What You Need To Know About Workplace Defamation

Article Summary

Defamation is not just a buzzword in pop culture. It is an illegal action that can harm a person’s reputation and even their livelihood if they lose their job. But what if the defamation comes from inside the workplace, from a supervisor, employer, or coworker? An employment lawyer can help you to fight against the common defenses employers hide behind and to navigate the nuances in pursuing a defamation lawsuit in different areas, such as D.C., Maryland, and Virginia.

For weeks millions were glued to the Johnny Depp-Amber Heard trial, an edge-of-your seat courtroom drama that was dissected by seasoned lawyers and social media influencers alike. Beneath the celebrity spectacle, the case centered on a single legal claim: defamation.

Defamation can arise in the workplace when an employer or supervisor makes untrue accusations about an employee’s performance, conduct, or integrity. A defamation claim may accompany other employment law claims such as wrongful termination or retaliation.

But while other employment claims are often pursued in federal court, defamation claims can open the door to state court — a more favorable place to be as an individual plaintiff. Defamation claims also provide options for suing supervisors and receiving reputational damages as monetary compensation.

For employees considering legal action, the key question is this: When do workplace statements cross the line from internal criticism or evaluation into legally actionable defamation?

What is Defamation?

The most general definition is that defamation is a false statement that has damaged someone’s reputation. You may have heard the words “slander” or “libel” before. Both words are defamation, but they specify the method in which the defamation was conveyed. “Slander” is spoken, and “libel” is written.

Every jurisdiction in the U.S. recognizes defamation as a justifiable reason for litigation, although the requirements for a defamation case can vary slightly. Each jurisdiction also has its own statute of limitations &mdash the deadline by which an employee must file a claim for defamation or that claim will be forever lost. In D.C.,¹ Maryland,² and Virginia,³ the statute of limitations is one year.

Some jurisdictions have additional rules depending on the type of defamation. Those jurisdictions distinguish between defamation per quod (where a plaintiff must prove the defamation caused them harm) and defamation per se (where, if proven, the defamation is so egregious that the damages are presumed). We’ll explore those two types in the “Damages” section below.

Basic Requirements of a Defamation Case

Although the standards vary from state to state, employees working to prove defamation in most contexts generally must show that (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the employee was (2) published to a third party (3) in a manner that was at least negligent and (4) that statement damaged the employee (unless the statement was so severely and obviously damaging that the plaintiff does not have to prove damages, as with defamation per se).⁴

Let’s break down each of those conceptual elements to determine whether a workplace statement rises to the level of defamation.

Statement: A statement is generally anything that is spoken (including sign language) or written. Again, “slander” would be a spoken (or signed) statement, and “libel” would be a written statement.

False: To be defamation, a statement regarding the employee must be factually incorrect. It cannot be a matter of opinion. Statements like “the employee is ugly” are rude but only an opinion. A statement like “Jeff is always late,” however, could be a false statement of fact. Compare that statement to the very similar “I believe Jeff is never on time.” The former is presented as a fact, and the latter is an opinion; therefore, the former may be defamation, and the latter is not.

Published: A statement generally is published if it is communicated to a third party. Spoken or signed statements may be shared in person or via audio and video communication services, such as phone or Zoom calls. A written statement may be a physical page that is handwritten or typed, a digital document, or a digital message (like an email) that is then delivered to a third party.

Third party: For a defamation case, the false statement must be communicated to another individual besides the employee it concerns. A conversation between the person who makes the statement and the employee is not defamation until and unless the person making the statement publishes it to someone else.

Negligent: The speaker of the statement usually can’t be held liable for defamation unless the employee can show that the speaker was at least careless about whether it was true. This generally can be proved by showing that the speaker ignored contradictory evidence, that they failed to verify the information before they published it to a third-party or that they failed to perform any fact-checking where a reasonable person would.

Special Requirements in the DMV

Different jurisdictions have different rules about the details that must be included when someone files a lawsuit.

Virginia requires that defamation claims be “plead with precision.” In practice, this means the complaint must include:

• The exact words of the allegedly defamatory statement(s) or the document containing the statement(s);⁵
• Who made or published the statement;
• When the statement was published; and
• To whom the statement was communicated.

