Legal & Judicial Updates (December 2025)

NOTABLE JUDGEMENTS DECEMBER 2025

ARBITRATION LAW

1. Case Title: Harshbir Singh Pannu & Anr. v. Jaswinder Singh [Click Here].

Citation: 2025 INSC 1400

Decided on: 08.12.2025

Facts: The Appellants and Respondent were partners in a firm governed by a partnership deed containing an arbitration clause requiring disputes to be referred to a sole arbitrator. Disputes arose, leading the Appellants to invoke arbitration. A Sole Arbitrator was appointed, and proceedings commenced. The arbitrator determined his fee under the Fourth Schedule to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

A key contentious matter before the arbitral tribunal was non-payment of arbitration fees, leading to termination of proceedings by the arbitrator under Section 38 of the Act after both parties failed to pay their respective shares. Aggrieved, the Appellants challenged the termination in the High Court, which rejected their petition and refused relief. The Appellants approached the Supreme Court by Special Leave Petition.

Issue:

1. What meaning should be ascribed to the words "termination of the arbitral proceedings" figuring in the different provisions of the Act, 1996? Is the phrase susceptible to only one meaning?
2. What is the meaning and effect of the termination of arbitral proceedings contemplated under Section 38 of the Act, 1996? Is it the same as the termination of arbitral proceedings contemplated under Section 32?
3. What is the remedy available to a party aggrieved by an order passed by an arbitral tribunal terminating the proceedings?

Judgment:

Answering the first and second issues, the judgment authored by Justice Pardiwala in detail held that the termination of proceedings under Section 38 (due to non-payment of an arbitrator's fees) would have the same effect of termination as the termination of arbitral proceedings contemplated under Section 32.

"The common thread that runs across Sections 25, 30, 32, and 38 of the Act, 1996 respectively is that although the arbitral proceedings may get terminated for varied reasons, yet the consequence of such termination remains the same i.e., the arbitral reference stands concluded and the authority of the tribunal stands extinguished.", the court held.

With respect to the third question of law, the Court held that the appropriate course is that the aggrieved party must seek recall of the termination order before the arbitral tribunal itself, which is obliged to consider whether the termination ought to be sustained. Where the tribunal recalls the order and revives the arbitral proceedings, no immediate judicial remedy lies, and the party must participate in the arbitration, reserving its challenge, if any, to the final award under Section 34 of the Act.

However, where the tribunal rejects the recall application, the aggrieved party may approach the court under Section 14(2). In such proceedings, the court will examine whether the mandate of the arbitrator stood validly terminated in law. If the court finds the termination to be illegal or without jurisdiction, it may set aside the termination order and either remand the matter to the same tribunal or, where warranted, appoint a substitute arbitrator in terms of Section 15 of the Act.

2. Case Title: Mohan Lal Fatehpuria vs. M/S Bharat Textiles & Ors. [Click Here]

Citation: SLP (C) No. 13759,13779 of 2025.

Decided on: 10.12.2025

Facts

The Appellants (husband and wife) and the Respondents were partners under a 1992 partnership deed containing an arbitration clause. Upon disputes arising, the Delhi High Court appointed a sole arbitrator in March 2020 to resolve the disputes. The arbitrator entered the reference and issued various procedural directions, including deposits towards administrative expenses. Proceedings stalled, and the tribunal failed to render an award within the statutory period under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

The Appellants filed petitions under Section 29A (6) seeking substitution of the arbitrator and extension of time, but the High Court declined substitution and instead extended the arbitrator's mandate by four months. The Appellants challenged this order before the Supreme Court

Issues:

1. Whether the mandate of a sole arbitrator terminates by operation of law on expiry of the statutory period under Section 29A.
2. Whether the High Court erred in extending the mandate instead of substituting the arbitrator in terms of Section 29A (6).
3. What is the proper interpretation of Sections 29A (4) and 29A (6) of the Act.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and quashed the High Court's order. It held that:

