On appeal from the decision of a District Judge, the County Court has held that claims under s.140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (CCA) are not governed by the provisions of the Limitation Act 1980 (Limitation Act) and so are not subject to any statutory period of limitation: Berry v Black Horse Ltd [2026] EWCC 54.
The judgment effectively imports the reasoning of the Supreme Court in THG plc v Zedra Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd [2026] UKSC 6 (see our blog post), which found that no statutory limitation period applies to unfair prejudice petitions under s.994 of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006).
The County Court ruled that the control mechanism for "stale" s.140A CCA claims should be governed by the court's broad discretion to grant relief under s.140B CCA. Importantly, the court has the power to use this discretion to deny relief where there has been an unjustified delay in the claimant bringing the claim. The court suggested that the six-year limit imposed by s.9 of the Limitation Act may be a useful yardstick, and that any enquiry in the exercise of the court’s discretion may well raise very similar issues to those that arise under s.32 of the Limitation Act, which governs the postponement of the running of time in cases of fraud, concealment or mistake (although the assessment may be less technical and more holistic).
The decision arose in the context of a motor finance commission claim, but the ruling is equally applicable to any claims brought by consumers under s.140A CCA. In the motor finance context, it is likely to increase risk for lenders with exposure, by removing the Limitation Act as a line of defence, leaving only the court’s less prescriptive discretion under s.140B CCA to control delayed claims. With the partial suspension of the Financial Conduct Authority’s motor finance redress scheme, there is a risk that more consumers will turn to litigation as their primary route to compensation. They may also take advantage of procedural developments such as the use of “omnibus” claim forms (see our blog post). This development therefore forms part of a landscape of recent decisions which are likely to have a meaningful impact on claims faced by motor finance lenders.
Both sides have indicated an intention to appeal but, as this will be a second appeal (it was heard at first instance by a District Judge), permission is required from the Court of Appeal. Permission seems likely to be granted, given that the appeal would raise an important point of principle (see CPR 52.7(2)(ii)).
We consider the decision in more detail below.
Background
In June 2005, the claimant purchased a car from a second-hand car dealer on finance, for which the dealer/broker received commission totalling £965.80 from the lender. Neither the fact nor the amount of this commission was disclosed to the claimant, who sold the vehicle and settled the outstanding balance on the finance agreement in 2007. The claimant issued proceedings against the lender in 2023, including a claim under s.140A CCA.
At first instance, the District Judge held that the limitation period for a claim brought pursuant to s.140A CCA was six years running from the end of the parties' relationship, under s.9 of the Limitation Act. On that basis, primary limitation had expired and there was nothing on the facts to postpone the running of limitation. The claimant appealed.
Decision
The County Court (His Honour Judge Glen) allowed the appeal, finding that claims under s.140A CCA are not governed by the provisions of the Limitation Act. We consider the key elements of the decision likely to be of interest to financial services firms below.
Scope of the Limitation Act
The judgment focused on ss.8 and 9 of the Limitation Act. S.8 governs actions on a “specialty", to which a twelve-year limitation period applies, while s.9 governs time limits for actions for sums recoverable by statute. S.9 provides that:
"(1) An action to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.”
The lender argued that (prior to the decision in THG, discussed below) it was “settled law” that the Limitation Act applied to claims brought pursuant to s.140A CCA. Indeed, it was common ground that the six-year period prescribed by s.9 of the Limitation Act applied for the purpose of a s.140A CCA claim in a number of earlier cases considered by the Supreme Court, including Smith v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2023] UKSC 34 and Potter v Canada Square Operations Ltd [2023] UKSC 41.
However, the court emphasised that it is for the parties to identify the issues that arise in the litigation and for the judge to adjudicate on those issues alone. It is not necessary for the courts to investigate whether some basic misunderstanding of the applicable law exists. While the situation before the court was unusual, it cited the leading judgment in THG, which notes:
"A settled practice, or widespread belief, is not the same as an authoritative decision on the meaning of provisions of the 1980 Act."
Accordingly, in the court’s view, it was not bound by any of the previous decisions relied on by the lender.
Impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in THG
The claimant argued that the court should follow and apply the decision of the Supreme Court in THG, which considered the application of the statutory limitation period to unfair prejudice petitions pursuant to s.994 of the CA 2006.
In relation to s.8 of the Limitation Act, the Supreme Court in THG clarified that it is the essence of an action upon a specialty that it is an action to enforce an obligation created by a deed or statute. By contrast, ss.994 and 996 of the CA 2006 do not create any substantive obligations, but merely exist to provide relief in respect of a “state of affairs” that constitutes unfair prejudice to one or more members, whether or not involving a breach of fiduciary or contractual obligations. The court therefore concluded that s.8 of the Limitation Act did not apply to actions under s.994.
On s.9 of the Limitation Act, the Supreme Court in THG held that it properly covers statutory monetary entitlements where the statute itself confers a right to recover money. However, it found that claims under statutory provisions which confer a wide discretion as to relief are not subject to s.9 of the Limitation Act, whether or not such claims include a request for monetary relief. As s.994 of the CA 2006 provides a discretionary jurisdiction in which any monetary payment flows only from the court’s order, not from a statutory money entitlement, s.9 of the Limitation Act did not apply either.
The leading judgment in THG referred to s.140A CCA claims as being “…in some measure analogous…” to the discretion conferred by s.994 of the CA 2006. Building on this, the County Court considered how THG should be applied in the present context, concluding that the true relevance of THG lay in the essential nature of the jurisdiction.
Nature of s.140A CCA claims
The County Court observed that a claim under s.140A CCA is a claim for relief under s.140B of the CCA and is not based on any breach of legal duty (per Lord Sumption in Plevin v Paragon Personal Finance Ltd [2014] UKSC 61). It confirmed that s.140A CCA (like s.994 of the CA 2006 and s.214 of the Insolvency Act 1986), is a "state of affairs" provision. Such provisions entitle a litigant to bring a claim based on alleged unfairness or wrongfulness, without the need for a separate breach of duty (contractual, tortious, or statutory) and give the court a wide discretion to grant remedies.
On this basis, the court held that claims under s.140A CCA are not governed by the provisions of the Limitation Act. Instead, the control mechanism for “stale” claims lies in the breadth of the court's discretion.
The court made two final comments which may serve as guidance as to how the court is likely to exercise its discretion, where the claimant has delayed in bringing s.140A CCA claims in future cases:
- The court’s enquiry may well raise very similar issues to those that arise under s.32 of the Limitation Act, which governs the postponement of the running of time in cases of fraud, concealment or mistake (although the assessment may be less technical and more holistic).
- The court may regard the limitation periods set by the Limitation Act as a useful yardstick, particularly the six-year limit imposed by s.9.
Accordingly, the County Court allowed the appeal, remitting the matter to the District Judge for a rehearing with further submissions on the issue of delay only.
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