Importantly, Virginia courts do not recognize innuendos beyond the ordinary plain meaning of the words. Plaintiffs are not allowed to expand upon the meaning to show it’s defamatory.⁶

Washington, D.C.’s requirements are less stringent than Virginia’s. A defamation complaint must still include the following information but not to the level of specificity required by Virginia:

• The allegedly defamatory statement(s);
• Who made the statement;
• When the statement was published;
• To whom the statement was communicated; and
• How the statement was communicated.⁷

Maryland falls between Virginia and D.C. in terms of how much detail a plaintiff must include when filing a claim. Courts generally require plaintiffs to provide enough factual detail to support each element of defamation. Under Maryland law, a plaintiff must show that:

• A false statement was made about the plaintiff;
• The statement was published to a third party;
• The speaker was at least negligent regarding the truth; and
• The plaintiff’s reputation was harmed as a result of the statement.⁸

Damages

If a person proves defamation, the law allows them to seek compensation for several kinds of harm called “damages.”

So-called “special” damages are economic losses resulting from the defamation. In an employment context, this generally includes loss of employment (or job offer), reduced earnings, and other out-of-pocket losses caused by the defamatory statement. Examples of out-of-pocket losses include job search expenses, relocation costs for new employment, or costs incurred to address or correct the false statement.

“General” damages are those that can’t be quickly or easily quantified because they are non-economic in nature, which can include reputational harm, humiliation, and mental and physical anguish.

Whether an employee needs to prove damage occurred depends on whether the defamation is considered per quod or per se.

Defamation per quod is the more common type of defamation and requires proof of how the false statements caused harm to the employee. For example, an employee could show that they lost promotions, received negative performance evaluations, or were fired because of the defamation. Constructive termination (where the false statements result in an employee self-terminating their employment) could also be a provable damage. Unlike its per se cousin, defamation per quod requires an employee to allege how they were damaged in their complaint against the employer.

Defamation per se, in contrast, requires no proof of actual damages because some statements are considered so inherently harmful that the law assumes they damaged a person’s reputation. These include but are not limited to false statements that the plaintiff is unfit for their profession, is infected with certain diseases, or that they committed a crime. Historically, statements about infidelity have also been considered defamation per se.

Again, keep in mind that the false statement must be presented as fact to be considered defamation. “Jeff robbed the corner store” is stated like a fact, but “I think Jeff robbed the corner store” is a person’s opinion that Jeff may have robbed the corner store.

In cases of defamation per se, plaintiffs are sometimes entitled to presumed damages. Presumed damages may not be an option in cases involving a media organization as a defendant or matters of public concern — unless the employee can show “actual malice.” They would need to prove that the defendant had actual knowledge that the statements were false or made the statements with reckless disregard as to whether they were true.⁹

In some defamation cases, a plaintiff may be awarded punitive damages, which are designed to punish particularly egregious conduct and discourage similar behavior in the future. In most jurisdictions, an award of punitive damages requires that the plaintiff prove the employer’s statement(s) were made with actual malice.

Unlike many jurisdictions, Virginia allows for damages against an employer to be mitigated. The damages awarded may be reduced if the defendant in a defamation case apologizes to the plaintiff or retracts the defamatory statement.¹⁰ However, Virginia law requires that the apology at least be attempted before the lawsuit is filed or as soon as possible thereafter.

Employer Privileges

Employees often encounter workplace statements that seem to be defamatory and appear to meet the required elements. A defamation claim may still fail, however, if the statement is protected by a legal doctrine called “privilege.”

There are several situations in which employers or supervisors are permitted to make statements without the risk of being sued for any resulting adverse consequences — again, unless the statement was made with malice.¹¹ As with many factors, different jurisdictions recognize different kinds of privilege.

Qualified/common-interest privilege: This type of privilege exists when the person making the statement and the person to whom it is communicated have a common interest in the information. The speaker must also be acting within the scope of their job. This most often occurs when someone makes a good-faith report about an employee to a supervisor or human resources representative. The communication is protected if it is only originally shared within the organization and made with honest, good intentions.¹²

Judicial proceedings privilege: D.C. recognizes absolute privilege for litigation and judicial proceedings.¹³ This means that statements made during court proceedings — and likely during administrative proceedings — generally cannot give rise to a defamation case.¹⁴ Virginia¹⁵ and Maryland¹⁶ recognize similar protections, though they may not cover as broad of a category as D.C. does.

