Allegations of general misbehaviour or offensive language, absent any sexual harassment, lie outside the scope of inquiry of an ICC.
The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 ('POSH Act') establishes a statutory framework for addressing sexual harassment in the workplace. At its heart lies the Internal Complaint Committee (ICC), empowered to receive and inquire into complaints that fall within the Act's scope. A recurring legal issue is the jurisdictional threshold—can an ICC proceed with a complaint that, on the face of it, does not disclose allegations amounting to 'sexual harassment' under Section 2(n) of the Act?
This question was addressed by the High Court of Kerala on February 10, 2025, in Hareesh M.S. v. Kerala State Financial Enterprises Ltd. (KSFE) & Ors. The petitioner, an employee of KSFE, challenged a notice issued by the ICC in response to a complaint by a political union office-bearer who was not employed at the petitioner's branch. The complainant alleged that during an altercation—following the issuance of a memo by the petitioner to female staff for failure to meet targets—he used abusive language and insulted her publicly. The petitioner contended that the allegations lacked any sexual element and therefore did not fall within the ICC's jurisdiction.
The High Court examined the statutory definition of 'sexual harassment' under Section 2(n) of the POSH Act, and noted that this definition forms the jurisdictional basis for any inquiry by the ICC. Further, it observed that the ICC's powers to receive complaints (Section 9) and conduct an inquiry (Section 11) are limited to complaints that prima facie disclose acts of sexual harassment per the Act. Allegations of general misconduct or offensive language, absent any sexually oriented conduct, do not meet this threshold. The ICC's jurisdiction hinges on the existence of a "jurisdictional fact"—namely, whether the complaint discloses prima facie sexual harassment. In the absence of such a foundation, the ICC lacks the authority to proceed. The ICC's notice was accordingly quashed, and the writ petition allowed.
Notably, while the POSH Act is silent on an ICC's authority to reject complaints at the preliminary stage, the court clarified that where allegations patently fall outside the scope of sexual harassment, a full inquiry is not warranted. However, the ICC must still apply its mind and document reasons when deciding not to proceed—including in cases involving frivolous complaints, requests for conciliation, or time-barred allegations. The judgement also indirectly highlights the importance of the complainant's status under the Act. Though not central to the ruling, the fact that the complainant was not an employee at the petitioner's branch further weakened the complaint. In a related context, the Calcutta High Court has also recognised that Local Committees may reject time-barred complaints, reinforcing the need for a holistic reading of Sections 2(n) and 3 when assessing jurisdiction.
Conclusion
This ruling serves as a clear reminder: the POSH Act is a special legislation, meant to address specific instances of sexual harassment at the workplace. General workplace grievances—disciplinary issues, interpersonal disputes, or offensive language without a sexual element—must be dealt with through appropriate internal processes or labour law mechanisms.
For employers, employees, and ICC members, the judgement underscores the importance of conducting a careful preliminary assessment to ensure that the Act's purpose is upheld, and that the ICC's jurisdiction is exercised within its statutory bounds.
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