In DMZ v. DNA,1 the Singapore High Court considered the authority of arbitral institutions to revise procedural determinations, particularly in the context of arbitration administration under the Singapore International Arbitration Centre ("SIAC") Rules. The case arose from a dispute over the commencement date of an arbitration, with the claimant challenging the SIAC Registrar's decision to retroactively amend the date after an initial determination.
For Canadian arbitration practitioners, the decision offers insight into judicial deference to institutional decision-making and the interplay between efficiency and finality. Below, we consider DMZ's takeaways.
Background
A dispute arose regarding four contracts between DMZ (the claimant) and DNA (the defendant) for the sale of oil products (the "Sale Contracts"). Each contract contained an arbitration clause governed by Singapore law, requiring disputes to be referred to arbitration under the SIAC Rules (2016 edition), with a three-member tribunal.2 A subsequent Extension Agreement modified payment deadlines for one contract but did not specify the number of arbitrators.
On June 24, 2024, DNA initiated arbitration, relying on both the Sale Contracts and the Extension Agreement, and requested consolidation.3 On July 9, 2024, SIAC issued a letter stating that the arbitrations were commenced on July 3, 2024, citing Rule 3.3 of the SIAC Rules.4 However, DMZ objected, arguing that the claims were time-barred under Singapore's six-year limitation period.5
On July 23, 2024, DNA requested that SIAC revise the commencement date to June 24, 2024, arguing that the original Notice of Arbitration had substantially complied with the SIAC Rules.6 DMZ opposed the request, and the parties made further submissions to the SIAC Registrar.7
On July 30, 2024, SIAC revised the commencement date to June 24, 2024, citing the parties' submissions and Rule 3 of the SIAC Rules.8 DMZ did not immediately challenge this decision, but later initiated court proceedings seeking:
- A declaration that the commencement date was July 3, 2024;
- A declaration that SIAC's July 30th Decision was ultra vires the SIAC Rules;
- A declaration that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable; and
- An order setting aside the July 30th9
However, because DNA was by this point undergoing insolvency proceedings in Hong Kong, DMZ was required to obtain court permission to proceed with its challenge. DMZ therefore applied for permission from the High Court to commence and proceed with its challenge.10
The High Court's Decision
In dismissing the application, the High Court considered two issues:
- Did the High Court have jurisdiction to review the SIAC Registrar's decision?
- Did the SIAC Registrar have the power to revise the commencement date of arbitration after issuing an initial determination?
No Jurisdiction by the Court to Review the Registrar's Decision
DMZ argued that SIAC, as the administering institution, was contractually bound to follow the SIAC Rules when determining the arbitration's commencement date but failed to comply with Rule 3.3, which sets commencement upon receipt of a complete Notice of Arbitration. DMZ also pointed to Rule 40.1 (now rule 63 of the 2025 edition of the SIAC Rules), which makes decisions by the SIAC President, Court, and Registrar conclusive and binding. Based on these rules, DMZ argued that Rule 40.1 made the July 9th Decision final, meaning the Registrar had no authority to alter the commencement date. Alternatively, DMZ argued that the July 30th Decision was arbitrary, capricious, and ultra vires the SIAC Rules.11
The Court accepted that SIAC was contractually bound by its own rules, but found DMZ's argument self-defeating—since the parties had agreed to the SIAC Rules, they were also bound by Rule 40.2, which expressly waived any right of appeal or review of the Registrar's decisions. DMZ's initial application to the High Court, which sought judicial review of the Registrar's decision of July 30, 2024, was therefore in breach of Rule 40.2.12
DMZ also sought to invoke the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (the "SCJA"), arguing that courts have broad discretion to grant declaratory relief in Singapore-seated arbitrations. However, the Court rejected this position, emphasizing that the policy of minimal curial intervention prohibits judicial interference except where expressly allowed under the International Arbitration Act (the "IAA"), which was not applicable in this case.13
Further, the Court noted that while the Registrar's decision was subject to SIAC's internal processes, it was not subject to review by the court, making DMZ's court application a "back-door" attempt to bypass SIAC's finality provisions.14
Notwithstanding its rejection of DMZ's application, the Court noted that challenges to procedural irregularities—such as an alleged breach of the SIAC Rules—could be raised at the setting-aside stage of an arbitral award under Article 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Model Law, rather than through premature court intervention.15 However, such challenges could only be made after an award is issued, meaning DMZ would have to complete the arbitration proceedings before seeking recourse.16
Accordingly, the Court found that, by acting in breach of the SIAC Rules, DMZ's application constituted an abuse of process.17
The Registrar has the Power to Revise the Commencement Date
The Court affirmed that the Registrar may revisit procedural decisions when appropriate. DMZ's argument that Rule 40.1 rendered the July 9th Decision "conclusive and binding" was rejected, as the rule only applied to the parties and the tribunal, not the Registrar itself. The Court also observed that while Rule 40.2 bars external appeals, it does not prevent the Registrar from reconsidering its own decisions.18
Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the Registrar's decision was administrative, akin to other case management determinations, such as time extensions and tribunal appointments. The Court affirmed the Registrar's discretion to correct procedural rulings where new facts emerged, and saw no reason to treat SIAC differently from other arbitral institutions, including the LCIA, where similar determinations are treated as administrative.19
Moreover, the Court found DMZ's reliance on the principle of finality misplaced, noting that while final awards are protected, procedural rulings can be revised. The Court observed that even arbitral tribunals may revise procedural orders, reinforcing that institutional administrators should have similar latitude. Additionally, Rule 41.2 of the SIAC Rules mandates fairness and efficiency.20 In that regard, allowing the Registrar to reconsider a decision promotes these objectives. Conversely, if the Registrar refuses to reconsider in such circumstances, there is a risk that a subsequent arbitral award could be challenged for breach of natural justice.21
