Changes To Turkish Procedural Law Under The 12th Judicial Reform Package

Law No. 7589, commonly referred to as the 12th Judicial Reform Package, has introduced substantial amendments to several long-debated areas of civil and administrative procedure. The most notable change is the abolition of the action for an unquantified claim, which had been available since 2011, and the incorporation of its principal procedural safeguards into the rules governing partial actions. The amendments also provide that, as a general rule, no more than three months may elapse between hearings in civil proceedings, facilitate remote participation in hearings, and revise the appellate remedies available in relation to the consolidation of actions. While these measures are intended to expedite judicial proceedings, they also introduce a new procedural framework for matters that may directly result in the loss of substantive rights, including the selection of the appropriate form of action, the increase of the amount claimed, and the interruption of limitation periods.

In administrative proceedings, the scope of disputes to be adjudicated by a single judge has been expanded. Regional administrative courts have also been expressly authorized to dismiss an appellate application by substituting or modifying the reasoning of the first-instance court, and the circumstances in which a case may be remanded to the first-instance court have been redefined. In addition, where a regional administrative court sets aside the first-instance judgment and renders a new judgment on the merits, a cassation appeal will, as a general rule, be available. However, certain disputes adjudicated by a single judge, as well as specific categories of disputes expressly enumerated by law, remain outside the scope of this rule. The amendments therefore seek to strike a new balance between procedural economy and the right to seek review of a judgment by a higher court. Their effect on pending proceedings and cases already at the appellate or cassation stage must be assessed separately in accordance with the applicable effective-date and transitional provisions.

Action for an Unquantified Claim Abolished: How Has the Partial Action Changed?

The action for an unquantified claim, previously governed by Article 107 of the Turkish Code of Civil Procedure, has been abolished under the 12th Judicial Reform Package. This form of action allowed a creditor to file suit for a minimum amount where, at the time of filing, the creditor could not fully and precisely quantify the claim or could not reasonably be expected to do so. It was frequently used for employment-related receivables, damages arising from bodily injury or loss of financial support, and other claims whose amount could only be determined through an expert examination. Although the new legislation abolishes this form of action, two of its principal safeguards—the right to increase the amount claimed and the interruption of the limitation period as of the filing date—have been incorporated into the rules governing partial actions.

Reasons for Abolishing the Action for an Unquantified Claim

The legislative commentary notes that Turkish courts had long experienced uncertainty regarding which claims could properly be brought as unquantified claims. Even where an action had been filed as an unquantified-claim action, the court could conclude that the amount had in fact been ascertainable when the action was commenced. This could give rise to disputes concerning procedural prerequisites and the claimant’s legal interest, and in some cases could result in dismissal.

If the limitation period expired while the proceedings were pending, the claimant might no longer be able to reassert the same claim using the correct form of action. Consequently, an error in selecting the procedural form could prevent the recovery of an otherwise valid claim solely on procedural grounds.

Rather than retaining the action for an unquantified claim and redefining its scope, the legislature chose to resolve these difficulties by abolishing it entirely. Under the new system, where the total amount of a claim cannot initially be determined, the claimant may bring a partial action, provided that the statutory requirements are satisfied, and increase the amount claimed once the total amount becomes ascertainable during the evidentiary phase.

However, the amendment does not mean that every claim may now be brought as a partial action. The existing requirements under the Code of Civil Procedure will continue to apply. In particular, the claim must be divisible, and its amount must not be undisputed or clearly ascertainable between the parties.

The Amount Claimed in a Partial Action May Be Increased Once

Under the new paragraph added to Article 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where only part of a claim has been asserted, the relief sought may be increased once within the same proceedings. The increase may be made until the close of the evidentiary phase and will not be subject to the prohibition against expanding the claims asserted in the action. Accordingly, once the actual amount of the claim becomes apparent through an expert report or other evidence introduced into the record, the claimant may seek the remaining amount in the existing proceedings without filing a separate action.

