Individual Employee Liability Under M.G.L. c. 151B

The Full Commission of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD") recently outlined the circumstances under which an individual employee may be held liable for discrimination under M.G.L. c. 151B, Massachusetts’ anti-discrimination statute. This decision, Woodason v. Town of Norton School Committee, et.al. ("Woodason"), brings some clarity to the issue of individual liability amidst an otherwise murky body of case law on this topic. Moreover, it serves as a tool during anti-discrimination and harassment training of supervisors and employees to incent them to act prudently and in compliance with c. 151B.

The Woodason case involved a disability discrimination suit brought by Ms. Woodason, a cafeteria assistant at the Nourse Elementary School in Norton County. After suffering a back injury and undergoing surgery, Ms. Woodason missed several months of work; eventually, she was cleared by her doctor to return to work with the permanent restriction that she not lift more than 25 pounds. The School Committee decided that Ms. Woodason could not return to work with this restriction because most of her daily tasks involved lifting objects that weighed more than 25 pounds. Ms. Woodason subsequently filed a charge of disability discrimination with the MCAD, naming two individual Committee members in addition to the School Committee.

After a public hearing, the MCAD Hearing Officer found that the School Committee had discriminated against Ms. Woodason for having failed to reasonably accommodate her disability, but that the two individuals should not be liable for their actions. The Hearing Officer reasoned that the individuals had merely acted within the scope of their employment in determining that Ms. Woodason could not perform the essential functions of her job, and had not engaged in actions distinct from their employer’s discriminatory conduct. Ms. Woodason appealed the finding of no individual liability for one of the School Committee members, and the School Committee appealed the finding of liability for the employer.

On appeal, the MCAD’s Full Commission agreed with the findings of the Hearing Officer, but disagreed with the rationale for individual liability under M.G.L. c. 151B. In explaining its decision, the Full Commission set forth the following three circumstances under which an individual may be liable for discrimination:

1. The named individual was an alleged perpetrator of the unlawful harassment, and therefore was "interfering with [the employee’s] exercise or enjoyment of the right to a non-discriminatory, harassment free, workplace"; or

2. The employee presented direct evidence of discrimination and the perpetrator was in a supervisory position with direct control over the employee’s employment; or

3. The employee only presented circumstantial evidence of discrimination, but proved that (a) the individual defendant had authority or a duty to act on behalf of the employer, (b) the individual’s action or failure to act implicated rights under c. 151B, and (c) the individual’s action or failure to act was in deliberate disregard of the employee’s rights. In order to satisfy this third theory of liability, the plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to infer an intent to discriminate or interfere with the employee’s exercise of rights under c. 151B.

In the Woodason case, the Full Commission found that the employee only presented circumstantial evidence of discrimination, which fell under the third – and most onerous – theory of liability. The Commission further determined that the evidence failed to show that the individual Committee member possessed the requisite intent to discriminate. Accordingly, the Commission upheld the Hearing Officer’s findings.

While the Woodason decision sets the parameters of individual liability under Massachusetts’ anti-discrimination law (such liability generally does not exist under Title VII), it nonetheless leaves ample room for interpretation and application. Therefore, the success of the MCAD’s effort to create uniformity remains to be seen. Nonetheless, this decision will be highly useful when training both supervisors and rank-and-file employees on discrimination and harassment matters, to enlighten them that their unlawful conduct may create legal exposure not only for their employer, but also for themselves.