Putting An End To Supply And Confidence In Ottawa

F
Fasken

Contributor

Fasken is a leading international law firm with more than 700 lawyers and 10 offices on four continents. Clients rely on us for practical, innovative and cost-effective legal services. We solve the most complex business and litigation challenges, providing exceptional value and putting clients at the centre of all we do. For additional information, please visit the Firm’s website at fasken.com.
In a video posted to social media on September 4, Jagmeet Singh, the leader of Canada's federal New Democratic Party, announced that he had "ripped up" the "Supply and Confidence Agreement" that his party had signed ...
Canada Government, Public Sector

In a video posted to social media on September 4, Jagmeet Singh, the leader of Canada's federal New Democratic Party (NDP), announced that he had "ripped up" the "Supply and Confidence Agreement" (SACA) that his party had signed with Justin Trudeau's Liberal minority government in March 2022, and which was intended to remain in place until June 2025.

In doing so, the NDP fundamentally changed the political dynamics in Canada's capital, sparking a return to a conventional minority Parliament with its attendant consequences: greater volatility in the House of Commons, increased partisan games in House Committees, a slow-down in the legislative process, and (arguably) a greater chance that a federal election will occur before the legislated fixed date of October 20, 2025.

This bulletin provides an overview of Canada's current federal political environment, the positions of the opposition parties, and what we might expect in the months to come.

A Primer on SACA

First, a primer on SACAs and the implications of the NDP decision to pull an early plug on the agreement. A foundational tenet of the Westminster parliamentary system is that the executive cannot continue in office without the ongoing support (confidence) of the majority of the members of the principal legislative chamber, the House of Commons. As a matter of constitutional (unwritten) convention, a government, defeated on a question of confidence, falls, requiring that Parliament be dissolved, and a general election called.

As a matter of convention, questions of confidence can take different forms:

  • Any opposition party can bring forward an express motion of non confidence. Since the return of Parliament on September 16, the Conservatives have availed themselves of this option twice with the government surviving thanks to the support of the NDP and the Bloc Québecois.
  • A government can expressly characterize any vote as a matter of confidence (in the current climate, this is something which the Liberals are unlikely to do).
  • Finally, budget bills and bills in the nature of supply, i.e. bills which require an appropriation of funds, are by convention deemed to be matters of confidence. Votes on the government's upcoming anticipated Fall Economic Statement are examples.

A conventional minority government is therefore inherently fragile, relying on opposition MPs to retain the "confidence" of the House and stay in power. The longer such a government lasts, the more likely accidents and circumstances may conspire to bring it to a premature end.

Against this backdrop, we consider the respective positions of Canada's major opposition parties.

Conservatives

The Conservatives position is straight-forward: Well ahead in the polls, the Conservatives want an election as soon as possible. The snag: Given the current seat distribution in the House of Commons, all three major opposition parties must vote together to defeat the government. The Conservatives cannot force an election without the support of both the NDP and the Bloc Québécois.

New Democrats

In the SACA, the NDP agreed to support the Liberals in exchange for support from the Liberals for shared policy priorities. These included establishing a national dental care program, legislating to create a framework towards implementing a national universal pharmacare plan, as well as enacting anti-replacement worker legislation.

However, the strength of a SACA-like arrangement depends on there being sufficient incentives to make it worthwhile for the opposition party to commit to keeping the minority government in power. With much of the content of the agreement having been implemented, there was less for the NDP to achieve through the SACA. Further, the policy successes have not translated into increased popular support for the NDP. In fact, the Conservatives have not only pulled away from the Liberals in national popularity but have been successfully making a play for the NDP's traditional base of unionized voters. In another sign of the considerable pressure the NDP has been facing from the Conservatives, just a week before the end of SACA, the Conservative Leader, Pierre Poilievre, had publicly called for Mr. Singh to stop propping up the Liberals.

By pulling the plug early on the arrangement, the NDP gave itself the opportunity to distinguish itself more clearly from the unpopular Liberal government it had been propping up. This proved especially timely, given two by-elections (special elections) held shortly thereafter, on September 16, which were critical to the party's fortunes. In the Winnipeg, Manitoba, electoral district of Elmwood-Transcona, the NDP narrowly managed to hold its seat against the surging Conservatives, while in the Montréal, Québec, district of LaSalle-Émard-Verdun, the NDP ultimately finished third in a tight three-way race, behind the victorious Bloc Québécois and the then-incumbent Liberals.

