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1 April 2026

CFTC Settlement In Singh Matter Highlights Cooperation Credit And Aiding-and-Abetting Claims

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The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission's settlement with former FTX engineering head Nishad Singh demonstrates how substantial cooperation in investigations can lead to significant penalty reductions, while also establishing precedent for holding non-trading executives liable for aiding and abetting fraud.
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On April 1, 2026, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the “CFTC” or the “Commission”) announced that the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York entered a supplemental consent order (“the Supplemental Order”) resolving the Commission’s enforcement action against Nishad Singh, the former head of engineering at FTX. The final resolution is noteworthy for the Commission’s express reliance on cooperation in declining to impose a civil monetary penalty and for the application of fraud and aiding-and-abetting claims against a non-trading engineering executive.

Background and First Consent Order

The CFTC’s action against Singh, a central engineering employee at FTX, arose from the collapse of the cryptocurrency exchange in November 2022. On February 28, 2023, the Commission filed a civil complaint alleging that Singh violated Section 6 of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) and CFTC Regulation 180.1 through fraud and aiding and abetting fraud committed by FTX, Alameda Research LLC (“Alameda”), and Samuel Bankman-Fried.1 The complaint alleged that Singh designed, implemented, or maintained technical features that granted Alameda undisclosed privileges on the FTX platform, including the ability to maintain negative balances, avoid liquidation, and withdraw customer assets without sufficient funds. It further alleged that Singh personally misappropriated millions of dollars through poorly documented loans and withdrawals funded, at least in part, by FTX customer assets, including after he knew or should have known that Alameda had created a substantial shortfall in customer funds that it could not repay.2

On April 13, 2023, the court entered a consent order as to liability and partial injunctive relief.3 Singh did not contest his liability on either count, and the court enjoined him from future violations of the CEA and CFTC regulations, imposed trading and registration prohibitions, and reserved the determination of restitution, disgorgement, and civil monetary penalties for later resolution.4

Cooperation Leads to No Restitution or Civil Monetary Penalty in Supplemental Order

On March 31, 2026, the court entered the Supplemental Order resolving the remaining issues of monetary relief and sanctions.5 Under the Supplemental Order, Singh consented to disgorgement of $3.7 million, representing the value of real estate purchased using funds that he knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that they consisted, at least in part, of misappropriated FTX customer assets.6 The Supplemental Order also imposed a five-year trading ban (restricting Singh from trading commodity interests) and an eight-year registration ban (restricting him from applying for CFTC registration or claiming an exemption).7

Most notably, the Commission acknowledged that it is not seeking restitution or a civil monetary penalty at this time.8 The Supplemental Order expressly tied that determination to Singh’s “cooperation in a Commission investigation and related proceedings,” including a parallel criminal action in which Singh pleaded guilty to multiple counts.9 The Supplemental Order further conditioned this relief on Singh’s continued cooperation and permits the Commission to seek additional remedies if he is found to have provided materially false information or otherwise breached his cooperation obligations.10

Resolution Aligns with Announced Cooperation Priorities of New CFTC Enforcement Director

The Supplemental Order aligns with the newly announced enforcement and cooperation priorities articulated by CFTC Director of Enforcement David I. Miller in public remarks delivered at NYU Law School on March 31, 2026. In those remarks, Director Miller emphasized that “[t]he era of regulation by enforcement is over” and that the Division of Enforcement (the “Division”) will focus on “policing fraud, abuse, and manipulation rather than setting policy.”11

Director Miller also previewed a significant shift in the Division’s approach to cooperation, stating that the Division “will soon be issuing a new Staff Advisory on Cooperation and will be rescinding the current policy, issued in February 2025.”12 He further explained that the changes in enforcement are intended to “ensure the rapid disposition of matters while appropriately crediting parties for their cooperation.”13 In describing those forthcoming changes, Director Miller addressed revisions to the “declination policy” and how the Division will assess self-reporting, while emphasizing that cooperation determinations will no longer be incremental. “Cooperation will be binary”—“you’re either in a hundred percent or you’re out.”14