Statutory immunities: Many jurisdictions, including Maryland and Virginia, have laws that protect employers who make statements in good faith (even if potentially defamatory in nature).¹⁷ As with other forms of privilege, statutory protections may be lost when the employer (or its agents) acts with malice. D.C. does not have similar legislation in place, but protections have been established by previous case decisions.

Defamation in the Workplace

Workplace defamation can sometimes be tricky to argue. The most common places for defamation to occur — such as human resources communications or termination meetings — are often protected by privilege. This doesn’t mean you should write it off immediately, however. There can still be options for a successful case.

Internal HR communications & performance evaluations

Courts have determined that internal human resources communications are generally protected by qualified privilege.¹⁸ Qualified privilege, however, can be lost if:

• The speaker acted with malice, meaning they intended to harm the employee;
• The statement was shared beyond those who reasonably needed to receive it (for example, through a company-wide email rather than communication contained between the supervisor and HR);
• The speaker knew the statement was false; or
• The speaker recklessly ignored information suggesting the statement was false.

Termination and investigation communications

Defamation claims can also arise out of termination meetings, explanatory letters, and investigation summaries. For each of these scenarios, qualified privilege typically exists, too, unless the employee proves malice, excessive publication (e.g., email blast or similar occurrence), or the supervisor’s statements were knowingly or recklessly false.¹⁹

Post-employment references

Sometimes the defamation doesn’t occur until after you’re no longer working for an employer. Let’s say you list your former employer as a reference on a job application. What if they make false and defamatory statements to a prospective employer? Jurisdictions vary regarding how they address this situation. Maryland and Virginia legally protect employers who disclose information about a former employee’s performance and reason for termination, provided that the former employer acts in good faith.²⁰ Employers lose this protection if they intentionally or knowingly disclose false information about an employee.²¹ D.C. does not have a comparable statute, but previous cases show that courts will similarly protect employers.

Statements made to government bodies

In most cases, statements made to government bodies regarding an employee are privileged or protected by law. A speaker often cannot be held liable for anything they say during unemployment hearings, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) proceedings, or other government proceedings.

Many of these proceedings require individuals to testify under oath or to attest to their statements under penalty of perjury. False statements in these situations can lead to criminal penalties, so the law generally assumes that witnesses are testifying in good faith unless proven otherwise. Additionally, granting immunity against defamation encourages people to provide complete and candid information that may be relevant to the proceeding. Courts recognize that participants in these proceedings should be able to speak freely without fear of defamation lawsuits.

D.C., Maryland, and Virginia all recognize privileges for statements made in judicial or administrative proceedings, but Virginia is unique in that its law goes a step further to specifically protect statements in unemployment hearings.

Who Can Be Sued for Defamation

Employers (or former employers) usually can be held liable for the defamatory statements of their employees if the speaker who made the defamatory statement was acting within the scope of their job.²² In some circumstances, plaintiffs can also sue the individual who made the statement, such as their supervisor or the human resources investigator.

Claims against an employer: When suing an employer, the employee must name the proper entity and then allege that the speaker acted within the course and scope of their employment when making the statement. In many cases, an employee should also consider bringing a claim for negligent hiring and/or retention if possible. See the “Additional Claims” section below for a brief explanation.

Claims against an individual: To sue an individual, a plaintiff has to overcome the issue of qualified privilege. They must either show that the speaker acted with malice or excessively published the defamatory statement (nullifying the privilege) or that the speaker acted outside of their job responsibilities (in which case, qualified privilege never applied).²³ When suing an individual, a plaintiff must name the speaker(s) personally.

Potential Employer Defenses

When an employee brings a defamation claim, the employer or supervisor is likely to assert that they didn’t do anything legally wrong — even if they acknowledge that the statement occurred. Defendants often argue that the statement was true or protected by privilege. The following are some of the most common defenses raised in defamation cases.