The Court also dismissed DMZ's concern that allowing the Registrar to reconsider decisions would lead to inefficiency. It found this overstated, noting that once the Registrar reached a reasoned decision, subsequent requests could be summarily rejected. Conversely, requiring parties to challenge SIAC's decisions in court would be far more disruptive.22
Moreover, the Court noted that while the IAA explicitly limits the ability to amend or review arbitral awards, no equivalent provision exists in the SIAC Rules regarding the Registrar's decisions, implying that such decisions may be subject to reconsideration.23 Further, the Court rejected DMZ's argument that SIAC could only reconsider decisions on its own initiative, calling this artificial—what mattered was whether the review was necessary, not who initiated it.24
Ultimately, the Court held that DMZ's challenge was an impermissible appeal disguised as judicial review. Despite alleging that the Registrar had acted arbitrarily, DMZ failed to show that relevant factors were ignored or irrelevant ones relied upon. Given that Rule 40.2 expressly barred appeals, the Court refused to entertain DMZ's arguments on the merits of the July 30th Decision.25
Commentary
DMZ presents an interesting case study for Canadian arbitration practitioners since the use of institutional rules in Canada is not uncommon. As a result, the points raised by DMZ regarding institutional autonomy warrant further consideration.
Most obviously, a central takeaway is the primacy of arbitration rules as a contractual framework. The Court emphasized that DMZ, having agreed to the SIAC Rules, was bound by them—including Rule 40.2, which explicitly barred appeals or judicial review of SIAC's procedural decisions. In addition, and although not explicitly considered by the Court, it stands to reason that a breach of contract claim against SIAC (given that SIAC was the contractual counterparty to DMZ and DNA) would be equally fruitless, given that SIAC's Rules contain immunity provisions at Rule 65.126 for the benefit of the institution (much like almost all other institutional rules). Accordingly, dissatisfied parties are unlikely to achieve any success through that route either.
In this regard, there can be an asymmetry between the powers of arbitral institutions to revisit their own procedural decisions and the inability of parties to seek external review. The SIAC Registrar had discretion to amend the commencement date, but DMZ was barred from seeking judicial recourse even where it alleged procedural error. Thus, while the institution retains the ability to self-correct, the parties are denied a mechanism to challenge a decision until after an award is rendered.
The foregoing logic would also seem to apply with equal force in Canada; absent non-waivable statutory provisions to the contrary, parties that elect for institutional arbitration will need to be mindful of the extent to which institutional rules limit opportunities for external challenge of administrative decisions.
Unsurprisingly, both the ADRIC and VanIAC rules contain immunity provisions, although the latter's domestic rules appear to be silent with respect to immunity for the institution.27 Of note, however, is that both institutions' rules provide that immunity applies with respect to arbitrations "under the [institution's] rules", such that it might be argued that non-compliance with the rules in question would not be captured by the exclusion of liability insofar as non-compliance is not "under" the rules.
Similarly, it bears noting that neither ADRIC nor VanIAC's rules appear to contain as robust a prohibition as SIAC (or, for example, the LCIA) against appealing or seeking judicial review of administrative/procedural decisions made by the institution. As a result, dissatisfied parties to an ADRIC or VanIAC arbitration might plausibly attempt the same maneuver as DMZ, but without facing the barrier erected by the SIAC Rules.
Accordingly, a more robust prohibition may be desirable for Canadian institutions regarding judicial recourse against institutional determinations, and enhanced exclusion of liability frameworks may also be worth further consideration.
Footnotes
2 DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 at para 4.
3 DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 at paras 6 – 8.
4 DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 at para 9.
5 DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 at para 10.
6 DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 at para 11.
7 DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 at para 12.
8 DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 at para 13.
9 DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 at para 15.
10 DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 at para 3.
11 DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 at para 22.
12 DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 at para 23
13 DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 at paras 24-26.
14 DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 at paras 27 and 28.
15 DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 at paras 33-35.
16 DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 at paras 35.
17 DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 at para 36.
18 DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 at paras 37-41.
19 DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 at paras 43-45.
20 DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 at paras 46-49.
21 DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 at para 49.
22 DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 at paras 50 and 51.
23 DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 at para 52.
24 DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 at para 53.
25 DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 at para 55.
26 Interestingly, the current version of the SIAC Rules contains a much more robust exclusion of liability for SIAC's benefit than prior versions of the Rules. The 2016 version – which governed DMZ – only contained an exclusion of liability in SIAC's favour "in connection with any arbitration administered by SIAC in accordance with these Rules", such that it might plausibly have been argued that non-compliance with that version of the Rules would not have been captured by the exclusion of liability.
27 In addition, VanIAC's exclusion of liability provision for international arbitrations appears to name a number of different individuals – including the tribunal, tribunal secretaries, VanIAC board members, and VanIAC staff – but not the institution itself (i.e. its corporate person).
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.