• Under Section 29A (4) of the Arbitration Act, if an award is not made within the prescribed one-year period (post completion of pleadings, with pandemic exclusions), the mandate of the arbitrator automatically terminates by operation of law, unless the Court has extended the period.
• Once the arbitrator's mandate has expired, he becomes functus officio, and continuation by the same arbitrator is not permissible in law.
• Where the mandate ceases to exist, the Court is empowered and obligated under Section 29A (6) to substitute a new arbitrator so that the arbitration continues expeditiously from the stage already reached.
• The High Court erred in merely extending the arbitrator's mandate without substituting him, as the statutory period had already expired.
• Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order, terminated the mandate of the original arbitrator by operation of law, and appointed Mr. Justice Najmi Waziri (former Judge, Delhi High Court) as the substituted sole arbitrator. The arbitration was directed to resume and conclude within six months from the date of the order.

3. Case Title: Shri Colonizers and Developers Pvt. Ltd. Thru. Director and Another vs. Abha Gupta [Click Here]

Citation: 2025: AHC-LKO:84193-DB

Decided on: 16.12.2025

Facts:

The Appellant challenged an order passed by a Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court (Commercial Division) in an execution proceeding arising out of an arbitral award in an international commercial arbitration. The Appellant contended that the execution application under Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ought to have been entertained by the District Commercial Court rather than the High Court.

The dispute concerned enforcement of a domestic award rendered in the context of an international commercial arbitration whose seat was in India. The Respondent had initially filed an execution application before the District Commercial Court, but later withdrew it and filed it before the High Court's Commercial Division.

Issue:

Whether a High Court Commercial Division has exclusive jurisdiction to enforce a domestic arbitral award arising out of an international commercial arbitration, or whether such enforcement lies before the District Commercial Court under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

Judgment:

The Allahabad High Court (Division Bench) upheld the impugned order and concluded that the High Court is the appropriate forum to enforce a domestic arbitral award made in the context of international commercial arbitration where the seat of arbitration is in India.

The Court analysed the interplay between Sections 2(1)(e), 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The Court noted that Section 36 requires awards to be enforced "in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure", but does not specify the enforcing forum. Consequently, the Court held that the definition of "Court" in Section 2(1)(e)(ii) of the Arbitration Act governs the question of competence. Under Section 2(1)(e)(ii), in the case of an arbitration falling within the definition of "international commercial arbitration," the term Court refers to a High Court having ordinary civil jurisdiction in relation to the subject matter. The Court reasoned that since the arbitration in question was international commercial arbitration and the award domestic, the enforcing forum must be the High Court, which alone qualifies under Section 2(1)(e)(ii). As a result, the High Court affirmed that the Commercial Division of the High Court was the correct forum for enforcement under Section 36, and dismissed the Special Appeal.

4. Case Title: M/s Khubi Ram Rajiv Kumar & Co. Thr Partner v. M/s Naveen Enterprises and Ors. [Click Here]

Citation: 2025: DHC :11674

Decided on: 20.12.2025

Facts:

The Appellant, a partnership firm engaged in commission agency business, supplied cloth and fabrics to the Respondents on credit, maintaining a running account. As of 01.04.2011, an outstanding amount of ₹1,92,483.46 was due, evidenced by invoices/bijaks and account statements. The invoices contained printed terms, including clauses for arbitration and interest.

After the Respondents failed to pay, the Appellant issued a demand letter and legal notice and invoked the arbitration clause under the Delhi Hindustani Mercantile Association's rules.

The Respondents did not appear in the arbitration, resulting in an ex parte award dated 31.03.2014. The Appellant challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, contending that the arbitrator erred in rejecting the claim for interest despite contractual stipulations and trade usage.

The District Court dismissed the objections, holding that they sought mere re-appreciation of evidence and did not show patent illegality.

Issue:

Whether the learned Arbitrator as well as the District Court was justified in rejecting the Petitioner's claim for interest, despite the existence of a contractual stipulation relating thereto and the statutory framework governing the award of interest under the A&C Act. Judgment:

The High Court examined the contractual documents and found that the invoices clearly contained a clause providing for interest at 1.75% per month (equivalent to 21% per annum).

