A Comparative Analysis Of The United Kingdom's Amended Arbitration Act And Turkish Arbitration Legislation

1.Introduction

Arbitration constitutes a widely preferred alternative dispute resolution mechanism, particularly in commercial disputes, due to its advantages in terms of expertise, confidentiality, and procedural efficiency. In the realm of international commerce, arbitration stands as the predominant method for resolving disputes outside the purview of state courts. In essence, arbitration refers to the resolution of disputes by an independent arbitrator or arbitral tribunal, rather than by national courts.

This article examines the recent amendments introduced by the Arbitration Act 2025 of the United Kingdom and compares them with the relevant provisions under Turkish arbitration law.

In the United Kingdom, both domestic and international arbitration proceedings are governed by the Arbitration Act 1996 (AA96), which was originally modeled to a significant extent on the UNCITRAL Model Law. The Act applies to arbitrations seated in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, while Scotland remains outside its jurisdiction.

In February 2025, the AA96 underwent substantial reform through the enactment of the Arbitration Act 2025 (AA2025), following the recommendations of a commission established by the UK Ministry of Justice in 2021. These legislative reforms were introduced with the aim of aligning the UK's arbitration framework with the evolving demands of contemporary international commerce, thereby reinforcing its position as a leading global arbitration hub.

In Turkey, international arbitration is primarily regulated under Law No. 4686 on International Arbitration (the IAL), which entered into force in 2001. As part of Turkey's broader strategy to establish itself as a center for international arbitration, the IAL largely reflects international standards. Except for a set of amendments adopted in 2018, the IAL has remained substantively unchanged and continues to be applied by Turkish courts in its original form.

The principal features of the Arbitration Act 2025, which introduce significant refinements to the UK arbitration regime, can be summarized as follows:

• Clarification of the applicable law governing arbitration agreements embedded in commercial contracts;
• Introduction of a summary judgment prosedure mechanism, empowering arbitral tribunals to dismiss unmeritorious claims at an early stage;
• Reform of jurisdictional challenge procedures, streamlining the process for raising objections to arbitral jurisdiction;
• Codification of court powers in support of arbitration, including provisions regarding the appointment and authority of emergency arbitrators;
• Enhanced disclosure obligations, setting out more precise and comprehensive duties for arbitrators with respect to potential conflicts of interest.

In this context, the present article offers a detailed comparative assessment of these developments, juxtaposing the UK's modernized framework with the current structure of Turkish arbitration legislation, for the benefit of legal practitioners, academics, and stakeholders engaged in international dispute resolution.

2. Law Applicable to the Arbitration Agreement

2.1 Amendment Introduced by AA 2025

Article 1 of AA 2025 introduces a significant clarification regarding the law applicable to the arbitration agreement, thereby resolving a long-standing ambiguity in arbitral practice. Under this new provision, if the parties have expressly designated a law to govern the arbitration agreement, that law shall be applied. In the absence of such an express choice, the law of the seat of arbitration shall applied the arbitration agreement.

This statutory amendment marks a departure from the previously established judicial approach under AA 1996, where, in the absence of an express choice of law for the arbitration agreement, English courts generally presumed that the governing law of the main contract also applied to the arbitration agreement. AA 2025 now decouples the arbitration agreement from the main contract in terms of applicable law, unless otherwise explicitly agreed.

2.2 Status under Turkish Law

According to Article 4 of the IAL, in the absence of a specific choice of law by the parties with respect to the arbitration agreement, Turkish law shall applied to the arbitration agreement. Importantly, the conflict-of-laws rules are not applied in this context. This interpretation derives from the wording of the IAL, which provides that the arbitration agreement shall be deemed valid if it complies with Turkish law, without making any reference to Turkish private international law provisions.

Accordingly, Turkish courts directly apply Turkish substantive law to assess the validity of an arbitration agreement, irrespective of any foreign element, unless the parties have expressly designated a different applicable law.

2.3 Evaluation

The approach adopted under AA 2025 provides a clear and predictable solution by affirming that the law of the seat governs the arbitration agreement where the parties have not made an express choice. This legislative development enhances legal certainty and is expected to streamline arbitral proceedings by reducing preliminary jurisdictional disputes.

