美国最高法院限制被告在集体诉讼中使用以和解请求的方式以“剔除”某些原告(英文版)
The Supreme Court in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez,
No. 14-587 (Jan. 20, 2016), held that a defendant's unaccepted
offer to fully satisfy the plaintiff's claim does not moot the
plaintiff's case. The Court's decision has particular
significance for class-action litigation. Following Campbell,
a defendant may not avoid a putative class action simply by
offering full relief to the named plaintiff—a defendant may
not "pick off" individual named plaintiffs merely by
offering to settle their individual claims. But the
Court's decision leaves open the possibility that a defendant
may achieve the same result by actually paying, rather than merely
offering to pay, the plaintiff the full amount of the
plaintiff's individual claim.
Background
Jose Gomez filed a putative class action against the marketing
firm Campbell, alleging that Campbell violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act by sending him a text message without his
permission. Campbell, in an offer of judgment under Rule 68
and a settlement proposal, offered to pay Gomez $1,503 for each
text message plus costs, the maximum amount Gomez could have
recovered on his individual claim. Gomez did not accept the
offer. Campbell then moved to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that no Article III case or
controversy remained because its offer mooted Gomez's
individual claim. The district court denied the motion, and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court's Decision
Campbell resolves an issue that has divided the circuits—whether
"an unaccepted offer to satisfy the named plaintiff's
individual claim [is] sufficient to render a case moot when the
complaint seeks relief on behalf of the plaintiff and a class of
persons similarly situated." Majority Op. at 1. The
Court held 6-3 that an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of
judgment does not moot a case. Id. Justice
Ginsburg, writing for the majority, explained that "[u]nder
basic principles of contract law, Campbell's settlement bid and
Rule 68 offer of judgment, once rejected, had no continuing
efficacy." Id. at 8. According to the
majority, "with no settlement offer still operative, the
parties remained adverse; both retained the same stake in the
litigation they had at the outset." Id. at
9. The majority further noted that Rule 68, which states that
an unaccepted offer of judgment "is considered
withdrawn," "hardly supports the argument that an
unaccepted offer can moot a
complaint." Id. To the contrary, the
"sole built-in sanction" for an unaccepted offer is a
cost-shifting provision. Id.
Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion then distinguished the
cases relied on by Campbell and Chief Justice Roberts in dissent on
the basis that, in those cases, the plaintiffs had in
fact received the relief that
they claimed. Id. at 10, 11 &
n.5. Gomez, by contrast, "remained empty-handed,"
and so his case "was not made moot by the expired settlement
offer." Id. at 11. The majority explicitly
declined to decide "whether the result would be different if a
defendant deposits the full amount of the plaintiff's
individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and the
court then enters judgment for the plaintiff in that
amount." Id.
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, but rejected the
majority's reliance on "modern contract law
principles." Instead, he relied on the common-law history
of offers to conclude that "a rejected offer does not end the
case." Concurring Op. at 1 (Thomas, J.). And Justice
Thomas concluded that, because Campbell "only offered to pay
Gomez's claim but took no further steps, the court was not
deprived of jurisdiction." Id. at 5.
Implications and Takeaways
The decision in Campbell has
significant implications for class-action defense
strategy. Following Campbell, a defendant cannot fend
off class actions with merely an offer
of complete relief. On the other hand, a defendant might
achieve the same result with payment of complete
relief. The majority opinion did not decide whether a
plaintiff's claim becomes moot where "a defendant deposits
the full amount of the plaintiff's individual claim in an
account payable to the plaintiff." Majority Op. at
11-12; see also Dissenting Op. at 10
(Roberts, C.J.) ("[T]he majority's analysis may have come
out differently if Campbell had deposited the offered funds with
the District Court."). And Justice Thomas's opinion
suggests that he might have reached a different conclusion had
Campbell paid Gomez's claims or taken other "further
steps" beyond an offer to
pay. Concurring Op. at 5 (Thomas, J.). Accordingly,
while Campbell precludes defendants from using a
Rule 68 offer of judgment to moot a putative class action, it does
not entirely remove Rule 68 or other means of satisfying a
plaintiff's claims as potential tools for minimizing
class-action exposure. The question of whether the claims of a
plaintiff who "won't take 'yes' for an
answer" can be mooted by depositing the offered funds with the
Court will have to wait for another day. And when that
question reaches the Court, the answer may well be different than
in Campbell. The Court's holding turned, in
large part, on the distinction between simply offering relief
(which does not moot a case) and giving relief (which
does). Placing funds in an account payable to the plaintiff
looks much more like giving relief than offering it.
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