One Year After Seven County: Trends In NEPA Review And Litigation Risk

One year ago, on May 29, 2025, the US Supreme Court issued its unanimous decision in Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, which established a “course correction” to bring agency compliance and judicial review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) back in line with the statutory text.¹ The Court aimed to rein in practices by agencies and lower courts that over time had expanded the NEPA process beyond its statutory basis and to clarify that courts must afford substantial deference to agency decision-making in implementing this procedural statute.²

Federal courts have since applied Seven County consistently across a broad range of NEPA disputes. Based on a review of dozens of district and circuit court decisions applying Seven County, this alert provides a one-year retrospective, highlighting key trends and practical takeaways for entities navigating NEPA review. The emerging case law reflects a strong and consistent trend demonstrating that lower courts are embracing the Supreme Court’s directive to defer to agency judgments across nearly every dimension of the NEPA process.

At the same time, a handful of cases signal that there are limits to the deference that agencies enjoy post-Seven County. Agencies continue to face litigation risk as a court may find that they failed to satisfy specific regulatory requirements or reasonably explain their approach in the administrative record.

Background

As discussed in our prior client alert, Seven County reoriented NEPA review by both narrowing the scope of analysis required under NEPA and requiring greater judicial deference to agency determinations in implementing NEPA. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that courts must afford “substantial deference” to agency judgments in NEPA analysis and decline to “micromanage” fact-dependent decisions so long as they fall within a “broad zone of reasonableness.”³ The Court emphasized that NEPA is “a procedural cross-check, not a substantive roadblock,” and that the ultimate question is whether the agency’s decision was “reasonable and reasonably explained,” not whether the analysis was perfect.⁴

Further, the Court clarified the scope of NEPA analysis in two ways. First, NEPA requires agencies to focus on the effects of the “proposed action” (i.e., the “project at hand”), not separate projects that are geographically or temporally distinct, even if those projects are foreseeable.⁵ Seven County makes clear that agencies must have broad latitude to draw a “manageable line” between such projects.⁶ Second, agencies are not required to analyze the environmental impacts of projects over which they have no authority.⁷ The decision did not specifically address how agencies should treat cumulative effects of a proposed action and acknowledged that agencies will need to make judgments in close cases where it is not clear whether one project is separate from another, leaving agencies and lower courts to confront these issues case by case in the highly deferential landscape.⁸

One Year Later: How Lower Courts Are Applying Seven County

Our analysis of 44⁹ post-Seven County district and circuit court decisions that substantively applied Seven County identified several trends and issues to watch.