In contrast, under the IAL, the applicable law is determined through a statutory rule that directly refers to Turkish law, but without addressing the broader interpretive complexities that may arise in cross-border commercial disputes. Consequently, Turkish law relies more heavily on judicial interpretation and scholarly opinion to fill the gaps concerning the applicable law to arbitration agreements.

Overall, AA 2025 provides a more structured and transparent framework, contributing to the attractiveness of the United Kingdom as a seat for international arbitration. Its emphasis on clarity and legal certainty reflects modern international arbitration standards.

3. Summary Procedures

3.1 Innovation Introduced by AA 2025

Summary procedures refers to a procedural mechanism allowing an arbitral tribunal to render an early decision on claims or defenses that are manifestly without merit, without requiring a full evidentiary hearing. Functionally to summary judgment procedures in common law jurisdictions, this mechanism enables the tribunal to swiftly dispose of issues that have no real prospect of success, thereby narrowing the scope of the dispute or concluding it entirely at an early stage.

With the enactment of Article 7 of AA 2025, tribunals seated in the UK have been explicitly granted the authority to adopt summary disposal procedures. This authority addresses prior concerns that such expedited decisions might compromise due process, potentially leading to the annulment or non-enforcement of awards.

Pursuant to Article 7:

• A party seeking summary disposal must give notice to the opposing party;
• The arbitral tribunal may grant summary disposal if it determines that a claim or issue has no real prospect of success;
• Parties retain the autonomy to contract out of this procedure through mutual agreement.

Importantly, while tribunals are empowered to proceed without a full hearing, they remain bound by the fundamental requirement of procedural fairness, including giving each party a reasonable opportunity to present its position.

The introduction of this provision is expected to enhance the efficiency of arbitral proceedings conducted under UK law, allowing arbitrators to resolve unmeritorious claims or defenses promptly and with greater legal confidence.

3.2 Status under Turkish Law

Under Turkish law, and specifically the IAL, there is no express equivalent to summary procedures. Arbitration proceedings are principally governed by the arbitration agreement and the procedural rules selected by the parties. As such, Turkish arbitral practice relies on party autonomy and general procedural discretion granted to the tribunal.

While the IAL does not preclude the adoption of expedited or bifurcated procedures, any such mechanisms must be explicitly agreed upon by the parties—either within the arbitration agreement or through a procedural order during the proceedings. In this context, a tribunal may be empowered to address certain preliminary or dispositive issues on a priority basis, thereby enhancing procedural efficiency. However, the absence of a statutory basis for summary disposal may render Turkish-seated tribunals more cautious in disposing of claims prematurely.

3.3 Evaluation

The introduction of a codified summary procedures mechanism under AA 2025 reflects a progressive approach to increasing the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of arbitration. It empowers arbitrators to eliminate frivolous or legally untenable claims without the delays of a full hearing, while preserving procedural safeguards.

By contrast, the lack of a corresponding statutory provision under the IAL creates uncertainty in Turkish arbitration practice, potentially deterring arbitrators from taking decisive procedural action even when a claim appears manifestly unfounded. While Turkish arbitration law offers considerable flexibility, the absence of explicit authority for summary disposal may impede the timely resolution of disputes and reduce predictability for parties and tribunals alike.

In conclusion, AA 2025 provides a clear procedural tool aligned with international best practices, while Turkish law remains more dependent on party agreement and tribunal discretion in shaping the conduct of proceedings.

4. Jurisdictional Objections

4.1 Provisions of AA 2025

Under the Competence-Competence principle, an arbitral tribunal has the authority to decide on its own jurisdiction, while the courts at the seat of arbitration retain ultimate supervisory authority. English arbitration law provides two mechanisms for raising jurisdictional objections before the courts:

• Section 32 of AA 1996 permits a party to seek a court determination on a preliminary jurisdictional issue before the tribunal renders a decision.
• Section 67 of AA 1996 allows a party to challenge the tribunal's jurisdictional ruling after the tribunal has ruled on the matter.