Going forward, even though the SACA is gone, and the pharmacare legislation has just received Royal Assent, the NDP is unlikely to intentionally want to bring down the government this fall while some of its key priorities still need further programmatic development as well as to get through Parliament, including implementing universal pharmacare coverage for a range of contraception and diabetes medications and passing amendments to the federal election law. Moreover, the NDP's provincial parties will be fighting two important elections in British Columbia and Saskatchewan this fall, and the federal wing of the party will invariably appreciate the extra time not only to distinguish itself from the Liberals and Conservatives, but to shore up its fundraising before going into the next federal election campaign.

Bloc Québécois

Meanwhile, the Bloc Québécois is attempting to be a power broker in this minority Parliament by giving the Liberals until October 29 to meet its first two policy demands, in exchange for not immediately attempting to bring down the government. The Bloc Québécois is currently polling well in Quebec, but given most Quebecers are unfavourable to Mr. Poilievre, the Bloc is trying to exact concessions favourable to their potential electoral base, instead of being seen to trigger the immediate advent of what may prove to be an unpopular Conservative majority government for Quebecers.

For one, the Bloc Québécois is demanding that the government speed up passage of a Bloc Québécois MP's initiative, Bill C-282, which would exempt agricultural supply management (dairy products, poultry and eggs) from any future trade negotiations, and which is currently stalled in the Senate. The government does not have direct levers to control the Senate agenda, given that most Senators (who in Canada are appointed, not elected) operate independently of political parties.

The Bloc Québécois is also seeking a 10% increase in Old Age Security1 payments to seniors between the ages of 65 and 74 , which is expected to cost an additional C$16 billion over five years. The government, in 2022, had previously topped up Old Age Security payments for seniors aged 75 and older.

On October 1, the Bloc Québécois Leader, Yves-François Blanchet, forced a vote on a motion requesting a formal government endorsement of his party's Old Age Security initiative, Bill C-319. Because this bill would expend public funds, it cannot be brought to a third reading vote without the government's sanction.2 While the October 1 vote was not on a confidence motion, the Bloc Québécois obtained the support of the Conservatives and the NDP, while the Liberals mostly voted against it, ostensibly on procedural grounds. All eyes in Ottawa are now on the Liberals, as they have not clearly stated their position on the Bloc Québécois demands, but are increasingly indicating that they will not support this measure as proposed.

What Does the Future Hold for This Minority Parliament and for Canadians?

Without a formal agreement, the minority Liberal government must now find a "dance partner" in either the NDP, Bloc Québécois or the Conservative Party on a piecemeal basis on its legislative initiatives in the House of Commons.

The legislative pace will slow, as the Liberals will be less likely to invoke time allocation in the face of opposition filibustering of their legislative agenda. Meanwhile, parliamentary committees will be the scenes of increased partisan games, as the NDP will not only seek out opportunities to distinguish itself from the Liberals but will be less likely to vote with the Liberals against studies and amendments. Most importantly, the Liberal government can no longer rely on the NDP to prop it up on confidence votes.

For the Liberal Government, this new dynamic brings yet another formidable challenge, following its stunning byelection defeats at the beginning of the summer recess in what had been a longtime held seat in Toronto-St Paul's and then last month in Lasalle-Émard-Verdun, as well as the recent sudden resignation of its national campaign director, Jeremy Broadhurst.

The (Current) Bottom Line

While the Liberals are in a more precarious position post-SACA, it is in some sense a return to the status quo of minority Parliaments that Canadians have become accustomed to since 2019, and it does not mean that the government will be imminently defeated.

But, with the temperature having risen with the House's return, any confidence motion risks the defeat of the government. We will continue to follow closely as the political machinations develop.

Footnotes

1. The Old Age Security is a financial support for seniors. Unlike Social Security in the United States, Canada's Old Age Security is funded from general tax revenue, not from payroll contributions (payroll taxes).

2. In the Westminster parliamentary system, the legislative branch can only pass taxation and spending bills that are endorsed by the executive branch. In Canada's parliament, the executive's endorsement is known as a "Royal recommendation."

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

Mondaq uses cookies on this website. By using our website you agree to our use of cookies as set out in our Privacy Policy.

Learn More