The amendment creates a special mechanism for increasing the amount claimed independently of the formal amendment procedure known as ıslah. However, because this right may be exercised only once, the amount of the increase must be calculated carefully. Increasing the claim prematurely on the basis of an initial expert report, increasing it by an insufficient amount, or increasing it before all components of the claim have been established may generate further procedural disputes concerning any remaining balance.

The Limitation Period Will Be Deemed Interrupted on the Filing Date for the Increased Amount

Under the previous partial-action regime, the limitation period was interrupted only with respect to the amount initially claimed. It continued to run for the balance that had not been included in the original claim. Particularly in cases involving lengthy evidentiary proceedings or expert examinations, the claimant could discover the total amount of the receivable only after the remaining portion had already become time-barred.

Under the new rule, even where the amount claimed is increased at a later stage, the limitation period for the increased portion will also be deemed to have been interrupted on the date the original action was filed. This effectively transfers to partial actions one of the most significant protections previously available under the action for an unquantified claim.

During the transitional period, the filing date of the action will be decisive. Actions for unquantified claims filed before the abolition of Article 107 will continue to be governed by the former version of that provision. Actions filed after the new rules take effect must structure the relief sought in accordance with the amended rules governing partial actions.

Intervals Between Hearings Limited to Three Months and Remote Participation Facilitated

One of the amendments intended to expedite civil proceedings introduces an express maximum interval between hearings. Under the new provision added to Article 147 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the interval between hearings may not, as a general rule, exceed three months. The requirement for a handwritten signature has also largely been eliminated for persons participating in hearings through audiovisual transmission.

Although both amendments seek to reduce delays and procedural costs, they do not entirely eliminate the court’s discretion to account for the particular circumstances of each case.

A Specific Justification Will Be Required for Hearing Intervals Exceeding Three Months

Under the previous rules, no express maximum interval applied between hearings in cases subject to the written procedure. Hearings could therefore be adjourned for extended periods due to court workload, pending expert reports, the taking of evidence through another court, or other procedural steps.

The new provision establishes a general rule that hearings must be held at intervals of no more than three months. Its purpose is to prevent cases from remaining inactive for prolonged periods. The general commentary to the legislative proposal states that the amendment is intended to expedite proceedings, promote procedural economy, and provide more effective protection for the right to trial within a reasonable time.

The three-month period is not absolute. Where the nature of the case requires additional time, such as where an expert examination is expected to take longer, evidence must be gathered through another court, or comparable compelling circumstances exist, the judge may set a longer interval. In such cases, however, the reasons for the adjournment must be expressly stated. The objective is to ensure that lengthy intervals are based on a specific necessity in the individual case rather than becoming routine practice.

The amendment does not provide that procedural steps taken after the three-month period are automatically invalid. Its principal effect is therefore to discipline hearing schedules and reduce unnecessary adjournments. In practice, the decisive issue will be whether courts provide concrete and reviewable reasons when they schedule hearings more than three months apart.

Exceptions to the Elimination of the Handwritten-Signature Requirement in Remote Hearings

Article 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits parties and their counsel, subject to a court order, to participate in hearings and perform procedural acts from another location through audiovisual transmission. Under the newly added paragraph, the statutory provisions requiring handwritten signatures will, as a general rule, no longer apply to persons authorized to participate remotely. This change will make it easier for parties and attorneys located in another city to attend hearings that do not require their physical presence in the courtroom.

Certain procedural acts that produce serious and final consequences for the parties remain outside the scope of this relaxation. Existing safeguards requiring the signing of the hearing record will continue to apply to judicial admissions, the taking of an oath, consent to the withdrawal of an action, waiver of claims, acceptance of the action, and settlement. Because these acts may alter the scope of the dispute or terminate the proceedings entirely, the legislature has retained the handwritten-signature requirement.

The new signature rules for remote hearings will enter into force on October 31, 2026. Until that date, the current practice will remain in effect. After the effective date, persons participating remotely will not be required to provide a separate handwritten signature, except in relation to the specifically excluded procedural acts.

The amendment may make remote hearings more functional. Nevertheless, remote participation will remain subject to a court order, and the parties will not acquire an unconditional right to attend hearings online on their own initiative.