With the introduction of Article 5 of AA 2025, the scope of Section 32 has been clarified. The amendment provides that once the tribunal has ruled on a jurisdictional issue, an application under Section 32 is no longer available:

"(1A) To the extent that the arbitral tribunal has already ruled on a matter relating to jurisdiction, no application may be made under this section."

This amendment codifies the previously accepted interpretation and clarifies that, where the tribunal has ruled, jurisdictional objections must be brought under Section 67 alone. The purpose is to eliminate procedural ambiguity and avoid duplicative litigation, thereby ensuring the efficiency and finality of arbitral proceedings.

This legislative clarification is particularly relevant in commercial arbitration, where time and cost-efficiency are paramount. By streamlining the available avenues for jurisdictional objections, AA 2025 supports the objective of minimizing procedural delays and reinforces arbitration's position as an effective dispute resolution mechanism.

4.2 Status under Turkish Law

Under Article 7/H/I of the IAL, the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle is explicitly recognized. The arbitral tribunal is empowered to decide not only on the substantive merits of the dispute but also on its own jurisdiction, including the existence, validity, and scope of the arbitration agreement.

This provision marked a significant development in Turkish arbitration law, as prior legislation—particularly the now-repealed Code of Civil Procedure No. 1086, which governed domestic arbitration—did not recognize this principle. With the enactment of the IAL in 2001, tribunals were explicitly granted the authority to rule on jurisdiction as a preliminary matter.

Importantly, Turkish law follows the principle of separability of the arbitration agreement, meaning that even if the main contract is declared null and void, the arbitration clause may remain valid and enforceable.

However, while the tribunal is authorized to make a preliminary jurisdictional ruling, ultimate review remains with the state courts. Turkish law does not provide a mechanism similar to Section 32 of AA 1996 for seeking pre-award judicial rulings on jurisdiction. Instead, the sole method of challenging a jurisdictional decision is through a set-aside (annulment) action initiated after the final award is rendered.

Thus, although Turkish law embraces the Kompetenz-Kompetenz doctrine, its application is procedurally narrower and does not offer the same range of judicial interaction as English law.

4.3 Evaluation

Both AA 1996/AA 2025 and the IAL recognize the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle, enabling arbitral tribunals to rule on their own jurisdiction, including challenges to the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement.

However, key procedural differences emerge:

• The UK regime, particularly after AA 2025, delineates a two-tiered approach: (i) Section 32 for pre-ruling challenges, and (ii) Section 67 for post-ruling challenges. The 2025 amendment ensures clarity and procedural discipline, precluding unnecessary court interference after a tribunal has made its decision.
• In contrast, the Turkish regime permits jurisdictional objections to be raised only after the final award via an annulment action, offering a more limited form of judicial review.

In this respect, the English framework presents a more flexible and structured model for addressing jurisdictional objections, balancing party autonomy with judicial oversight. The amendments under AA 2025 further enhance procedural transparency and contribute to the overarching goal of efficient dispute resolution, a standard toward which Turkish arbitration law continues to evolve.

5. The Auxiliary Role of Courts

5.1 Innovations Introduced by AA 2025

Under the Arbitration Act 1996 (AA96), state courts play a crucial auxiliary role in supporting arbitration proceedings by performing various functions such as taking witness statements, preserving evidence, issuing provisional measures. However, these powers were traditionally limited to the parties to the arbitration.

AA 2025 introduces significant changes by extending the powers of state courts to cover third parties who are not parties to the arbitration agreement. This extension enables courts to assist with matters such as evidence preservation or the enforcement of interim measures involving third parties.

Furthermore, third parties are granted the right to object to these court orders, ensuring that their rights and legal security are preserved in the judicial process. This change addresses previously unresolved legal uncertainties surrounding the scope of court powers in arbitration proceedings and clarifies that English courts can now provide comprehensive support for arbitration, including in matters involving non-parties.

The provision aims to resolve potential disputes over whether English courts could exercise such powers in relation to third parties, thus enhancing the overall efficacy and predictability of arbitration proceedings.

5.2 Status under Turkish Law

In contrast, under Article 6 of the International Arbitration Law (IAL), the authority of arbitrators is more limited regarding interim measures. Specifically, arbitrators do not have the authority to issue interim measures that would require enforcement by state authorities or other public institutions. This restriction applies to measures such as provisional attachments or other orders that affect third parties.