• Under Section 28(3) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, the arbitrator was obliged to consider contractual terms and trade usages. Disregarding such provisions rendered the award patently illegal.
• The Court also noted that under Section 31(7) of the Act, an arbitral tribunal has the power to include interest between the cause of action and the award and thereafter on the awarded sum.
• The District Court erred in characterising the objections as merely factual re- appreciation, failing to apply the statutory framework and contractual terms.
• Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal to the extent that the rejection of the claim for interest could not be sustained.
• The impugned judgment and the arbitral award dated 31.03.2014 were set aside insofar as they rejected the claim for interest.

CRIMINAL LAW

1. Case Title: State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohd. Arshad Khan

Bench: Sanjay Karol & N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ (Click here)

The aforementioned case is the result of an appeal filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh against the judgment passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in petitions for quashing preferred by persons accused under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 3/25/30 of the Arms Act 1959.

During the investigation of the case, it was prima facie found that the accused, along with the concerned arms license holders, were involved in acts relating to forgery, concealment of material facts, and submission of false affidavits in connection with the processing and issuance of arms licenses.

Subsequently, a writ petition was filed by the accused under Article 226 before the Allahabad High Court seeking quashing of the FIR and protection from arrest. However, the Court, relying on Shobhit Nehra v. State of U.P¹., refused to quash the FIR, and directed completion of the investigation within 90 days, and granted protection from arrest till the concerned court takes cognizance of the matter. The State, in furtherance, filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. The primary issues that the court dealt with were, firstly, whether directing a time-bound investigation, while disposing of a petition for quashing without granting the relief actually prayed for, is legally sustainable and justified, or not and secondly, whether protecting from arrest, while disposing of a petition for quashing without granting the relief actually prayed for, is legally sustainable and justified, or not.

2. Case Title: Bal Kumar Patel @ Raj Kumar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh Bench: Sanjay Karol & N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ (Click here)

In the aforementioned case, the appellant was a holder of a valid arms license issued by the competent authority. Meanwhile, a common FIR dated 12 June 2007 was registered against him, alleging violations of the Arms Act, 1959, and IPC offences relating to forgery and cheating. These FIRs led to multiple criminal cases (2007) under Sections 25, 27, 30 of the Arms Act and Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 of the IPC. Subsequently, a chargesheet was filed on 25 July 2007, and cognizance was taken on 10 August 2007. However, the Arms license, which was earlier cancelled in 2009, was restored by the District Magistrate on 11 July 2012. In 2014, the State Government issued a Government Order (GO) deciding to withdraw prosecution in three Arms Act cases in the public interest and interest of justice. Pursuant to the GO, the Public Prosecutor filed applications under Section 321 CrPC seeking withdrawal. However, permission of the High Court, as required by Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India⁴, was not obtained. Hence, the Trial Court refused to permit withdrawal and instead granted 30 days to obtain the High Court's permission. But the State failed to seek permission. Further, the Appellant filed applications under Section 482 CrPC / Section 528 BNSS before the Allahabad High Court seeking quashing. However, the High Court dismissed all applications, and as a result, the Appellant approached the Supreme Court under Article 136. The court primarily dealt with three main issues:

• Whether criminal proceedings could be quashed when the withdrawal of prosecution lacked mandatory High Court permission.
• Whether the refusal by the High Court to quash proceedings was legally justified.
• Whether the scope of judicial duty applies when considering the withdrawal of prosecution involving MPs/MLAs.

The Court came to the conclusion that the withdrawal of prosecution against MPs/MLAs without prior leave of the High Court is legally impermissible, and criminal proceedings cannot be quashed on that basis. Hence, the Appeals were dismissed, and the refusal to quash criminal proceedings was upheld, by expressing no opinion on the merits of the criminal cases. The Appellant was put at liberty to raise all contentions at the discharge stage or during trial. The Court opined that the withdrawal of prosecution under Section 321 CrPC requires an independent application of mind by the Public Prosecutor and the consent of the court, which must ensure that such withdrawal is bona fide, in public interest, and not intended to stifle the course of justice, as per the case of State of Kerala v. K. Ajith⁵ and State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey⁶. In the present case, although the State decided to withdraw the prosecution and the Public Prosecutor moved an application under Section 321 CrPC, no permission of the High Court was obtained as required by law. In the absence of such permission, the withdrawal was legally impermissible.

