In The 'Strike Zone': The Disruptive Technology Strike Force And U.S. Export Controls

Two-and-a-half years ago, agencies from across the Justice, Commerce, Treasury, and Defense Departments partnered to form the Disruptive Technology Strike Force, with the stated mission "to fiercely protect advanced technology from being unlawfully acquired by foreign adversaries," utilizing an "all-tools approach to aggressively pursue enforcement actions against illegal procurement networks."

Unlike notable departures from Biden administration priorities in law enforcement and cross-border matters, the Trump administration will continue efforts to aggressively combat export control violations and prosecute related crimes.

At the Commerce Department Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) 2025 Update Conference on Export Controls and Policy, Commerce Secretary Harold Lutnick struck a bellicose tone: reportedly designating BIS the "intellectual frontline" of a "reemerging great power conflict" with Iran, Russia, and the "relentless threat from" China.

The Disruptive Technology Strike Force appears suited to the task, but how will it fare as federal law enforcement and U.S. foreign policy objectives are rapidly reshaped? Another interagency group—Task Force KleptoCapture—was promptly disbanded by U.S. Attorney General Pamela Bondi in February 2025, notwithstanding its complementary focus on sanctions and export restrictions on Russian officials and allies. Reflecting the Trump administration's shifting priorities, one observer at the BIS Update Conference noted that enforcement against China was "hot, Russia not so much."

Although its principal targets may be realigned, the Disruptive Technology Strike Force remains in operation and as recently as April 2025 was credited with charges against Iranian co-conspirators attempting "to procure U.S. parts of Iranian Unmanned Aerial Vehicles."

The Strike Force's enduring mandate, and the breadth of industries it implicates, underscore the benefit of understanding the legal framework for U.S. export controls and assessing the initiative's history and enforcement actions to date.

Legal Foundations of U.S. Export Controls

Modern U.S. export controls were initially promulgated under statutes including the Export Administration Acts of 1969 and 1979, which were both allowed to lapse repeatedly and rendered effectively defunct shortly after their enactment.

Export controls were then primarily authorized by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §1701 et seq., which grants the President broad authority to address "any unusual and extraordinary threat...to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States," id. §1701(a), upon the declaration of a national emergency. IEEPA was enacted in 1977, ironically in an effort to curb the President's power in response to concerns that prior administrations had exploited so-called "emergencies"—then existing continually for more than forty years—to control trade as an adjunct to foreign policy.

Notwithstanding these concerns, the text of IEEPA grants the President sweeping authority. After declaring a national emergency under the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§1601-51, subject to periodic renewal, the president may "investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any...importation or exportation of...any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest." Id. §1702(a)(1)(B).

Nearly 50 years after its enactment, the issue of presidential overreach under IEEPA remains salient: on August 29, 2025, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a decision invalidating many of President Trump's tariffs issued pursuant to IEEPA. SeeV.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump, 2025 WL 2490634 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 29, 2025).

Whether the Supreme Court will reverse that decision and agree with the administration that IEEPA gives the President wide latitude to exercise "emergency" powers in matters of international commerce remains to be seen, potentially ushering in an expansive roster of export controls and other measures targeting foreign actors.

Congress ultimately passed the 2018 Export Control Reform Act ("ECRA"), 50 U.S.C. §§4801-52, providing a permanent statutory basis for export control rules that had been developed and administered by BIS over decades: the Export Administration Regulations, or "EAR," 15 C.F.R. §§730-74.

The EAR are a detailed series of regulations limiting the export or transfer of certain materials to various restricted nations, entities, and persons, and also restricting activities in support of such exports or transfers. As explained by BIS, the core questions under the EAR are: (i) what is being exported; (ii) where it is being exported to; (iii) who receives the export; and (iv) the intended end use for the export, all of which are subject to stringent review.

Depending on the answers, an individual or entity may be barred entirely from exporting or transferring the relevant item or subject to a comprehensive licensing program, administered by BIS, that provides for government oversight and approval for any exports or transfers subject to the EAR intended to prevent the illicit (or errant) export of controlled materials.

Unlike sanctions regulations, 31 C.F.R. §501, et seq.—which are administered by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control and prohibit U.S. persons or entities from engaging in transactions involving designated nations, entities, or persons—export controls restrict only the export or transfer of specific commodities, software, and technology.

A core tenet of export controls, and a critical enforcement issue, is the regulation of "dual-use" items, defined as an "item [that] has civilian applications and military, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, or law-enforcement-related applications." 50 U.S.C. §4801(2) (emphasis added).

Export Controls Challenges and Origins of the Strike Force

Export controls present a highly challenging enforcement environment for several reasons. First, the threats posed by nations and non-state actors are changeable and unpredictable, and further complicated by malleable diplomatic and trade initiatives pursued by successive administrations.

Second, fast-moving technological advancement requires ever-evolving threat assessments; technology that is apparently benign today may be tomorrow's next crucial weapons component.

Third, effective enforcement requires insight into far-flung global transactions, often in places where transparency is limited.

Finally, the sheer volume of individuals and entities—perpetrators and innocent alike—participating in affected industries presents a substantial burden for both enforcement and compliance efforts. Enter the Strike Force: a dedicated task force intended to promote inter-agency coordination between subject-matter experts covering key aspects of commerce, law enforcement, international and homeland security, and military and advanced technology oversight.