Appellate Remedies Concerning the Consolidation and Severance of Actions Revised

Where related actions are heard before different courts, there is a risk of inconsistent judgments and duplicative examination of the same evidence. For this reason, actions arising from the same or similar grounds, or where the judgment in one action may affect the other, may be consolidated.

The amendment does not alter the substantive conditions for consolidation. Instead, it revises when a consolidation order becomes binding on the other court and at what stage the order may be challenged.

A Consolidation Order Will Not Bind the Court Hearing the First Action Until It Becomes Final

Where related actions are pending before courts of the same level and jurisdiction within the same judicial district, the court before which the second action was filed decides whether the cases should be consolidated. Under the former rule, that decision immediately bound the court before which the first action had been filed.

The Turkish Constitutional Court invalidated this rule on the ground that making the consolidation order binding on the other court before appellate review was completed was incompatible with the principle of the lawful judge.

Under the new provision, the court hearing the first-filed action will be bound by the consolidation order only after that order becomes final. Accordingly, where an interlocutory appeal is filed against the consolidation order, the court before which the proceedings will continue will be determined after the appellate review has been completed.

This amendment is particularly significant where the consolidated actions concern different subject-matter jurisdictions or have reached different stages of the proceedings.

A Consolidation Order May Be Challenged by a Separate Interlocutory Appeal

The amendment to Article 168 of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly provides that a consolidation order issued between courts located within the same judicial district may be challenged before the regional court of appeals without waiting for a judgment on the merits.

Under the former system, consolidation and severance orders could generally be challenged only together with the final judgment. As a result, an erroneous consolidation order could affect the entire proceedings but remain unreviewed until the case had been concluded.

By contrast, a first-instance court’s severance order may be appealed only together with the final judgment. Likewise, consolidation or severance orders issued by a regional court of appeals may be challenged before the Court of Cassation only together with the judgment on the merits.

Furthermore, an error concerning consolidation or severance will not, by itself, constitute sufficient grounds for setting aside or reversing the final judgment. The separate interlocutory appeal is therefore available only for consolidation orders issued by first-instance courts located within the same judicial district.

Cassation Review in Civil Cases Revised

The circumstances in which a judgment rendered by a regional court of appeals after setting aside the first-instance judgment may be challenged before the Court of Cassation have been revised. The amendment is primarily intended to prevent a new outcome entered for the first time against a party at the appellate stage from becoming final solely because the amount in dispute falls below the ordinary cassation threshold.

The amendment also limits the Court of Cassation’s authority to reverse a judgment solely on the ground that the first-instance court lacked subject-matter or territorial jurisdiction.

When May a New Judgment Rendered on Appeal Be Challenged Before the Court of Cassation?

Under the former system, judgments of regional courts of appeals in disputes falling below a specified monetary threshold could not be challenged before the Court of Cassation. This restriction applied both where the appellate court dismissed the appeal and where it set aside the first-instance judgment and entered an entirely new judgment on the merits.

The Turkish Constitutional Court invalidated the restriction as applied to the second category. It held that denying cassation review where an appeal had been granted in whole or in part and a new judgment had been entered on the merits was incompatible with the right to seek judicial review of a judgment.

Under the new paragraph added to Article 362 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where the regional court of appeals grants the appeal in whole or in part and renders a new judgment on the merits, that judgment may be challenged before the Court of Cassation if the amount or value in dispute exceeds the monetary threshold applicable to appeals before the regional court of appeals.

In other words, the lower appellate threshold, rather than the ordinary cassation threshold, will apply to this category of judgments. If the amount or value does not exceed the appellate threshold, cassation review will remain unavailable.

The new rule applies only where the regional court of appeals sets aside the first-instance judgment and renders a new judgment on the merits. Where the regional court dismisses the appeal and finds the first-instance judgment lawful, the availability of cassation review will continue to be determined under the general rules.

Accordingly, parties must examine not only the outcome reached by the regional court of appeals but also the specific procedural form of its decision before the applicable time limit for seeking further review expires.

