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The Court of Appeal has confirmed that a tribunal cannot be given an open-ended power to revise its award, as such a clause is incompatible with the finality required by the Arbitration Act 1996
Introduction
The Court of Appeal has made clear that arbitral awards cannot be left open to perpetual revision. In Gluck v Endzweig [2026] EWCA Civ 145, it reinstated enforcement of a Beth Din award and held that a clause allowing amendments “at any time” was fundamentally incompatible with the Arbitration Act 1996 (the Act). However far party autonomy stretches, an award must reach finality within a finite period. The decision reinforces a simple principle: in arbitration under the Act, final means final.
Background
The dispute arose under a 2019 share purchase agreement between Mr Gluck and Evertop Ltd, guaranteed by Mr Endzweig, which provided for disputes to be “finally resolved by arbitration by the Beth Din” (a Jewish rabbinical court in London). A separate December 2019 arbitration agreement appointed two rabbis and included a clause allowing the Beth Din to “amend and add to and change” its judgment “at any time”, while stating the agreement was “valid according to the Arbitration Act”.
The Beth Din issued a First Award in March 2024 and a Second Award in May 2024 quantifying the sum payable to Mr Gluck. Concerns about calculation errors were raised directly with the Beth Din, which informed the parties on 6 June 2024 that the Second Award was under review.
The First Instance decision
On 8 November 2024, Mr Gluck obtained ex parte permission to enforce the Second Award under section 66, without referencing the Beth Din’s ongoing review. Evertop and Mr Endzweig applied to set aside the enforcement order, arguing the Second Award was not final and that Mr Gluck had failed in his duty of full and frank disclosure by not highlighting the tribunal’s review in the ex parte application. On 10 February 2025, the Beth Din issued a revised third award reducing the amount payable.
On 21 February 2025, the High Court set aside the enforcement order of the Second Award, holding that the parties had agreed an open-ended correction power that displaced the statutory 28-day limits in section 57, and that the Second Award was therefore not final when enforcement was sought. The judge rejected arguments that this destroyed finality, reasoning that the Beth Din could simply refuse further reviews or declare itself functus officio. Mr Gluck appealed, arguing that an unlimited power of correction or alteration is outside section 57 and incompatible with the finality required by the Act.
The Court of Appeal’s decision
The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal, overturning the High Court's ruling and reinstating the order enforcing the Second Award.
It held that the arbitration agreement’s clause allowing the Beth Din to amend its award “at any time” was incompatible with the scheme of the Act. While section 57(1) permits parties to agree wider powers of correction, party autonomy cannot extend to a mechanism that would prevent an award ever becoming final. The Court emphasised that finality is a core requirement of a statutory arbitration award, and that an award which may be amended indefinitely cannot be treated as final or enforceable. It rejected reliance on section 58(1)’s “unless otherwise agreed” wording, explaining that agreed review processes must still culminate in a binding result; the parties cannot agree a process under which an award never becomes final.
The Court considered and rejected various alternative constructions of the clause, including treating it as confined to interim awards, as allowing the Beth Din to declare itself functus officio, or as subject to the 28-day default time limits in section 57. Each interpretation failed because the unlimited amendment power would still allow the tribunal to revisit any purported final determination, including a declaration of finality. The Court also rejected the suggestion that the parties had contracted out of the Arbitration Act, noting that both the SPA and the arbitration agreement showed a clear intention that any award should be enforceable under the Act.
The Court concluded that the unlimited amendment clause was “repugnant” to the arbitration agreement’s purpose and severed it. This restored the default correction regime in section 57. As no valid correction or additional award was made within the 28-day period, the Second Award remained final and enforceable. The Court therefore held that the High Court had erred in setting aside the enforcement order and reinstated Mr Gluck’s right to enforce the Second Award.
Comment
The Court of Appeal’s decision confirms that finality is a mandatory feature of arbitration under the Act. While the Act permits parties to tailor procedural aspects of their arbitration, including limited post-award corrections under section 57, it does not allow parties to agree terms that would render an award perpetually open to revision. A clause granting arbitrators the power to amend their award “at any time” is incompatible with the statutory scheme and therefore unenforceable. This ruling underscores the importance of ensuring that arbitration agreements are drafted to allow awards to become final and binding within a defined timeframe. Clauses that purport to allow indefinite review or amendment risk being severed, undermining the enforceability of the award and frustrating the parties’ commercial expectations.
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