As per the IAL, arbitrators may only issue provisional measures or provisional attachments that bind the parties to the arbitration. This means that the arbitral tribunal cannot impose measures or orders that affect third parties who are not involved in the arbitration proceedings.

This limitation reflects the principle that arbitration is based on the voluntary consent of the parties, and thus, external entities or individuals who are not parties to the arbitration cannot be subjected to direct measures or sanctions within the scope of the arbitration process.

5.3 Evaluation

The extension of court powers over third parties under AA 2025 represents a significant advancement in the effectiveness of arbitration proceedings in the United Kingdom. This reform enhances the ability of courts to provide robust support for arbitration, ensuring that interim measures or other actions taken during the course of arbitration can be enforced even when they involve non-parties to the arbitration agreement.

Moreover, the right granted to third parties to object to such measures ensures that their legal rights are respected, striking a balance between the efficiency of arbitration and the protection of third-party interests.

In contrast, Turkish arbitration law presents a more conservative approach, with the IAL limiting court and arbitral intervention to parties to the arbitration. The inability of arbitral tribunals to issue orders that affect third parties or require enforcement by state authorities confines the impact of arbitration decisions and limits the scope of the tribunal's powers. This may result in less flexibility and efficiency in enforcement, particularly in complex cases where third parties are involved.

The UK reform promotes cooperation between the judiciary and arbitration by enabling courts to play a more active role in ensuring the effectiveness of arbitration proceedings. Conversely, the more restricted approach under Turkish law reflects a more traditional view of arbitration as a process that is confined to the consent of the parties and does not extend its effects to third parties.

Thus, the difference in approaches between English and Turkish law underscores the varying degrees of flexibility in the arbitration systems, with the UK adopting a more inclusive and pragmatic approach to court support in arbitration, while Turkey maintains a more limited framework for court intervention in arbitration.

6. Arbitrators' Impartiality and Disclosure Obligation

6.1 AA2025 Provision

A significant innovation introduced by AA2025 is the imposition of an ongoing disclosure obligation for arbitrators. Arbitrators must disclose any circumstances that may reasonably give rise to doubts about their impartiality. This obligation extends beyond the pre-appointment phase and continues throughout the arbitration process. Notably, arbitrators are required to disclose not only what they know but also what they reasonably should know regarding potential conflicts of interest or bias. Additionally, this obligation is mandatory, and the parties cannot waive it through mutual agreement.

This provision codifies principles previously established in English case law, reflecting a commitment to maintaining transparency and impartiality in arbitration proceedings. However, AA2025 does not provide an exhaustive list of specific conditions under which disclosure is required. Instead, it leaves the determination to the circumstances of each case, allowing for flexibility based on the nature of the industry or sector involved. For instance, a situation that might raise concerns about impartiality in one industry may not trigger the same concerns in another. Similarly, the level of diligence expected from an arbitrator may vary depending on the context.

The introduction of this systematic approach is especially beneficial in commercial disputes, where confidence in the impartiality and transparency of the arbitration process is crucial. AA2025 thus enhances the predictability and reliability of arbitration, making it a more attractive option for businesses seeking a fair and efficient resolution mechanism. The mandatory disclosure obligation ensures that arbitrators uphold the highest standards of impartiality, which, in turn, reinforces England's credibility as a hub for international arbitration.

6.2 Status under Turkish Law

Under Article 7 of the Turkish International Arbitration Law (IAL), a proposed arbitrator is required to disclose any circumstances that could potentially affect their impartiality or independence before accepting the appointment. Additionally, if any new circumstances arise during the arbitration process that may affect impartiality, the arbitrator is obligated to disclose these developments immediately. This reflects a dynamic approach to the disclosure obligation, ensuring that arbitrators maintain transparency throughout the proceedings.

In practice, arbitrator candidates must inform the party proposing their appointment about any potential conflicts of interest or other situations that could raise concerns. Once appointed, the arbitrator must formally notify the parties of any such issues. If no objections are raised within the prescribed timeframe, the parties cannot subsequently challenge the arbitrator's appointment on the same grounds.