Against that backdrop, the Supplemental Order reflects a cooperation-focused resolution of a serious fraud matter consistent with the enforcement priorities that Director Miller described. The settlement imposes disgorgement and time-limited trading bans, while the Commission expressly declines to seek restitution or a civil monetary penalty, tying that determination to Singh’s cooperation in the Commission’s investigation and parallel criminal case.15 The Supplemental Order also conditions that relief on continued, full cooperation and preserves the Commission’s ability to seek additional remedies if Singh fails to satisfy those obligations.16

Settlement Includes Aiding-and-Abetting Charges Against Non-Trader Executive

The CFTC’s settlement with Singh is also notable for its use of a secondary liability theory in which Singh, an engineering executive, was held accountable for aiding and abetting the fraudulent activities of other parties. Specifically, as alleged, “Singh was responsible for creating or maintaining various undisclosed components in the code” that helped to grant “Alameda functionalities that allowed it to misappropriate FTX customer assets.”17 Singh is alleged to have developed code features that facilitated Alameda’s improper withdraw of customer assets.

Key Takeaways

  • Concrete Benefits for Cooperation. Taken together, the Supplemental Order and Director Miller’s announced enforcement priorities signal that significant cooperation in CFTC investigations can yield substantial benefits, including meaningful limitations on monetary penalties under certain circumstances. Market participants should track forthcoming CFTC Division of Enforcement announcements and review any new staff advisories concerning cooperation to ensure responses to CFTC enforcement inquiries are calibrated to have the maximum impact on cooperation credit, consistent with tailored CFTC response strategies.
  • Aiding-and-Abetting Exposure for Non-Trading Personnel. The Singh case demonstrates the Commission’s willingness to pursue aiding-and-abetting fraud claims against secondary actors in a fraudulent scheme based on their alleged roles in support of violative conduct by others. It makes clear that individuals who act in support of the misconduct of others can also face significant enforcement exposure under the CEA, including those who serve in non-trading functions like engineering. This example of secondary liability highlights the importance of broad market conduct training for company employees and executives, even those outside of any immediate commodity trading business activity.

Footnotes

1. Compl. ¶¶ 9–10, 86–92, CFTC v. Singh, No. 1:23-cv-01684-PKC, ECF No. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2023).

2. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 7, 44, 50–61, 67.

3. Consent Order of Judgment as to Liability And Partial Injunctive Relief Against Nishad Singh, CFTC v. Singh, No. 1:23-cv-01684-PKC, ECF No. 17 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2023).

4. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 8, 19–20, 23–24, 29.

5. Supplemental Consent Order Against Nishad Singh, CFTC v. Singh, No. 1:23-cv-01684-PKC, ECF No. 39 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2026).

6. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 15.

7. Id. at ¶¶ 18.

8. Id. at ¶ 16.

9. Id. at ¶ 16, referencing parallel criminal action, United States v. Singh et al., No. 22-cr-673 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

10. Id. at ¶ 16, 17.

11. Public Statements & Remarks, CFTC, Remarks at NYU Law School – CFTC Enf’t Priorities, Insider Trading in the Prediction Markets, and Coop. with the CFTC (Mar. 31, 2026), www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opamiller1.

12. Id., referencing CFTC, Div. of Enf’t, Enf’t Advisory: Advisory on Self-Reporting, Coop., and Remediation (Feb. 25, 2025).

13. Id.

14. Id.

15. Supplemental Consent Order Against Nishad Singh, at ¶ 16, CFTC v. Singh, No. 1:23-cv-01684-PKC, ECF No. 39 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2026).

16. Id.

17. Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Charges FTX Co-Owner with Fraud by Misappropriation and Aiding and Abetting Fraud Related to Digital Asset Commodities (Feb. 28, 2023), www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8669-23.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

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