A Judgment May Not Be Reversed Solely for Lack of Subject-Matter or Territorial Jurisdiction

A new provision added to Article 371 of the Code of Civil Procedure prevents the Court of Cassation from reversing a judgment solely because the first-instance court lacked subject-matter or territorial jurisdiction.

Accordingly, even where the Court of Cassation concludes that the first-instance court was not competent or territorially authorized to hear the dispute, it may not reverse the judgment on that ground alone. This limitation will not apply, however, to cases heard by a regional court of appeals acting as a court of first instance.

The amendment is intended to prevent lengthy proceedings from being returned to their initial stage solely because of a dispute over subject-matter or territorial jurisdiction, thereby requiring the parties to relitigate the same matter from the beginning.

Nevertheless, the amendment does not eliminate the importance of jurisdictional objections. Parties must still raise such objections in a timely manner before the first-instance court and during the appellate proceedings. The new rule merely prevents a jurisdictional defect from serving as the sole ground for reversal at the cassation stage.

Scope of Administrative Cases to Be Heard by a Single Judge Expanded

Although administrative and tax courts generally adjudicate cases through judicial panels, certain disputes are decided by a single judge. Under the previous system, whether a case would be heard by a single judge depended largely on the monetary value of the dispute. The new legislation preserves this structure but also assigns certain categories of cases before administrative courts to a single judge regardless of their monetary value. According to the legislative commentary, the amendment is intended to expedite the resolution of disputes in areas where settled case law already exists and where adjudication by a judicial panel is not considered necessary in light of the nature of the dispute.

Single-Judge Cases Subject to a Monetary Threshold

Annulment actions brought against administrative acts concerning a specific monetary amount, as well as full remedy actions, will be adjudicated by a single administrative court judge where the amount in dispute does not exceed TRY 486,000 for 2026. Similarly, tax disputes arising from taxes, duties, fees, and comparable fiscal obligations will be heard by a single tax court judge where their total value does not exceed the same threshold. In this respect, the system based on a monetary threshold remains substantially unchanged.

Because the applicable monetary thresholds are adjusted annually in accordance with the revaluation rate, the amount in effect on the filing date must be verified separately. Whether the value of the dispute falls below or exceeds the applicable threshold directly determines whether the case will be heard by a single judge or by a judicial panel. Accordingly, particularly in full remedy and tax actions, the manner in which the relief sought is formulated is relevant not only to court fees and appellate remedies but also to the composition of the court.

Decisions Concerning Students, Public Officials, and Professional Organizations

Under the new legislation, cases concerning students’ promotion to the next grade, determination of grades, dormitory accommodation, student loans, scholarships, and certain disciplinary sanctions have been brought within the jurisdiction of a single judge. However, serious disciplinary measures resulting in suspension from education or dismissal from the educational institution remain outside this scope.

Similarly, cases brought by public officials against temporary assignments, travel allowances, official housing and leave-related decisions, as well as reprimand sanctions, will be adjudicated by a single judge.

A comparable distinction has been introduced for disciplinary sanctions imposed on members of professional organizations having the status of public institutions. Sanctions that temporarily or permanently prevent the exercise of a profession will continue to be heard by a judicial panel, while other disciplinary disputes will be decided by a single judge.

Although the amendment is intended to expedite the resolution of less serious disputes in areas governed by settled case law, adjudication by a single judge also has implications for appellate remedies. In particular, where a case was heard by a single judge, cassation review is separately restricted in respect of a new judgment rendered by a regional administrative court after setting aside the first-instance judgment.

Substitution of Reasoning and Remand of Cases in Administrative Appeals Revised

The types of decisions that regional administrative courts may render following appellate review have been defined in greater detail. Before the amendment, it was unclear how a regional administrative court should proceed where the outcome of the first-instance judgment was legally correct but its reasoning was erroneous or incomplete. The narrowly defined circumstances in which a case could be remanded to the first-instance court also caused uncertainty in practice in relation to certain procedural deficiencies.

The new legislation expands the grounds for remand while simultaneously enumerating them exhaustively, with the aim of preventing cases from moving unnecessarily back and forth between the regional administrative court and the first-instance court.