The Strike Force was announced in February 2023, led by the Justice Department's National Security Division and BIS, and initially including experts from FBI, Homeland Security Investigations, and fourteen U.S. Attorneys' Offices in major metropolitan areas known to be locations for high-tech industry and advanced research.

By its first anniversary in February 2024, the Strike Force had announced fourteen charged cases alleging "sanctions and export control violations, smuggling conspiracies, and other offenses related to the unlawful transfer of sensitive information, goods, and military-grade technology to Russia, China, or Iran."

The Strike Force announced its further expansion, adding the Defense Department Criminal Investigative Service and U.S. Attorneys' Offices in North Carolina, Texas, and Georgia as formal partners. Five additional prosecutions announced by the Strike Force in September 2024 further highlighted its inter-agency connections, including investigations conducted alongside more agencies such as the NASA Office of Inspector General and Customs and Border Protection.

Through the combined efforts of attorneys and agents with specialized knowledge investigating complex supply chain and financial transaction activities, and culminating in prosecutions in numerous federal jurisdictions, the Strike Force exemplifies effective coordination between what is sometimes derided as the "alphabet soup" of federal agencies.

Strike Force Targets—Materials, Methods, and Nations

With the announcement of at least twenty charged cases, the Strike Force's modus operandi is coming into focus. The cases charged to date have involved efforts—some thwarted, some not—to export or transfer a wide array of products, including many "dual-use" items that are both widely used in civilian commercial industries, such as auto and aircraft manufacturing, but also have substantial military applications, for example: semi-conductors; microelectronics and integrated circuits; fire suppression technology; infrared sensory equipment; laser welding tools (which can be used to build nuclear weaponry); accelerometers (used for advanced navigation, including for warships, aerospace, and military aircraft); and isostatic graphite (a material present in items such as brakes or gaskets, but that may also be used to produce nuclear fuel).

Other illicit exports prosecuted by the Strike Force are less common, but no less worrisome: components for missile systems and unmanned aerial vehicles and drones; quantum cryptography elements (technology using principles of quantum physics to detect eavesdropping over secure communications); nuclear weapons testing materials; and sophisticated software, source code, and engineering files from highly sensitive projects, such as nuclear submarines and military aircraft, from sources like NASA, research universities and defense contractors.

All of the prosecutions to date involve either China, Iran or Russia as the destination country, with Russia appearing as the ultimate destination in over half of the charged cases. Consider whether this year's BIS Update Conference, and the Trump administration's modulated tone concerning Russia, suggests the focus may shift toward China or other targets.

The cases sometimes involved intermediaries in other jurisdictions as straw purchasers, transshipment hubs interposed to disguise the final destination, and financing transfer points to obscure the sources of payment. These included various European nations, Turkey, Cyprus, Kazakhstan, Hong Kong, and the United Arab Emirates.

Strike Force investigations have involved a variety of charged conduct, ranging from simple plots by individuals attempting to smuggle banned technology to Iran in their luggage or ship it directly to China via international mail service, to sophisticated multi-national procurement schemes, utilizing shell enterprises and other subterfuge to mask the true nature of the transactions, often ensnaring unwary businesses along the way.

For example, in one complex case, United States v. Postovoy, No. 24-CR-414-LLA (D.D.C.), the defendant was a Russian citizen and U.S. resident, who allegedly used U.S. and Hong Kong entities he owned, as well as co-conspirators in Turkey and Switzerland, to contract with several unsuspecting U.S. companies for the purchase of microelectronics used in drones and destined for Russia, based on false export license applications or eschewing licensure requirements altogether.

The government claims that Postovoy shipped the illicit goods via Hong Kong, Europe, and elsewhere, and routed payments through legitimate intermediate bank accounts to hide the Russian source of the funds. Postovoy is detained and awaiting trial on the charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States, ECRA violations, smuggling, and conspiracy to commit money laundering, subject to up to twenty years' imprisonment if convicted. See 50 U.S.C. §4819(b)(2).

In April, a similar scheme undertaken to export commercial aircraft braking technology to Russia drew sentences of seventy months and two years, respectively for two co-conspirators who pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the ECRA and conspiracy to commit money laundering. United States v. Patsulya, et al., No. 23-CR-770-DWL (D. Ariz.).

While these cases demonstrate the risk that an unwary U.S. supplier may be duped into selling controlled goods, another Strike Force case showcases the risk from employees. In United States v. Chenguang Gong,No. 24-CR-127-JFW (C.D. Cal.), a dual U.S. and Chinese citizen recently pleaded guilty to one count of theft of trade secrets and is awaiting sentencing of up to a maximum ten years' imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. §1832(a)(5).

Gong, a Stanford University Ph.D., worked for several U.S. companies overseeing integrated circuits research and development. During successive stints with an IT company, an aerospace company, and a research lab, Gong illicitly copied proprietary files concerning controlled technologies, including semiconductor image sensors, infrared sensors, and analogue-to-digital converters. The investigation revealed his association with so-called "Talent Plans" in China, programs that recruit strategically placed individuals to steal and transfer restricted technology.

The cases pursued by the Strike Force are wide-ranging, multifaceted, and indicative of a dynamic international threat environment. Although this administration's law enforcement priorities remain in flux, there is little reason to believe that industry players touched by export controls regulations—from suppliers, to research labs, to financial institutions—can relax their vigilance regarding the potential for export-related violations. To the contrary, the track record of the Strike Force and administration comments suggest there will be greater focus on enforcement in the years ahead.

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