Last week the Connecticut Supreme Court released its decision in State v. Langston, holding that a trial court, when sentencing a defendant for a crime of which he was convicted, could consider the conduct underlying a charge of which he was acquitted, if it found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant had committed the crime, notwithstanding his acquittal of that charge. In rejecting the defendant's claim that the sentencing court's consideration of the conduct underlying the assault charge of which he was acquitted violated his federal and state constitutional rights to due process and to a trial by jury, the court relied upon U.S. v. Watts, and its own earlier decision State v. Huey.
In State v. Huey, the Supreme Court emphasized the broad discretion a sentencing court has to consider matters that, although not admissible at trial, had some minimal indicium of reliability. In Huey, the court determined that ''[i]t is a fundamental sentencing principle that a sentencing judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, and largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider or the source from which it may come."
In Watts, the United States Supreme Court held that a jury's not guilty verdict does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, provided that conduct was proved by a preponderance of the evidence. In Watts, the court emphasized the long line of cases allowing a sentencing court to consider conduct underlying any crime of which the defendant has been acquitted, provided the conduct was proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
Since Watts, the United States Court has clarified that a sentencing court may consider a broad range of conduct, provided that the sentence imposed falls within the statutory range and the conduct does not serve as a basis to enhance that sentence. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, (''[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.''); and United States v. Booker, (reaffirming Apprendi and reiterating that ''[w]e have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range.'')
But what really drew my attention to the Langston decision, other than general interest in keeping informed, was its trip down memory lane with State v. Huey, of which I have fond memories. Langston described well the Huey Court's discussion of the breadth of information that a judge may consider during sentencing as a matter of due process, namely, any information that has a ''minimal indicium of reliability." And ultimately, Langston relied heavily on Huey to reject the defendant's claim that consideration of acquitted conduct violated the state constitution, which according to the defendant affords greater protection of the rights to due process and to a trial by jury than the federal constitution. And finally, again citing to Huey, the Langston court agreed with its previous analysis in Huey that, "it is not the province of our appellate courts to interfere with the discretion of sentencing judges, so long as they have reasonable and persuasive bases for relying on the information they choose." Nonetheless, the court ended with a strong word of caution discouraging sentencing courts from expressing disbelief or disagreement with the jury's verdict and using that disbelief or disagreement as a basis for imposing a particular sentence.
If you look closely at the Huey decision, you'll see that I was the public defender representing Huey and therefore the losing appellant counsel. The fond memories derive from a different perspective, however. I was very pregnant when the case was first scheduled for oral argument. In fact, it was originally scheduled for my due date. When I called the clerk's office to suggest that the argument be postponed for a month, the clerk asked if my first child was born on or near my due date. You really can't make this up. I informed him that my first born was in fact born on his exact due date and almost at my desk, and that, although the Supreme Court was filled with justices who had many children (not quite enough to fill an NFL team's roster-but close), I did not think that any one of them wanted to help me deliver my baby. He reluctantly agreed to postpone the oral argument, and the rest is indeed history. Fast forward three years later when I was a trial judge relying on the wisdom of Huey to sentence. It's nice to see its lessons continued with the caveat Langston provides. Life can be long, often interesting and if we're lucky, meaningful with lots of fond memories.
Copyright 2023. ALM Global, LLC. All Rights Reserved. Originally published by Connecticut Law Tribune [https://www.law.com/ctlawtribune/2023/06/14/connecticut-supreme-court-decision-brings-back-memories/ ], reprinted by permission.
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