Truth: Truth is an absolute defense against defamation.²⁴ The first element of defamation requires that the statement be false, so if the statement is not false, then the employee has not been defamed. However, it’s on the defendant to prove that the statement was true. As an example, let’s say Marcus was an employee at a Virginia hospital. Marcus’s medical license became suspended in Virginia, so the hospital fired him because he could not practice medicine. The hospital also notified the National Practitioner Data Bank of Marcus’s suspended license. If Marcus sues the hospital for defamation, the hospital would have to present documentation and testimony from the state licensing board to prove that Marcus’s license was, in fact, suspended.

Substantial truth: An employer might argue that the statement contains some inaccuracies but is mostly true in overall substance. A statement being substantially true (even if not 100% true) undercuts several of the required elements for a defamation case. If a statement is mostly true, then is it really considered false? Moreover, a substantially true statement can’t have been made negligently because there was enough care taken in making the statement for it to have come out only partially untrue. It can also be argued that a substantially true statement could not have damaged the employee. Again, however, the defendant has to first prove that the statement was substantially true, and there’s a lot of gray area. Whether a statement is substantially true is typically a question for the jury to decide.

Opinion: As we’ve touched on, opinions are not statements of fact and generally cannot support a defamation claim. They are protected by the First Amendment. If employees were allowed to sue because of opinions, courts would become paralyzed by the sheer volume of defamation lawsuits. The defendant does still bear the burden of proving that their statement is an opinion, but this is reasonably easy because of the many hallmarks that distinguish opinions from objective facts.

Consent: If an employee consents to the statement being shared, the employer generally cannot be held liable for defamation. Perhaps the statement is false, widely published, and actually damaging for the employee. But consent means that the employee authorized the publication of the statement, therefore either confirming the veracity of the statement or absolving the employer of any negligence they may have committed in making the statement. Once an employee has given consent, they cannot then come back and hold the employer liable when the statement harms them.

Anti-SLAPP

A SLAPP — short for “strategic lawsuit against public participation”²⁵ — is a lawsuit filed primarily to intimidate or silence someone who has spoken out on an issue of public concern. These lawsuits are often brought by individuals or companies with greater financial resources in the hopes of forcing critics to spend more time and money defending the case rather than continuing to speak out. Defamation claims are frequently used in SLAPP lawsuits.

To address this problem, at least 30 states have enacted anti-SLAPP laws, which allow SLAPP victims to ask a court to dismiss these lawsuits early in the case.

However, anti-SLAPP laws can operate as a double-edged sword. They were designed to protect individuals who speak out on matters of public interest, but employers may use these same laws to try to dismiss valid defamation claims brought by employees. In those situations, the employer might argue that the employee wasn’t defamed but is instead trying to punish the employer’s protected speech. The employee would then be required to prove the merits of their case earlier in the litigation process than otherwise.

The strength of anti-SLAPP protections varies by jurisdiction. D.C. has one of the most robust anti-SLAPP statutes and provides broad protection for speech on matters of public interest. Defendants may be able to invoke the statute even when the alleged defamation occurred in private settings, such as workplace communications or internal emails.²⁶ Maryland’s anti-SLAPP law is more limited and primarily applies to statements made to the government or the public.²⁷

Virginia takes a somewhat different approach. Virginia law grants immunity to individuals who make certain protected statements, including statements:

• About matters of public concern that would be protected under the First Amendment;
• Made at a public hearing before a governmental body authorized by the Commonwealth;
• Made during a Title IX hearing; or
• Made by an employee about an employer in situations where retaliation for such statements is prohibited by law.²⁸

However, the immunity can be lost if the speaker knows the statement is false.²⁹

Additional Claims Employees Often Bring Alongside Defamation

False light: This claim arises when an individual is portrayed publicly in a way that is false and highly offensive to a reasonable person. False light differs from defamation because it requires the offensive portrayal to be widely publicized, such as deepfake adult content published on social media. This action is recognized in D.C.³⁰ and Maryland³¹ but not in Virginia.