Trends

1. Deference permeates all aspects of NEPA review. Courts repeatedly cite Seven County’s admonition that deference is the “bedrock” of judicial review of NEPA claims, and they consistently broadly defer to agencies on methodological choices,¹⁰ range-of-alternatives determinations,¹¹ sufficiency of detail¹² and scope-of-analysis determinations.¹³ Taken together, these decisions confirm that Seven County operates as a cross-cutting constraint on judicial second-guessing of agency determinations regarding the scope of reviews under NEPA. Agencies prevailed in over 80% of the cases we examined, with losses largely confined to narrow, case-specific issues. Generally, if an agency’s analytical choices fall within a “broad zone of reasonableness,” the agency’s review will be found to have satisfied NEPA. For agencies and project proponents, these cases suggest a favorable environment for defending NEPA documents.
2. Agencies have wide latitude to draw a “manageable line” when defining the scope of NEPA analysis. Prior to Seven County, a limited set of cases used the “manageable line” concept to exclude from NEPA review only those activities outside an agency’s jurisdiction.¹⁴ Under Seven County, courts are now especially deferential to agency decisions to exclude impacts from actions that fall outside the reviewing agency’s jurisdiction.¹⁵ Moreover, post-Seven County cases extend the “manageable line” concept to other NEPA scope determinations¹⁶ and consistently uphold agency decisions to exclude geographically or temporally distinct projects and future, contingent actions from the scope of analysis, even if their effects are foreseeable.¹⁷ Courts have not necessarily required agencies to explain the lines drawn on what to exclude—in some cases, courts have simply inferred the lines and then deferred to agencies’ apparent choices.¹⁸ Nonetheless, despite agencies’ broad discretion, project sponsors should work with agencies early to define the proposed action description and scope of analysis, and ensure that the written record reflects a clear rationale for excluding activities as separate in time, place or regulatory authority.
3. Cumulative impacts remain a potential vulnerability (for now). Courts generally defer to agency assessments of cumulative impacts.¹⁹ Nevertheless, agencies may fall short if they exclude obviously adjacent projects or skip the analysis altogether.²⁰ That said, as discussed in our prior client alert, new NEPA procedures have omitted express requirements to conduct cumulative impact analysis. As time passes, therefore, courts will apply those new procedures, and litigation risk related to cumulative impact analysis likely will decline. For now, the key takeaway is that cumulative impacts remain a potential vulnerability, especially for decisions made under prior procedures, but future risk will depend on how courts interpret and apply the new, more flexible NEPA procedures.
4. There are bounds on the “broad zone of reasonableness.” Even after Seven County, agencies cannot gloss over regulatory requirements or basic administrative law principles.²¹ For example, the District of Washington vacated a Forest Service NEPA analysis because project maps and a “condition-based management” plan were too vague to comply with NEPA’s requirement to ensure a “hard look” at impacts and enable the public to provide meaningful comment.²² In another case, the District of Alaska held that the Forest Service violated NEPA by defining the project’s purpose and need so narrowly—by baking in projected growth assumptions—that it effectively predetermined the outcome and foreclosed consideration of reasonable alternatives.²³ These post-Seven County agency losses generally suggest that project proponents and agencies should remain attentive to the fundamental tenets of NEPA review and ensure the analysis is reasonable and explained in the record.
5. Even when courts find that agencies have fallen short, they have gravitated toward remand without vacatur. Seven County underscored that a NEPA deficiency does not necessarily require vacating an agency decision. The central question is whether the agency had sufficient information to make an informed decision.²⁴ Post-Seven County, courts have elected to remand deficient NEPA analyses without vacating the agency decision in cases where the NEPA error was discrete and not structural and where vacatur would have severe on-the-ground consequences.²⁵ For project sponsors, this trend provides some reassurance that NEPA deficiencies are less likely to unravel approvals of projects, particularly where the administrative record demonstrates a substantively informed decision and the equities weigh against project disruption. That said, advancing projects to key milestones (e.g., receiving a Notice to Proceed and initiating construction) can strengthen arguments against vacatur, and project sponsors should ensure that the underlying substantive approvals are well-supported in the record. In a post-Seven County landscape where plaintiffs may shift focus to non-NEPA claims, as discussed below, a defensible record across all governing statutes is increasingly critical both on the merits and in avoiding remedies that lead to extremely costly and disruptive delays.

Issues to Watch

1. Application of Seven County deference beyond NEPA. Some courts have begun applying Seven County’s principles of agency discretion and deference in regulatory matters across other statutes. For example, the Western District of North Carolina deferred to the definition of the “action area” delineated in a Biological Opinion considering effects to protected wildlife and plant species under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), finding that it fell within the “broad zone of reasonableness.”²⁶ The Ninth Circuit similarly invoked Seven County to grant heightened deference to the National Marine Fisheries Service’s critical habitat designations under the ESA.²⁷ To date, courts have not explicitly applied Seven County principles to reviews of historic properties under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), but the procedural similarities between Section 106 and NEPA suggest that there are arguments supporting increased deference in those areas as well.
2. Shifting plaintiff focus to other statutes. Given the increased difficulty of prevailing on NEPA claims, plaintiffs will likely shift their focus to other statutes, including the ESA, the NHPA, and substantive authorizing and land management statutes. Ensuring that the record demonstrates compliance with these other statutes and supports a substantive decision will be critical for the long-term durability of federal approvals.
3. Interpretation of new NEPA procedures. The court decisions since Seven County generally relate to agency actions developed under prior NEPA frameworks, including the now-removed Council on Environmental Quality regulations.²⁸ As courts begin reviewing agency actions under the current frameworks—which generally afford agencies greater discretion and impose fewer prescriptive analytical requirements (including, in many cases, eliminating a stand-alone cumulative effects analysis)—we expect the basis for further judicial deference on outstanding issues such as cumulative effects to be stronger, a point on which agencies have lost even post-Seven County.²⁹