The duty to disclose is not limited to the pre-appointment phase; it is an ongoing obligation throughout the arbitration process. This obligation encompasses not only professional and economic relationships but also familial, social, or other connections that could create reasonable doubts about the arbitrator's impartiality. The aim is to ensure that the parties can assess the arbitrator's ability to act impartially, allowing for transparency in the decision-making process.

However, an arbitrator who discloses these relationships is not automatically disqualified from the proceedings. The disclosure serves as a tool for the parties to evaluate whether they share concerns about the arbitrator's impartiality. The arbitrator must consider what a reasonable person would expect to be disclosed, taking into account the parties' backgrounds, the nature of the arbitration, and any relevant industry-specific factors.

6.3 Evaluation

The principles of impartiality and independence are foundational to the fairness of arbitration proceedings. Arbitrators must not only be impartial but also appear to be impartial in the eyes of the parties. In this regard, AA2025 significantly strengthens these principles by introducing a continuous disclosure obligation that extends throughout the arbitration process. The provision mandates that arbitrators disclose what they reasonably should know, broadening the scope of the disclosure duty. This ensures that arbitrators maintain transparency and impartiality, contributing to a more predictable and reliable arbitration process.

While AA2025 does not provide a comprehensive list of specific disclosures, its flexible approach allows for case-by-case evaluation. This flexibility accommodates the diverse contexts in which arbitration may occur and accounts for the varying standards of disclosure across different sectors. This approach aligns with the need for sector-specific sensitivity and the perception of impartiality by the parties involved.

Similarly, Turkish arbitration law also emphasizes the disclosure of potential conflicts of interest, extending the obligation beyond the appointment stage to cover the entire arbitration process. Article 7 of the IAL echoes the principles found in AA2025, requiring arbitrators to disclose circumstances that may affect their impartiality and to update the parties about any new developments during the proceedings. In both legal systems, the disclosure obligation reflects a balance between the arbitrator's personal evaluation and the parties' perception of impartiality, with the reasonable person standard being central to the assessment.

Ultimately, the disclosure obligation is not just a procedural formality but a critical ethical responsibility that reinforces the legitimacy of the arbitration process. By minimizing concerns about the arbitrator's impartiality, both English and Turkish arbitration systems foster trust in arbitration as a fair and effective means of dispute resolution. This approach promotes the growth and expansion of arbitration by ensuring that all parties can be confident in the neutrality of the process.

7. Arbitrators' Liability and Resignation

7.1 Provision under AA 2025

AA2025 introduces significant developments concerning the liability and resignation of arbitrators, aimed at reinforcing their independence and institutional protection within arbitration proceedings.

Under the previous legislation (AA96, Section 29), arbitrators were generally granted immunity from liability for acts or omissions carried out in the performance of their duties, provided they had not acted in bad faith. However, this immunity did not extend to resignations, potentially exposing arbitrators to claims for additional costs or damages incurred by the parties due to their withdrawal.

This gap has now been addressed through AA2025, which expands the scope of arbitrators' immunity:

• Courts may no longer hold arbitrators personally liable for costs associated with removal applications, unless bad faith is proven.
• Where an arbitrator resigns, they may only be held financially liable if the resignation is determined to be "unreasonable" in light of all the circumstances.
• The burden of proof lies with the party alleging the unreasonableness of the resignation.

These reforms provide arbitrators with the confidence to step down from proceedings if concerns arise regarding their impartiality or independence, without the fear of facing personal liability. In doing so, AA2025 prevents the risk of arbitrators feeling compelled to remain involved in proceedings purely to avoid litigation or cost-related consequences, even in ethically problematic situations.

This development also provides protection against strategic pressure or abuse by parties who might otherwise attempt to intimidate arbitrators with potential legal action through removal requests. By codifying and limiting liability, the reforms align with the overarching goals of transparency, neutrality, and efficiency in arbitration.

7.2 Status under Turkish Law

Unlike the structured approach under English law, Turkish arbitration law does not contain detailed provisions on arbitrators' liability or resignation in the International Arbitration Law (IAL, Law No. 4686). Therefore, such matters are interpreted based on general legal principles and, in some cases, by analogy to the Turkish Code of Civil Procedure (HMK).

