Since the introduction of statutory adjudication Ontario, courts have been faced with various attempts by construction industry participants to test the boundaries of the adjudication regime including efforts, in some cases, to circumvent or otherwise avoid the application of adjudication altogether. While such attempts have by and large been unsuccessful, where parties are able to push those boundaries even slightly (which are in each instance unique to the facts of that particular case) other like-minded litigants may see opportunity or leverage and attempt to push the boundaries further to the extent it benefits their own case. Consequently, and given the critical importance of certainty in legal process, the Ontario courts' continued support of adjudication continues to be vital.
In the present case, being Ontario Superior Court's decision in Integricon Construction Inc. v. Stevens et al., 2025 ONSC 4688 ("Integricon v. Stevens"), the Superior Court offers one such example of support for the adjudication regime. Specifically, this case involved an unsuccessful motion by homeowners to stay or set aside garnishment proceedings which were being used by a contractor to enforce an adjudicator's determination. In its decision, the Court affirmed the strict procedural framework governing adjudication and enforcement, emphasizing the limited role of courts in reviewing such determinations outside the proper statutory avenues. Below, we briefly review the decision and consider its implications.
Background
Two homeowners (the "Homeowners") retained Intergricon Construction Inc. ("Integricon") to provide general contractor services for the construction of a single-family home. The parties' contract included a draw schedule, based upon the achievement of various milestones. After completing a milestone, the first draw of $170,828.19 was paid. Integricon then completed the foundation and backfilling work (which were identified as the contractual milestones for the release the second draw) and invoiced accordingly.
Although Integricon took the position that this milestone was achieved in accordance with the contract, the Homeowners refused to pay, asserting instead that the second draw required 25% completion of the overall project – a threshold not yet met. They took this position based on the assessment of their lender, the Royal Bank of Canada ("RBC"), who had concluded that completion of foundation and backfilling only constituted 15% completion of the project. As a result, RBC declined to advance funds to the Homeowners in order to pay for the second draw. In other words, the Homeowners declined to advance payment to Integricon on the basis that they themselves had not received funds from RBC.
Because of the Homeowners' refusal to pay this outstanding amount, Integricon noted the Homeowners in default and initiated adjudication regarding its entitlement to the second draw pursuant to its contract with the Homeowners. While the adjudication was pending, Integricon also registered a lien against the property.
After completing adjudication, the adjudicator ultimately found in favour of Integricon, on the basis that the draw schedule set out in the contract – which called for payment of the second draw upon completion of foundation and backfilling work – was not conditional upon financing from RBC. The adjudicator found no reference to 25% in respect of the foundation and backfilling work milestone – such that there was a misalignment issue for the Homeowner as it related to funding. In other words, to the extent RBC disagreed that 25% of the work was completed, such disagreement was solely between the Homeowners and RBC. Consequently, the adjudication determined that the Homeowners were liable for $215,243.53 (plus interest).
However, the Homeowners refused to comply with the adjudicator's determination. They advised that they were willing to satisfy the determination if Integricon agreed to continue working on the project, but Integricon instead advised that it was terminating the contract due to this refusal to comply with the adjudicator's determination and ongoing default under the contract.
Integricon then filed the adjudicator's determination with the Superior Court under s. 13.20 of the Construction Act1 – thus giving the adjudicator's determination the same effect as an order of the Superior Court – and began garnishment proceedings.
In response, the Homeowners brought a motion to set aside or stay the garnishment, claiming potential double recovery (e.g., in respect of the lien) and unfairness due to Integricon's alleged repudiation of the contract.
Superior Court's Decision
The Court dismissed the Homeowners' motion, and instead offered a strong affirmation of the adjudicator's determination and the adjudication regime more broadly. In that regard, the Court concluded that the Homeowners were improperly seeking to overturn or delay enforcement of the adjudicator's determination through ulterior means that are not supported by the Construction Act.
The primary focus of the Homeowners' motion was to stay or prevent enforcement of the adjudicator's order through the garnishment process. However, the Court emphasized that the correct procedural path to challenge an adjudicator's determination under the Construction Act is strictly and narrowly defined, with the determination being binding until:
(a) the Divisional Court grants a stay of the determination;
(b) leave to commence a judicial review application is granted and the application is granted;
(c) the matter that is subject to the determination is addressed by a judge;
(d) the matter that is subject to the determination is addressed by an arbitrator under the Arbitration Act, 1991; or
(e) by agreement of the parties.2
Despite the foregoing, the Homeowners failed to take any of the appropriate procedural steps to properly challenge the determination.