Accordingly, the Trial Court rightly refused consent for withdrawal, and the High Court correctly declined to exercise its powers under Section 482 CrPC / Section 528 BNSS to quash the proceedings. Hence, no interference was warranted.

3. Case Title: Farookh vs. Kayyakkutty @ Kadeeja Bench: Kauser Edappagath, J (Click here)

In the aforementioned case, a revision petition is filed challenging an order passed by the Family Court, Tirur, in M.C. No. 229/2022. The respondent in this case is a mother who filed a petition under Section 125 CrPC seeking maintenance of ₹25,000 per month from her son, the petitioner in this case. Where the Family Court, in its order dated 19.07.2025, awarded ₹5,000 per month, which was challenged by her son.

The Petitioner contended that the respondent earned income through cattle rearing, and her husband is a fisherman owning a boat and efficiently maintains her. Meanwhile, he himself has his own wife and child to maintain. While the respondent argued that she has no employment or independent income, and the petitioner, employed in the Gulf, has sufficient means to maintain her.

The court primarily dealt with two main issues:

• Whether an aged mother can claim maintenance from her son despite her husband being alive.
• Whether the maintenance awarded was excessive or unreasonable.

The Court held that a mother's right to maintenance from her children under Section 125 CrPC / Section 144 BNSS is independent of her husband's obligation, and a son with sufficient means cannot evade this duty. Hence, the revision petition was dismissed, and the maintenance of ₹5,000 per month was upheld.

The Court opined that Section 125 CrPC / Section 144 BNSS is a measure of social justice and must be construed liberally. So, the obligation of a son to maintain his mother is independent of the husband's duty to maintain her. Even if the husband has income, the son cannot avoid his statutory duty if the mother is unable to maintain herself.

Further, the allegations of cattle rearing income were unsupported by evidence, and the petitioner, despite disputing income, failed to produce proof and did not depose. While the petitioner's obligation to his wife and child does not absolve him of responsibility towards his aged mother, considering the petitioner's means and the needs of the respondent, the maintenance awarded was reasonable.

4. Case Title: Dinesh Kumar Srivastava vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others Bench: Pankaj Bhatia, J. (Click here)

In the aforementioned case, an FIR was registered under Sections 376, 506, 406, 323, 504 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) SC/ST Act against the applicant, where the informant alleged that she met the applicant on jeevansathi.com. She disclosed her Scheduled Caste status and contended that she entered into a relationship involving physical intimacy on the false promise of marriage. It was further alleged that the applicant took money from her and later refused to marry. While the applicant contended that the relationship was consensual and lasted for a substantial period, and hence lacked allegations attracting Section 376 IPC. Additionally, the applicant had previously failed to secure bail before the High Court and the SC/ST Court, and he now appears apprehensive of arrest despite no material indicating his guilt.

The primary issue to be decided was, whether anticipatory bail can be granted despite the bar under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act when the application is filed under Section 482 BNSS. The Court held that the bar under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act does not apply to an anticipatory bail application filed under Section 482 BNSS, and consensual relationships without prima facie evidence of rape justify the grant of anticipatory bail. Hence, the application was allowed, and anticipatory bail was granted. In the event of arrest, the applicant was released on anticipatory bail on furnishing a personal bond of ₹20,000 and two sureties of ₹20,000 each, with the following conditions imposed, i.e., Attendance at all hearings, no commission of similar offences, no inducement, threat, or tampering with evidence, and no travel outside India without the Court's permission.

The Court opined that Section 18 of the SC/ST Act bars anticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC, but the present application was filed under Section 482 BNSS, making the bar inapplicable. Further, the FIR indicated a consensual relationship over a considerable period without allegations of force or lack of consent, and given the informant's age and the absence of prima facie material constituting Section 376 IPC, the applicant was entitled to anticipatory bail.

To read this article in full, please click here.

Footnotes

2. [1901] AC 495.

3. (2021) 19 SCC 401.

4. 2021(20) SCC 599.

5. (2021) 17 SCC 318.

6. 1957 SCC OnLine SC 22.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.