Pursuant to Article 419 of the HMK, unless otherwise agreed, an arbitrator who accepts the appointment but fails to perform their duties without just cause may be held liable for damages suffered by the parties. This provision is primarily applicable to domestic arbitration, but it reflects a general principle that may also inform interpretations in the international arbitration context under Turkish law.

There is, however, no clear statutory framework regulating the consequences of resignation, nor is there a specific mechanism for evaluating whether a resignation is reasonable or justified. Similarly, there is no codified immunity provision for arbitrators in Turkish law comparable to that found in AA2025.

As a result, there is a legal vacuum regarding the protection of arbitrators in Turkish arbitration practice, particularly in relation to their civil liability, which may lead to uncertainties for arbitrators acting under Turkish law.

7.3 Evaluation

The amendments introduced by AA2025 provide a clear, balanced, and comprehensive framework for addressing issues of arbitrator liability and resignation. By expanding immunity and clarifying the conditions under which an arbitrator may be held liable, English law provides a protective and predictable environment for arbitrators to perform their duties independently.

In contrast, the absence of corresponding provisions in Turkish arbitration law may give rise to uncertainty and deter individuals from serving as arbitrators, particularly in complex or high-stakes disputes. The lack of statutory immunity or structured resignation standards potentially leaves arbitrators vulnerable to unfounded claims or financial risk, especially in cases involving dissatisfaction by one or more parties.

Both systems recognize the importance of maintaining arbitrators' independence. However, the English model clearly demonstrates how protective legislation can foster greater confidence in the arbitration process—both for arbitrators and for parties seeking a neutral and stable forum for dispute resolution.

In conclusion, incorporating statutory protections and clearer resignation protocols into Turkish arbitration law would represent a significant improvement. Such reforms would contribute to strengthening institutional trust, encouraging qualified professionals to serve as arbitrators, and enhancing the overall credibility and attractiveness of arbitration in Turkey. Aligning with international best practices in this area would further support Turkey's efforts to establish itself as a competitive arbitration jurisdiction.

8. Emergency Arbitrators and Interim Measures

8.1 Regulation under AA2025

One of the most significant innovations introduced by AA2025 is the codification of the authority and enforceability of emergency arbitrators' decisions, which were previously governed only by institutional arbitration rules and lacked statutory clarity.

Prior to AA2025, many institutional rules—such as those of the ICC or LCIA—allowed for the appointment of emergency arbitrators to issue interim or conservatory measures before the constitution of the main arbitral tribunal. However, the legal effect and enforceability of such decisions under English law remained uncertain, particularly in terms of recognition and judicial support.

AA2025 fills this gap by explicitly recognizing the status and powers of emergency arbitrators, thereby integrating them into the statutory framework of the Arbitration Act. Key features of this reform include:

• Emergency arbitrators are granted authority to issue binding decisions with enforceable legal consequences;
• Their orders may compel a party to act or refrain from acting within a specific time frame;
• Non-compliance with an emergency arbitrator's order entitles the opposing party to apply to the courts for enforcement, as if the order were made by the full arbitral tribunal;
• Sections 41 and 42 of AA96, which govern the enforcement of arbitral orders and procedural powers, are now extended to cover emergency arbitrators' decisions.

This change represents a substantial strengthening of interim relief mechanisms in arbitration, offering parties rapid, enforceable solutions in time-sensitive situations such as evidence preservation, asset dissipation, or breach prevention. Although AA2025 does not regulate the appointment process for emergency arbitrators, it refers this matter to institutional arbitration rules, while providing a clear statutory enforcement mechanism.

By bridging the gap between institutional procedure and national enforcement, AA2025 enhances the predictability and credibility of emergency measures and reinforces England's position as a leading arbitration hub.

8.2 Status under Turkish Law

The Turkish International Arbitration Law (IAL) does not contain explicit provisions regarding the appointment, powers, or enforceability of emergency arbitrators. In practice, the use of emergency arbitration is typically governed by the arbitration rules chosen by the parties (e.g., ICC, ISTAC, or LCIA rules).