Conclusion

One year after Seven County, the emerging case law confirms that the decision has meaningfully reshaped the NEPA landscape in ways that favor agencies and project proponents. Courts are consistently applying a highly deferential standard of review, giving agencies broad latitude to define the scope of analysis and to make methodological judgments, while limiting successful challenges to narrow, record-specific deficiencies. At the same time, Seven County has not eliminated litigation risk: Agencies—and applicants working with them—must continue to ensure that NEPA analyses and the agencies’ subsequent substantive decisions are grounded in the governing regulations and procedures, clearly explained in the administrative record and coordinated with compliance under all applicable environmental statutes. While project proponents will likely experience greater certainty afforded by Seven County, continued evolution in the case law is anticipated in the coming months.

WilmerHale advises clients across industries on issues relating to project design and siting, federal and state permitting, environmental review under NEPA and analogous statutes, stakeholder engagement and agency negotiations, and related enforcement and litigation. Drawing on experience before key federal and state agencies and deep cross‑disciplinary capabilities, we help clients navigate complex and evolving regulatory frameworks, develop and permit large-scale projects, and manage associated litigation and compliance risks.

Footnotes

1. Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle Cnty., 605 U.S. 168 (2025).

2. Id. at 184.

3. Id. at 169, 192.

4. Id. at 173, 185.

5. Id. at 190.

6.The “manageable line” concept was emphasized in Seven County but originated in pre-Seven County case law. See Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 n.7 (1983); Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004).

7.Seven Cnty., 605 U.S. at 188.

8. Id. at 190 (“[t]here may be a gray area” but “a court should defer to an agency so long as the agency drew a reasonable and ‘manageable line’” (quoting Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 767)).

9. As of publication on June 5, 2026.

10. See, e.g., Standing Trees, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 1:24-cv-138-JL-TSM, 2025 WL 2411206, at *11 (D.N.H. Aug. 20, 2025) (finding agency’s decision to rely on state water quality data rather than producing baseline water quality data fell “within a broad zone of reasonableness” (quoting Seven Cnty., 605 U.S. at 183)).

11. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 141 F.4th 976, 998 (9th Cir. 2025) (finding agency’s use of a full field development standard to select alternatives fell within a “broad zone of reasonableness” (quoting Seven Cnty., 605 U.S. at 183)).

12. See, e.g., Gas Transmission Nw., L.L.C. v. FERC, 157 F.4th 674, 713 (5th Cir. 2025) (holding that agency determinations regarding EIS depth and breadth must merely “fall within a broad zone of reasonableness” (quoting Seven Cnty., 605 U.S. at 183)).

13.See, e.g., All. for the Wild Rockies v. Anderson, No. CV 24–125-M-KLD, 2026 WL 892326, at *7 (D. Mont. Mar. 31, 2026) (extending “substantial deference” to agency’s determinations of how to limit its NEPA analysis (quoting Seven Cnty., 605 U.S. at 183)).

14. See N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 561 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that in cases citing to the test, “this [manageable] line appears to approximate the limits of an agency’s area of control.”).

15. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. FERC, 153 F.4th 1295, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (holding that an agency could no longer be compelled to “speculate about the effects of a separate project that is outside its regulatory jurisdiction” (quoting Seven Cnty., 605 U.S. at 189)); Lopez v. United States, No. CV-25-02758-PHX-DWL, 2025 WL 2380475, at *22 (D. Az. Aug. 17, 2025) (finding that the Forest Service was not required to consider alternative mining techniques for operations that may occur on private lands that the Forest Service lacks authority to regulate).

