In Curtin v. United Trademark Holdings, Inc., No. 2023-2050 (Fed. Cir. May 21, 2025), the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's (TTAB) dismissal of Rebecca Curtin's opposition to United Trademark Holdings, Inc.'s (UTH) registration of the mark RAPUNZEL for dolls and toy figures.
Background
UTH, a doll seller, applied to register the trademark RAPUNZEL for dolls and toy figures. The USPTO approved the application and published the mark for opposition. Ms. Curtin, a trademark law professor and allegedly interested doll collector and consumer, filed an opposition, asserting that the mark was generic, descriptive, functional, and failed to function as a trademark, and that UTH's application contained fraudulent statements as to its exclusive right to use the mark. For her injury, Ms. Curtin alleged "'[she] and other consumers will be denied access to healthy marketplace competition for products that represent' Rapunzel," and "will face increased cost of goods," and that the mark, if registered, would "chill creation of new dolls and toys of the fairytale, crowding out the substantial social benefit of having diverse interpreters of the fairy tale's legacy." UTH denied Ms. Curtin's allegations and asserted as a threshold issue that Ms. Curtin was not "entitle[d] to a statutory cause of action" and therefore did not have standing to oppose its application.
TTAB Decision
The TTAB first addressed the issue of standing and concluded that, as a mere consumer, Ms. Curtin lacked statutory standing to oppose registration under 15 U.S.C. § 1063. To assess the issue, the TTAB applied the Lexmark framework, developed by the Supreme Court in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014), and extended by Corcamore, LLC v. SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Due to Ms. Curtin's lack of standing, the TTAB dismissed the opposition without addressing the merits. Ms. Curtin timely appealed the dismissal to the Federal Circuit.
Federal Circuit Decision
The Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB's dismissal, finding that the TTAB (1) correctly relied upon Lexmark and Corcamore as controlling and (2) correctly applied the Lexmark framework.
In her appeal, Ms. Curtin first argued that the TTAB erred in applying the Lexmark and Corcamore line of cases because they addressed entitlement to sue under 12 U.S.C. § 1125(a) and 15 U.S.C. § 1064, respectively. Since Ms. Curtin's opposition arose out of § 1063, she argued that Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999), should control. Ms. Curtin contended that, as Ritchie held, the appropriate test for standing to oppose a mark under § 1063 was that an "opposer must have a 'real interest' in the proceedings and must have a 'reasonable' basis for his belief of damage."
The Federal Circuit found Ms. Curtin's arguments for reliance on Ritchie to be unpersuasive on multiple fronts and held that the Lexmark framework was the appropriate test for standing. Ms. Curtin's claims that UTH's mark was generic, descriptive, and failed to function as a trademark were "rooted in commercial interests[.]" Ritchie was distinguishable because, although the basis for opposition was codified under § 1063, it was rooted in injuries of disparagement and reputational harm, not commercial interests. The court found that Lexmark and Corcamore "provide the better line of cases by which to evaluate Ms. Curtin's ability to bring her opposition" because the framework in those cases assesses a challenge based on harm to commercial interests. Moreover, even though neither Lexmark nor Corcamore pertains to § 1063, given "'the linguistic and functional similarities between [§ 1063 and § 1064, . . . t]here is no basis for interpreting them differently." Finally, the court found that even if Ms. Curtin could successfully show that Ritchie, rather than Lexmark and Corcamore, applied, she failed to show how Ritchie's "real-interest" test would change the outcome. Therefore, the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB's decision to analyze a trademark opposition based in commercial interests under § 1063 using the same analysis as for cancelation for commercial interests under § 1064, namely, the Lexmark framework.
The Federal Circuit then proceeded to affirm the TTAB's application of the Lexmark framework.The framework required Ms. Curtin to show that (1) her interests were within the "zone of interests" protected by the statute and (2) she had a reasonable belief that she would be damaged by registration of the mark. Ms. Curtin could not satisfy either prong.
In Corcamore, the Federal Circuit explained that "the purpose of the zone-of-interests test is to foreclose[ ] suit only when a plaintiff's interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress authorized that plaintiff to sue." In assessing Ms. Curtin's claim, the court held that "the zone-of-interests test should be tailored based on the specific bases cited for opposing registration ... for a mark." As discussed, Ms. Curtin cited commercial interests as her basis for opposing UTH's mark. The court noted that, although "trademark law exists to some extent to protect consumers ... the Supreme Court has explained that this goal may be served by conferring rights that only commercial actors have statutory standing to exercise." Therefore, the Federal Circuit affirmed that the TTAB's holding was consistent with the Lanham Act: only affected commercial actors can assert commercial interests within the zone of interests protected by the statute. Ms. Curtin, a consumer rather than a commercial actor, did not meet this requirement.
In the second prong of the Lemark framework, the TTAB had concluded that Ms. Curtin's evidence of her alleged injury was too "limited" and "remote," and the Federal Circuit agreed. Quoting Lexmark, the TTAB "held that a person opposing a registration 'must show economic or reputational injury flowing directly from' the registration, and '[t]hat showing is generally not made when' a defendant's conduct produces injuries to a fellow commercial actor that in turn affect the plaintiff." As a consumer, Ms. Curtin relied on speculative and general economic theories, so her "allegations of harm were at best downstream effects of harms to commercial actors and were too remote to support a reasonable belief in injury."
In sum, the Federal Court agreed with all aspects of the TTAB's holding: the Lexmark framework was the appropriate test for standing, and under this test, Ms. Curtin, a mere consumer, did not qualify.
Read more here. The case is Curtin v. United Trademark Holdings, Inc., No. 2023-2050 (Fed. Cir. May 21, 2025).
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