Instead, the Homeowners here attempted to challenge the interim binding effect of the adjudicator's determination through a garnishment motion under Rule 60.08(16) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits a court to set aside garnishment if it would result in unfairness or prejudice.3
In summarily rejecting this approach, the Court made clear that a garnishment motion is not the proper venue to revisit or relitigate the correctness of an adjudicator's decision.4 To permit this would effectively allow parties to circumvent the Construction Act's adjudication framework, "eviscerating" the goals of prompt payment and interim dispute resolution.5 Integricon, having filed the determination with the Court as allowed under s. 13.20 of the Construction Act,6 was properly exercising its statutory rights. The garnishment order was a valid mechanism to enforce a binding adjudicator's determination, provided there was no stay or judicial review in process (which did not occur in this case, as the Homeowners did not secure a stay or commence judicial review).
The Court consequently rejected the Homeowners' argument that garnishment would result in unfairness or double recovery. It noted that s. 13.5(5) of the Construction Act permits multiple parallel remedies, including both adjudication and lien registration, such that there was nothing abusive in pursuing all remedies available to Integricon.7 In the Court's view, the potential for overlap does not create inherent unfairness; any funds recovered through garnishment would be deducted from the amount paid into court to vacate the lien.8
Finally, the Court also rejected the Homeowners' argument that that the termination of the contract (which the Homeowners argued was in fact a repudiation) meant that Integricon was somehow not entitled to benefits of the determination. Relying on prior case law in the adjudication context, the Court concluded that contract had not ceased to exist due to the termination – rather, the obligations that arose before the contract was terminated nevertheless remained in force. The entitlement to payment provided through the adjudication was found to be such an obligation arising prior to termination.
In view of the foregoing, the Court dismissed the Homeowners' motion.
Commentary
Given recent case law that has highlighted various construction industry parties' attempts to test the boundaries of the Construction Act's adjudication regime (some of which attempts were successful), Integricon provides a valuable affirmation that compliance with adjudication is not optional, and that attempting to undermine its efficacy through indirect means is to be discouraged.
To the contrary, Integricon v. Stevensis a critical reminder that the procedural framework of statutory adjudication must be followed with precision. Adjudication was meant to provide fast, interim binding determinations to ensure cash flow on construction projects. The legislature deliberately narrowed the grounds and procedural options for challenging such determinations, so as to preserve the integrity and efficiency of the system.
Attempting to use post-determination enforcement proceedings to relitigate or stay an adjudicator's determination without engaging the judicial review process disregards the procedures imposed, and intentions contemplated, by the legislature. The Court was unequivocal that its role in such garnishment motions is not to reassess the merits of the adjudicator's findings. In that regard, Integricon v. Stevens underscores the distinction between enforcement and substantive review: while garnishment motions may consider the equities of enforcement, they do not open the door to challenging the adjudicator's conclusions.
In addition, the Court's clarification of double recovery risk is notable – notwithstanding the possibility of concurrent lien proceedings and adjudication, the risk of duplication in recovery can be mitigated through mechanisms available to the court, such as adjusting lien security or recovery amounts. While this may seem to be common sense to many who understand the legislation, it is helpful to have the Court's stated view on this clearly affirming the ability of downstream decision makers (e.g., a judge or arbitrator) to make necessary adjustments to quantum to account for early payments or credits.
Ultimately, this decision also reinforces the core policy objectives behind the Construction Act's prompt payment and adjudication provisions: to preserve cash flow, minimize disruptions, and resolve payment disputes quickly and efficiently. It sends a clear signal that parties seeking to avoid enforcement of an adjudicator's determination must comply with the prescribed processes for doing so, and cannot rely on equitable arguments in inappropriate forums to delay enforcement.
Footnotes
1. Construction Act, RSO 1990, c C 30, s 13.20.
2. Integricon Construction Inc v Stevens et al., 2025 ONSC 4688 at para 55.
3. Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, r 60.08(16).
4. Integricon Construction Inc v Stevens et al., 2025 ONSC 4688 at para 56.
5. Integricon Construction Inc v Stevens et al., 2025 ONSC 4688 at paras 57-58.
6. Construction Act, RSO 1990, c C 30, s 13.20.
7. Construction Act, RSO 1990, c C 30, s 13.5(5).
8. Integricon Construction Inc v Stevens et al., 2025 ONSC 4688 at para 66.
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