16. See, e.g., Nat’l Council of Negro Women v. Duffy, No. 1:22-CV-314-HSO-BWR, 2026 WL 754991, at *14 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 17, 2026) (upholding a “manageable line” that “exclud[ed] the effects of speculative projects that are separate in time and place.”); All. for the Wild Rockies v. Anderson, 2026 WL 892326 (holding that the US Forest Service “drew a ‘manageable line’ in determining how much depth of analysis to afford and how much detail to include” with regards to cumulative effects (quoting Seven Cnty., 605 U.S. at 191)).

17. See, e.g., Am. Wild Horse Campaign v. Raby, 144 F.4th 1178, 1192 (10th Cir. 2025) (holding that the agency has no obligation to analyze even foreseeable effects of future actions when they arise from separate projects). 

18. See, e.g., All. for the Wild Rockies v. Mulholland, No. CV 25-5-M-KLD, 2026 WL 892385, at *22 (D. Mont. Mar. 31, 2026) (upholding agency’s “apparent” scoping decisions where agency decisions “show[ed] evidence of a faint but ‘manageable’ line”); All. for the Wild Rockies v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 2:24-cv-157-RLP, 2025 WL 2655984, at *10 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 16, 2025), appeal dismissed in part No. 25-7201, 2026 WL 413044 (9th Cir. Feb. 5, 2026) (upholding an “apparent” line drawn to exclude other projects as separate based on general references that did not contain details of any specific projects excluded).

19. See, e.g., Chattooga Conservancy v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., No. CV 24-518 (TJK), 2026 WL 865760, at *10 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2026) (deferring to agency’s cumulative impact analysis because agencies are “better equipped to assess what facts are relevant to the agency’s own decision than a court is” (quoting Seven Cnty., 605 U.S. at 181)); All. for the Wild Rockies v. Anderson, No. CV 24–125-M-KLD, 2026 WL 892326, at *8 (D. Mont. Mar. 31, 2026) (holding that the US Forest Service “drew a ‘manageable line’ in determining how much depth of analysis to afford and how much detail to include” with regards to cumulative effects (quoting Seven Cnty., 605 U.S. at 191)).

20. See, e.g., All. for the Wild Rockies v. Mulholland, 2026 WL 892385, at *19-21 (holding that the Forest Service improperly omitted from its cumulative effects analysis a reasonably foreseeable project adjacent in time and space to the proposed action); All. for the Wild Rockies v. James, No. CV-25-104-BU-BMM, 2026 WL 686492 (D. Mont. Mar. 11, 2026) (finding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on claim that the Bureau of Land Management’s actions were arbitrary and capricious based on the failure to conduct and publish a cumulative impacts analysis on spring grazing’s effect on sage grouse).

21. See, e.g., All. for the Wild Rockies, v. Mulholland, 2026 WL 892385, at *21 (“[D]eference to the agency cannot overcome the plain language of the relevant NEPA regulation.”); Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 141 F.4th at 999 (holding that longstanding administrative law precedents requiring agencies to acknowledge and explain changes in agency position still applied, despite the heightened deference conferred by Seven County).

22. All. for the Wild Rockies v. U.S. Forest Serv., 2025 WL 2655984, at *12.

23. Miller v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 1:24-cv-00013-SLG, 2025 WL 2802244, at *8 (D. Alaska Sept. 30, 2025).

24. Seven Cnty., 605 U.S. at 185.

25. Orutsararmuit Native Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 3:23-cv-00071-SLG, 2025 WL 1654878, at *7 (D. Alaska June 10, 2025); Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 141 F.4th at 1015-16 (citing Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1995)).

26. Defs. of Wildlife v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 1:24-cv-00118-MR-WCM, 2026 WL 914620, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2026) (finding that, although “not a model of clarity or thoroughness,” the Biological Opinion’s definition of the action area falls within the “broad zone of reasonableness” (citing Seven Cnty., 605 U.S. at 182-83)).

27. Alaska v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 171 F.4th 1145, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 2026) (“But ‘when an agency exercises discretion granted by a statute,’ we ask only ‘whether the agency action was reasonable and reasonably explained.’” (quoting Seven Cnty., 605 U.S. at 179-80)).

28. Removal of National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Regulations, 91 Fed. Reg 618 (Jan. 8, 2026) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500-1508).

29. See supra note 21.