Tortious interference with prospective/at-will employment: Tortious interference claims arise when an individual causes harm to the plaintiff’s at-will employment (or offer of employment). Some people have qualified privilege to make reports to someone’s employer, but those who do not — either because they don’t have a relevant workplace relationship or because they acted with malice — could be seen as interfering with the contractual relationship between employer and employee. This would occur if their defamatory statement caused the employer to demote, dismiss, or otherwise modify the employee’s job. The speaker who made the defamatory statement doesn’t need to work for the same employer to potentially be liable for this claim. A jilted ex-partner who contacted an employer and made accusations that cost the employee their job could be sued for tortious interference. The bar for this type of claim is low, only requiring proof of negligence. D.C., Maryland, and Virginia all recognize tortious interference claims in different forms.

Intentional infliction of emotional distress: Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) is recognized in D.C., Maryland, and Virginia. To prove an IIED claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, that it was intentional or reckless, and that it caused extreme emotional distress to the plaintiff. When possible, claims for IIED pair well with defamation because the requirements for proving malice are similar.

Negligent hiring/retention: This type of claim alleges that the employer knew (or reasonably should have known) the unfitness of the employee it hired and, as such, is liable for the harm the employee causes. If a supervisor defames an employee, the employee may be able to argue that the employer’s negligence in hiring that supervisor contributed to the harm they experienced. Courts in D.C., Maryland, and Virginia all recognize claims for negligent hiring and/or retention.³²

Wrongful/abusive discharge: These kinds of claims may be available if the employee was actually (or constructively) terminated — if the termination also violated public policy. D.C., Maryland,³³ and Virginia all have variations of wrongful or abusive discharge.

Insulting words: Virginia is unique among the three jurisdictions discussed here in that it recognizes a claim for “insulting words.”³⁴ This claim is frequently pled alongside defamation in Virginia because it is so similar to defamation and is codified in statute. However, the claim is narrow and requires showing that the exact words were intended to insult the plaintiff.

DMV Distinctions Worth Noting

Complaint requirements: Virginia requires the highest level of detail in a defamation complaint, requesting the exact words or actual document containing the defamation. D.C. and Maryland are less strict but still require that the claims be specific.

Immunity/privilege: As discussed above, Maryland and Virginia provide certain statutory protections for employers who make employment-related statements in good faith. Similar immunity in D.C. is established by case decisions rather than statutes, but the result is almost the same. In all three jurisdictions, protections may be lost if the speaker acted with malice.

Proceedings privilege: Virginia grants absolute privilege for statements made during unemployment hearings. Agency and other tribunal communications are carefully analyzed across all three jurisdictions to determine whether they are privileged or otherwise immune from liability.

Anti-SLAPP: A defendant in a defamation case has the best chance of getting the case dismissed using an anti-SLAPP statute in D.C. Anti-SLAPP protections in Maryland are limited to situations where the accused individual made statements to the public or to a government body. Virginia is even more specific about which statements may be protected by anti-SLAPP statutes.

Questions to Consider Before Bringing a Defamation Claim

• What was the defamatory statement? Are you able to identify what was specifically said (and, if possible, the exact words said)?
• Who made the statement? Was the statement made by a supervisor, coworker, or another individual, and were they acting within the scope of their employment?
• Was the statement shared with others? Who was the audience, and how was the statement communicated (for example, in a meeting, email, or report)?
• Could the statement be protected by privilege? For example, was it made in an HR investigation, during litigation, or in another situation where the law may protect certain communications?
• What harm resulted from the statement? Did you lose a job opportunity, experience reputational harm, or suffer other damages?
• Could anti-SLAPP laws apply? In some jurisdictions — especially Washington, D.C., and Virginia — defendants may try to dismiss defamation claims early by arguing that the lawsuit targets protected speech.

The variations of privileges and anti-SLAPP protections available in each jurisdiction make workplace defamation complicated to navigate, but a solid defamation claim can not only help your case for other employment law grievances but also open the door for more compensation.

If your job has been impacted by a defamatory statement, contact The Employment Law Group today

Footnotes

1. D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(4).

2. Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-105.

3. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-247.1.

4. Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63 (D.C. 2005); Piscatelli v. Van Smith, 35 A.3d 1140 (Md. 2012); Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 325 S.E.2d 713 (1985).