While institutional rules adopted by parties may permit the appointment of an emergency arbitrator and empower them to issue interim measures, the IAL does not clarify how such measures are to be recognized or enforced by Turkish courts.

Moreover, under Article 6 of the IAL, arbitrators (including emergency arbitrators) may not issue provisional measures or attachments that require coercive enforcement or affect third parties. Only state courts may issue such binding orders with enforceability toward third parties or via public authorities.

Thus, while emergency arbitrators may issue interim relief within the scope of party autonomy, their decisions remain legally non-binding under Turkish law unless voluntarily complied with, or unless the relevant court is petitioned to issue a corresponding measure under the Code of Civil Procedure (HMK) or the IAL's court assistance provisions.

8.3 Evaluation

The reforms introduced by AA2025 mark a significant advancement in ensuring that emergency arbitration decisions are not merely symbolic but fully enforceable, thereby closing a longstanding gap in English arbitration law.

By allowing emergency arbitrators' decisions to be treated with the same procedural standing as those issued by a constituted tribunal, AA2025 offers parties legal certainty and enhances the efficiency and responsiveness of the arbitration process—especially in urgent, high-stakes commercial disputes.

In contrast, Turkish arbitration law continues to lack a clear legislative framework regarding emergency arbitration. The absence of statutory recognition or enforcement mechanisms for emergency arbitrator decisions may deter parties from relying on emergency arbitration when operating under Turkish law, or create uncertainties in implementation, even when international rules are adopted.

In this context, the AA2025 model offers a valuable comparative framework for Turkish lawmakers. Incorporating similar provisions into Turkish law would align domestic arbitration practices with international standards, strengthen interim protection mechanisms, and enhance the credibility of Turkey as a venue for resolving urgent cross-border disputes.

9. General Evaluation

The Arbitration Act 2025(AA2025) constitutes a substantive reform rather than a mere technical amendment to the Arbitration Act 1996 (AA96). This legislative development reflects a deliberate evolution of the United Kingdom's arbitration framework, striking a prudent balance between preserving the foundational principles of arbitration and addressing the needs of contemporary dispute resolution practice.

Through enhanced procedural clarity, increased transparency, and institutional efficiency, AA2025 introduces notable improvements in the following key areas:

• Clarification of the law applicable to arbitration agreements, eliminating legal uncertainty;
• Empowerment of arbitral tribunals through mechanisms such as summary disposal and jurisdictional autonomy;
• Codification of emergency arbitrators' authority and the enforceability of their decisions;
• Expansion of court assistance, including measures applicable to third parties;
• Strengthening arbitrator independence, through mandatory and ongoing disclosure obligations and extended immunity.

These amendments reflect a modern approach to arbitration that is responsive to the evolving expectations of commercial actors, legal practitioners, and arbitral institutions. In doing so, the United Kingdom has reinforced its position as a leading global seat of arbitration, ensuring alignment with international best practices while preserving the procedural flexibility and judicial support that characterize English arbitration law.

By contrast, while Turkish arbitration law, particularly Law No. 4686 on International Arbitration (IAL), reflects core international principles such as party autonomy and Kompetenz-Kompetenz, it continues to rely heavily on doctrinal interpretation and judicial practice to address procedural ambiguities. The absence of express provisions on matters such as emergency arbitrators, summary disposal, or expanded court assistance results in a framework that, although functional, may present practical limitations in urgent or complex cross-border disputes.

In this regard, the legislative technique and conceptual clarity of AA2025 can serve as a comparative model for potential reform in Turkish arbitration law. Incorporating similar provisions would not only promote greater legal certainty but also strengthen Turkey's institutional attractiveness as an international arbitration seat.

In conclusion, AA2025 embodies a forward-looking, cohesive, and technically sound reform package. It addresses long-standing gaps, codifies best practices, and introduces mechanisms that enhance the fairness, efficiency, and enforceability of arbitration. This reform is expected to consolidate the United Kingdom's reputation as a jurisdiction of choice for international arbitration and serves as a valuable reference point for other jurisdictions—including Turkey—seeking to modernize and strengthen their arbitration regimes.

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