The Reasoning May Be Substituted Where the Outcome Is Correct

The outcome of a first-instance judgment may be legally correct even though the legal reasoning stated in the judgment is erroneous or incomplete. Under the previous provision, a regional administrative court could dismiss an appellate application only where it found the judgment lawful or corrected a factual error.

The new rule expressly permits a regional administrative court to dismiss the appellate application by substituting or modifying the reasoning where the outcome of the judgment is correct. This avoids setting aside the judgment and rendering a new judgment solely because of a deficiency in the legal reasoning.

As a result of this amendment, the appellate court may preserve the outcome reached by the first-instance court while basing that outcome on a different legal ground. However, substitution of the reasoning does not mean that the first-instance judgment has been set aside.

This distinction is also important in determining whether the judgment is subject to cassation review. Where the regional administrative court merely substitutes the reasoning and dismisses the appellate application, it will not be deemed to have rendered a new judgment after setting aside the first-instance judgment.

Grounds for Remanding a Case to the First-Instance Court Expanded

Additional circumstances have been introduced in which a regional administrative court may remand a case to the first-instance court. A remand will be available where decisions rendered following preliminary review, as well as other final procedural decisions, are found to be erroneous; where the court should have rejected the complaint but instead rendered a judgment directly on the merits; or where the case file was improperly completed against a missing or incorrectly designated defendant.

A judgment may also be set aside and the case remanded where the court failed to rule on one of the claims or rendered an incomplete judgment. Because remand decisions in these circumstances are final, the first-instance court will resume the proceedings after curing the identified deficiency.

An important feature of the amendment is that the grounds for remand are exhaustively listed in the statute. A regional administrative court may not set aside a judgment and remand the case to the first-instance court in circumstances other than those expressly specified.

This limitation is intended to ensure that the appellate court resolves the dispute itself whenever possible and that remand remains an exceptional procedural mechanism.

Deficiencies Concerning Site Inspections, Expert Examination, and Hearings May Be Cured on Appeal

Where the first-instance court failed to conduct a site inspection or obtain an expert opinion despite the need for such evidentiary measures, or failed to hold a hearing even though a hearing was legally required, the regional administrative court may, as a general rule, set aside the judgment and remand the case to the first-instance court. The new legislation, however, also authorizes the regional administrative court to cure these deficiencies itself and proceed to decide the merits. Accordingly, the appellate court may conduct a site inspection, appoint an expert, obtain an expert report, or hold a hearing where it considers such measures necessary. This authority is intended to prevent every procedural deficiency from automatically returning the case to the first-instance stage and thereby prolonging the proceedings.

The manner in which this authority will be exercised will depend on the nature and scope of the individual dispute. Where the deficiency can be remedied through a limited evidentiary step, the regional administrative court’s direct resolution of the case may materially expedite the proceedings. By contrast, remand may be more appropriate where the dispute requires extensive fact-finding, the collection of substantial additional evidence, or a broad examination of the parties’ arguments. Although the new system therefore grants the appellate court a measure of discretion, that discretion operates within a framework in which the statutory grounds for remand are expressly and exhaustively defined.

Cassation Review Made Available for New Judgments Rendered by Regional Administrative Courts

In administrative proceedings, a regional administrative court does more than review the legality of the first-instance judgment. Where it grants the appellate application, it may set aside that judgment and render a new judgment directly on the merits of the dispute. Under the previous system, however, where the case did not fall within one of the categories expressly listed in Article 46 of the Administrative Procedure Law, the judgment rendered by the regional administrative court was final. This meant that even where a party faced an adverse determination for the first time at the appellate stage, no further review by the Council of State was available.

The new legislation establishes, as a general rule, that judgments rendered by regional administrative courts after setting aside first-instance judgments may be challenged through cassation review. Certain exceptions have nevertheless been retained in light of the nature of the proceedings, the subject matter of the dispute, and the legislature’s objective of limiting the Council of State’s caseload to cases warranting further review.

Why Did the Constitutional Court Annul the Previous Rule?