5. Bennett v. Lundh, 916 S.E.2d 356 (Va. Ct. App. 2015).

6. Schaecher v. Bouffault, 772 S.E.2d 589 (Va. 2015).

7. See Crowley v. N. Am. Trans. Ass’n, 691 A.2d 1169 (D.C. 1996).

8. See generally Batson v. Shiflett, 602 A.2d 1191 (Md. 1992).

9. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).

10. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-46.

11. See Larimore v. Blaylock, 528 S.E.2d 119 (Va. 2000); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 350 A.2d 688 (Md. 1976); Payne v. Clark, 25 A.3d 918 (D.C. 2011).

12. See Larimore v. Blaylock, 528 S.E.2d 119 (Va. 2000); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 350 A.2d 688 (Md. 1976); Payne v. Clark, 25 A.3d 918 (D.C. 2011).

13. See D.C. Code § 16-4203 (communications in mediation are privileged and excluded from tort liability); D.C. Code § 4-1705.01 (communications to and with an attorney referral service are privileged); see Finkelstein, Thompson & Loughran v. Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc., 774 A.2d 332, 338 (D.C. 2001).

14. Messina v. Fontana, 260 F.Supp.2d 173, 178 (D.D.C. 2003).

15. Katz v. Odin, Feldman & Pittleman, P.C., 332 F.Supp.2d 909 (E.D. Va. 2004); Penick v. Ratcliffe, 149 Va. 618 (1927); Spencer v. Looney, 116 Va. 767, 82 S.E. 745 (1914).

16. See generally Day v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp., 907 F.3d 766 (4th Cir. 2018); see Norman v. Borison, 418 Md. 630, 658 (2011); Mixter v. Farmer, 215 Md. App. 536, 543 (2013) (“an absolute privilege for attorneys to make potentially defamatory statements if the statements have some rational relationship to the judicial proceedings.”)

17. Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-423; Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-46.1.

18. See Larimore v. Blaylock, 528 S.E.2d 119 (Va. 2000); Raytheon Tech. Servs. v. Hyland, 614 S.E.2d 84 (Va. 2004).

19. See Crowley v. N. Am. Trans. Ass’n, 691 A.2d 1169 (D.C. 1996).

20. Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-423; Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-46.1.

21. Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-423(b); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-46.1.

22. See Debastian v. Dist. of Columbia, 636 A.2d 958 (D.C. 1994); Giant of Va. v. Pigg, 152 S.E.2d 271 (Va. 1967); see generally Barclay v. Briscoe, 47 A.3d 560 (Md. 2012) (collecting Maryland cases establishing the common law doctrine for respondeat superior).

23. See e.g., Armstrong v. Thompson, 80 A.3d 177 (D.C. 2013).

24. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-46; Alexandria Gazette Corp. v. West, 93 S.E.2d 274 (Va. 1956); M & S Furniture Sales Co. v. De Bartolo Corp., 241 A.2d 126 (Md. 1968); see also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

25. Pring, George William; Canan, Penelope (1996). SLAPPs: Getting Sued for Speaking Out. Temple University Press.

26. D.C. Code § 16-5501 et seq.

27. Md. Cts. & & Jud. Proc. § 5-807.

28. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-223.2(A).

29. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-223.2(B).

30. See Desbach v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F. Supp. 1285 (D.D.C. 1981); Kitt v. Capital Concerts, Inc., 742 A.2d 856 (D.C. 1999); Lane v. Random House, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 141 (D.D.C. 1995).

31. See Crowley v. Fox Broadcasting Co., 851 F. Supp. 700 (D. Md. 1994); Prince George’s County v. Longtin, 19 A.3d 859 (Md. 2011).

32. Negligent hiring: see Sebastian v. Dist. of Columbia, 636 A.2d 958 (D.C. 1994); Asphalt & Concrete Servs., Inc. v. Perry, 108 A.3d 558 (Md. App. 2015); Southeast Apartments Mgmt., Inc. v. Jackman, 513 S.E.2d 395 (Va. 1999); Negligent retention: Williams v. Dist. of Columbia, 916 F. Supp 1 (D.D.C. 1996); see Economides v. Gay, 155 F. Supp. 2d 485 (D. Md. 2001); Doe v. Baker, 857 S.E.2d 573 (Va. 2021).

33. See Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 830 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1987).

34. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-45.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.