned about the difficulty in determining the appellant's income, since he had not been forthright in his financial statements, or in his evidence about his financial situation. The only evidence came from his May 2023 financial statement. The Court found no error in the trial judge's reliance on that amount.

3.No. The appellant was obligated to pay the Mehr as a debt owed under an enforceable marriage contract. The appellant opposed the payment of the Mehr because he claimed that the respondent relied on a forged marriage certificate. There was no evidence that the certificate was forged. The appellant had not pursued a motion to compel the respondent to produce an original. Given that the trial judge did not order an equalization payment, and the appellant admitted he had not paid the Mehr, he was ordered to pay it.

4.No. The fact that the appellant was not successful and was found not to be credible did not demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias. Moreover, the appellant's allegation that the trial judge helped the respondent was baseless. A fair reading of the record revealed that the trial judge treated both sides fairly.

5.No. The Court concluded they would not interfere with a costs order unless the trial judge had committed an error in principle, or the costs award was plainly wrong. The appellant had not demonstrated either. Even if the Court were to consider the appellant's fresh evidence, it found no basis to interfere with the costs award.

Brady v. Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care, 2025 ONCA 722

[Huscroft, Copeland and Rahman JJ.A]

Counsel:

A.M. Chapman and E.H. Wargel, for the appellant

D.S. Alli and V.A.F. McCorkindale, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Employment and Labour, Wrongful Dismissal, Civil Procedure, Striking Pleadings, Jurisdiction, Limitation Periods, Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sched. A, s. 48(1), Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B. s. 4, Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.9, s. 7.1(6), Reopening Ontario (A Flexible Response to COVID-19) Act, 2020, S.O. 2020, c. 17, Weber v. Ontario Hydro, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929, McAuley v. Canada Post Corporation, 2021 ONSC 4528, Joseph v. Paramount Canada's Wonderland, 2008 ONCA 469, Strathan Corporation v. Khan, 2019 ONCA 418

facts:

The motion judge dismissed a wrongful dismissal claim for two independent reasons. First, she found that, in its essential character, the appellant's claim arose from the interpretation, application, administration, or alleged violation of the collective agreement. As a result, pursuant to Weber v. Ontario Hydro and s. 48(1) of the Labour Relations Act, the Superior Court did not have jurisdiction over the claim. Second, she found that the claim was statute-barred because it was commenced after the two-year limitation period had expired. The appellant argued that the motion judge erred in both conclusions.

issues:

Did the judge err in finding the wrongful dismissal claim was statute barred?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

No. Because the limitation issue was dispositive, the Court heard oral submissions on that issue first, and dismissed the appeal finding that the claim was commenced after the expiration of the limitation period. As a result, it was not necessary for the Court to hear submissions on the jurisdictional issue. The appellant argued that her claim was discoverable on April 30, 2020, and commenced her claim by Notice of Action on October 27, 2022. The temporary suspension of limitation periods in response to the COVID-19 pandemic ended on September 14, 2020, and the total length of the suspension of limitation periods under the regulation was 183 days. The appellant argued that the limitation period should be calculated by starting on the date her claim was discoverable and adding the full length of the suspension of limitation periods, plus the two-year limitation period. Using this approach, the appellant believed she had until October 30, 2022, to commence her claim.

The Court held that on September 14, 2020, the limitation period started running on the appellant's claim. Because the two-year period started running on September 14, 2020, it expired on September 14, 2022. The appellant commenced her claim on October 27, 2022, which was outside the two-year limitation period. The Court also found that the appellant's reliance on McAuley was misplaced, because in McAuley the claim was discoverable prior to the COVID-19 suspension of limitation periods, the suspension of limitation periods stopped the running of limitation periods for 183 days, and then the limitation clock restarted running on September 14, 2020. Where the claim was not discoverable before the commencement of the suspension of limitation periods, the limitation clock did not start running until the suspension ended on September 14, 2020, and there was no need to notionally add 183 days.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Meffe v. Toronto (City), 2025 ONCA 716

[Huscroft, Copeland and Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

C. Lun, for the appellant

G. Tanner, for the respondent

Keywords: Real Property, Municipal Law, Land Use Planning, Public Law, Municipal Liability, Civil Procedure, Striking Pleadings, No Reasonable Cause of Action, Abuse of Process, Collateral Attack, Self-Represented Litigants, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 21, Salasel v. Cuthbertson, 2015 ONCA 115, Mitchell v. Lewis, 2016 ONCA 903

Scanga v. Balena, 2025 ONCA 727

[Miller, Paciocco and Favreau JJ.A.]

Counsel:

G. Gryguc, E. Zeppieri and W. Noorani, for the appellants

R. Moodie and B. Martin, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Referral Fees, Regulated Professions, Lawyers, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Limitations Periods, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, ss. 15 and 4, Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. v. Shapiro, Cohen, Andrews, Finlayson(1998), 38 O.R. (3d) 257 (C.A.), Pickering Square Inc. v. Trillium College Inc., 2016 ONCA 179

Kakoutis v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2025 ONCA 715

[Paciocco, Zarnett and Favreau JJ.A.]

Counsel:

K. Hou, for the moving party

L.K., acting in person

Keywords:Civil Procedure, Judgments, Enforcement, Writs of Possession, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 43, ss. 17(a), 19(1)(c), 134(3)

S.S. v. S.R.A., 2025 ONCA 724

[Tulloch C.J.O., Roberts and George JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. J. Stangarone and J. McArthur, for the moving party

A. Mehdi, for the responding party

Keywords: Family Law, Support, Parenting, Civil Procedure, Orders, Enforcement, Appeals, Abuse of Process, Vexatious Litigants, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 134(3), Abu-Saud v. Abu-Saud, 2020 ONCA 824, Consentino v. Consentino, 2017 ONCA 593, Lamothe v. Ellis, 2022 789, Talwar v. Grand River Hospital, 2025 ONCA 35, J.J.W. v. K.F., 2024 ONCA 362

Gloger v. Evans, 2025 ONCA 730

[Huscroft, Coroza and Monahan JJ.A.]

Counsel:

C. Lun, for the appellant

C. Salazar, for the respondent

Keywords: Wills and Estates, Contracts, Real Property, Civil Procedure, Settlements, Enforcement

124020 Ontario Limited v. Hike Metal Products Limited, 2025 ONCA 735

[Huscroft, Coroza and Monahan JJ.A.]

Counsel:

R. Colautti and A. Elkeeb, for the moving party

J. H. Cooke, for the responding parties

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Final or Interlocutory.