The Turkish Constitutional Court held that the categorical exclusion of cassation review in cases where a regional administrative court set aside the first-instance judgment and rendered a new judgment imposed a disproportionate restriction on the right to seek judicial review of a court decision. In such cases, the decision that ultimately determines the parties’ legal position is no longer the judgment of the first-instance court, but the new ruling entered by the appellate court following its own assessment of the facts and law. Denying any further judicial scrutiny of that ruling was considered particularly problematic where the adverse result arose for the first time at the appellate stage.

The Constitutional Court did not, however, conclude that every administrative dispute must necessarily be subject to cassation review. It also recognized the resolution of disputes within a reasonable time and at minimum cost, the reduction of the Council of State’s caseload, and the strengthening of the Council of State’s function as a court responsible for ensuring consistency in administrative case law as legitimate legislative objectives. The new framework therefore does not open every appellate judgment to cassation review. Instead, it seeks to balance the right to obtain review of a newly entered judgment against the statutory exceptions designed to preserve procedural efficiency.

New Judgments Rendered After Setting Aside the First-Instance Judgment Will Generally Be Subject to Cassation Review

The existing cassation regime will continue to apply to the categories of cases already identified as subject to review under the first paragraph of Article 46 of the Administrative Procedure Law. In cases falling outside those categories, however, where the regional administrative court grants the appellate application, sets aside the first-instance judgment, and enters a new judgment on the merits, the new judgment may be challenged before the Council of State within thirty days following service.

The availability of cassation review will therefore depend not only on the subject matter of the dispute but also on the procedural nature of the decision rendered by the regional administrative court. Where the appellate application is dismissed, the new rule will not apply. Likewise, where the regional administrative court agrees with the outcome reached by the first-instance court and merely substitutes or modifies the legal reasoning, it will not be deemed to have set aside the judgment and rendered a new ruling.

Accordingly, determining whether cassation review is available requires a careful examination of the operative part and procedural characterization of the appellate judgment. It is not sufficient to review only the substantive outcome. The parties must also determine whether the regional administrative court dismissed the appeal, substituted the reasoning while preserving the judgment, or set aside the first-instance decision and entered an entirely new judgment.

Cases Excluded from Cassation Review

Where an administrative or tax case was adjudicated by a single judge, cassation review will remain unavailable even if the regional administrative court sets aside the first-instance judgment and renders a new judgment on the merits. The same exclusion applies to cases arising under the Law on the Protection of Farmers’ Property, the Law on the Prevention of Unlawful Interference with Possession of Immovable Property, and the Law on Foreigners and International Protection.

Judgments concerning only attorneys’ fees and litigation costs will likewise remain outside the scope of cassation review. In addition, decisions that do not exceed the monetary differential threshold prescribed by law will not be subject to review by the Council of State. These exceptions reflect the legislature’s decision to preserve finality in disputes considered less significant in terms of subject matter, monetary value, or procedural complexity.

The new cassation regime will apply to decisions rendered by regional administrative courts after the effective date of the amendment. Decisions issued before that date will continue to be governed by the previous appellate framework. For this reason, determining whether cassation review is available requires verification not only of the date on which the judgment was served but also of the date on which it was rendered.

Statutory Interest Rate Linked to the Rediscount Rate

Article 1 of the Law on Statutory Interest and Default Interest has been amended to replace the fixed-rate system previously used to determine statutory interest. The new rule applies to obligations for which interest is payable under the Turkish Code of Obligations or the Turkish Commercial Code where the parties have not contractually agreed on the applicable interest rate. As a result, statutory interest will no longer remain fixed at a rate prescribed independently of prevailing economic conditions.

Under the new framework, the statutory interest rate has been converted into a dynamic rate calculated by reference to the rediscount rate applied by the Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye. This structure allows the applicable rate to respond to changes in the economy and monetary conditions. The amendment entered into force on July 31, 2026.

How Will the Statutory Interest Rate Be Calculated?

Under the new system, the annual statutory interest rate will be equal to 80 percent of the rediscount rate applied by the Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye to short-term lending transactions on December 31 of the preceding year. That rate will, in principle, apply during the following calendar year.

