Supreme Court Unanimously Rejects Heightened Pleading Requirements For "Majority Group" Discrimination Claims

On June 5, 2025, the United States Supreme Court ruled unanimously in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, No. 23-1039 (U.S. June 5, 2025), that courts cannot require plaintiffs who are members of a majority group to provide additional evidence not required for minority-group plaintiffs as part of their prima facie showing of discrimination at the summary judgment stage.² The Court declared that Title VII's use of "any individual" does not allow for courts to "impose special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone."³

Factual Background and Procedural History

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees based on protected characteristics, including race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. In cases that do not involve "direct" evidence of discrimination, plaintiffs typically rely on the "burden-shifting" framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), to rely on circumstantial evidence in support of their allegations. Under this approach, the employee bears the initial burden to provide prima facie evidence of discrimination. If the employee successfully meets this burden, then the employer must articulate some legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the employment action taken. The employee can then attempt to overcome the employer's justification by showing that the reason provided is a pretext for discrimination. A plaintiff can make a prima facie case of unequal treatment using this framework by showing they applied for an available position for which they were qualified but were rejected under circumstances that suggest unlawful discrimination.⁴

Marlean Ames previously worked as an executive secretary in the Ohio Department of Youth Services, which operates Ohio's juvenile correctional system.⁵ Ames was later promoted to the role of program administrator, and in 2019 she applied for a newly created position in the Department's Office of Quality and Improvement.⁶ Ames, who is heterosexual, was interviewed, but ultimately did not receive the position, and a different candidate, a lesbian woman, was hired for the role.⁷ After interviewing for the position with the Office of Quality and Improvement, Ames was removed from her program administrator position. Ames was demoted to her previous executive secretary role.⁸ A gay man was then hired to take on the program administrator position.⁹

Ames filed a lawsuit against the Department of Youth Services, alleging discrimination under Title VII. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment to the Ohio Department of Youth Services against Ames.¹⁰ The Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling, holding that, as a plaintiff who was a member of a majority group, Ames was required to provide evidence to establish "background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority."¹¹ The Sixth Circuit explained that plaintiffs in Ames' situation could satisfy the additional showing by presenting information such as the decisionmaker is a member of the relevant minority group or by providing statistical evidence showing a pattern of discrimination against members of the majority group.¹² Ames presented evidence that a lesbian woman was granted the promotion she was seeking and a gay man was hired to fill her former role following the demotion, but failed to provide additional information to fulfill the background circumstances requirement.¹³

Court's Analysis and Ruling

In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Brown Jackson, the Supreme Court focused on the plain text of Title VII to reject the background circumstances requirement, emphasizing that the language of the statute prohibits the failure or refusal to hire or discriminate against "any individual."¹⁴ The Court noted that these protections were enacted "without regard to that individual's membership in a minority or majority group," and concluded that courts "impos[ing] special requirements on majority plaintiffs alone" run afoul of Congress' intent when drafting the statute.¹⁵

Ohio argued that the background circumstances showing was "just another way of asking whether the circumstances surrounding an employment decision, if otherwise unexplained, suggest that the decision was because of a protected characteristic."¹⁶ The Court disagreed with this characterization, noting that it was at odds with the Circuit Court's own description of background circumstances explicitly as "a showing in addition to the usual ones for establishing a prima-facie case."¹⁷

Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence joined by Justice Gorsuch, agreeing with the Court's opinion in full but emphasizing that the background circumstances requirement exemplifies the dangers of "judicial lawmaking."¹⁸ Justice Thomas argued that the McDonnell Douglasframework requires too much evidence at the summary judgment stage and places a higher burden on plaintiffs than Title VII requires.¹⁹ He noted that he is willing to consider its validity in a future case.²⁰

Practical Advice

The Court's ruling in Ames eases evidentiary burdens for employees who are majority-group plaintiffs to survive summary judgment in disparate treatment claims. It thus highlights for employers the importance of carefully evaluating all employment decisions to ensure that they are based on non-discriminatory reasons and are supported by documented evidence. The Court's decision also follows recent trends in employment law, where courts and executive agencies are increasingly viewing federal anti-discrimination laws through the lens of "illegal DEI"– as discussed in previous OnPoints.²¹ Employers should carefully monitor further developments in this area of law, given the Court's receptivity to reevaluating other employment discrimination frameworks and the current administration's broad stance on what constitutes illegal discrimination.²²

Footnotes