However, where the rediscount rate in effect on June 30 differs by five percentage points or more from the rate applicable on December 31 of the preceding year, 80 percent of the June 30 rediscount rate will apply during the second half of the year. The statutory interest rate may therefore change during the course of the same calendar year. Where economic conditions produce a sufficiently significant change in the rediscount rate, a new statutory rate may apply beginning on July 1.

The amendment follows a decision of the Turkish Constitutional Court concerning the inadequacy of the previous interest regime in relation to non-contractual obligations. The Court found that, although interest accrued as a consequence of delayed payment, the previous system did not provide an effective mechanism capable of compensating creditors for the loss in the value of money. This deficiency was considered incompatible with the constitutional protection of property rights.

By linking statutory interest to an indicator that more closely reflects current market conditions, the new system seeks to establish a more realistic and contemporary balance between creditors and debtors. The rate will now be capable of adjusting to material changes in economic conditions rather than remaining detached from inflation and prevailing monetary policy.

How Will the Amendment Affect Calculations in Litigation and Enforcement Proceedings?

The linkage of statutory interest to the rediscount rate will directly affect the amount of interest awarded in actions involving monetary claims and the calculations made during the enforcement of court judgments. In proceedings extending over several years, it may no longer be appropriate to apply a single interest rate from the date on which interest began to accrue until the date of payment. Instead, the applicable rates for each relevant period will need to be identified and calculated separately.

Where the statutory rate changes during the second half of the year, the interest calculation may need to be divided into separate periods beginning on July 1. Courts, enforcement offices, attorneys, and financial experts will therefore need to take account of the applicable rediscount rates and the dates on which each statutory rate became effective when calculating the amount due.

The amendment does not diminish the importance of correctly identifying the type of interest claimed and the date from which it begins to accrue. On the contrary, commercial default interest, contractually agreed interest, and statutory interest under Law No. 3095 may produce materially different legal and financial consequences. The legal basis of the interest claim must therefore be clearly stated in the complaint, and the applicable commencement date must be properly identified.

Where a judgment refers only to “statutory interest” without specifying a numerical rate, the applicable rate will be determined under the new system by reference to the rediscount rates in effect during the relevant periods. As a result, both judgments and enforcement calculations may require the application of more than one rate where the debt remains unpaid across different statutory-interest periods.

Practical Impact of the Procedural Amendments

The new provisions seek to achieve more than the mere shortening of civil and administrative proceedings. They also aim to reduce the loss of substantive rights caused by procedural uncertainty, incorrect characterization of claims, and limitations in the former appellate system. Following the abolition of the action for an unquantified claim, the timing and scope of any increase in the amount sought will become particularly important where the claimant initially asserts only part of the receivable.

At the same time, the rule deeming the limitation period interrupted on the original filing date for the increased portion of the claim substantially reduces the risk that the remaining receivable will become time-barred during lengthy expert examinations or evidentiary proceedings. The limitation placed on intervals between hearings and the facilitation of remote participation may also contribute to more efficient proceedings, although their practical effectiveness will ultimately depend on court workload, judicial practice, and available technical infrastructure.

The amendments concerning appellate remedies are especially significant where an appellate court sets aside a first-instance judgment and enters a new ruling. In both civil and administrative proceedings, allowing such judgments to be challenged before the Court of Cassation or the Council of State under specified conditions enables parties to seek review of an adverse determination entered against them for the first time at the appellate stage.

Nevertheless, important exceptions remain. Administrative and tax cases heard by a single judge, as well as certain categories of disputes expressly identified by law, continue to be excluded from cassation review. The availability of a further appellate remedy will therefore depend not only on the substantive outcome of the case but also on the procedural form of the appellate judgment, the date on which the action was filed, the date on which the judgment was rendered, and the applicable transitional provisions.

The effect of these procedural amendments on pending proceedings and newly filed cases must consequently be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The procedural stage of the dispute, the characterization of the appellate decision, the relevant effective dates, and the governing transitional rules may each determine whether the new provisions apply and whether a further right of review is available.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.