Phoenix Partner and Co-Chair of Lewis Brisbois'
Transportation Practice Julie E. Maurer recently
prevailed on a motion to dismiss a motor carrier's
third-party claims when the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey agreed that the carrier lacked standing to sue under the
Carmack Amendment and that its remaining equitable claims were
preempted under the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization
Act (FAAAA).
In this matter, the plaintiff insurer pursued a subrogation claim
against multiple motor carriers and transportation services
providers regarding computer chip manufacturing equipment that was
allegedly damaged during transit in the United States prior to
shipment overseas. Lewis Brisbois filed a motion to dismiss on
behalf of one of those motor carriers, and the plaintiff
voluntarily dismissed all claims as to that carrier, with
prejudice.
However, nearly two years later, one of the carriers that
remained in the case filed a third-party complaint against the
carrier previously represented by Lewis Brisbois, asserting a
Carmack claim and state law claims of negligence, contribution, and
indemnity. Ms. Maurer filed a motion to dismiss all claims against
the dismissed carrier, arguing that the third-party plaintiff
carrier had no standing to sue under the Carmack Amendment, and
that the FAAAA preempted the state law equitable claims and claim
of negligence.
In its opposition, the moving carrier argued that because it was
listed as both shipper/consignor and as consignee on several bills
of lading allegedly related to the plaintiff's claims, the
carrier was entitled to sue under the Carmack Amendment. In her
reply, Ms. Maurer countered that regardless of whether the carrier
was listed as a shipper on a bill of lading, the carrier was not,
and never claimed to be, an entity with a beneficial interest in
the goods shipped.
The court granted the motion to dismiss and ordered that all claims
against the carrier represented by Lewis Brisbois be dismissed with
prejudice. In doing so, the court agreed that as a motor carrier
hired to load, transport, and repackage goods, the carrier lacked
standing as a party entitled to recover under the receipt or bill
of lading for the actual loss or injury to property. The court also
ruled that because the state law equitable claims and claims of
negligence against the carrier all hinged on alleged negligence in
performing motor carrier services, they were preempted under the
FAAAA as “relating to a price, route, or service of any motor
carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of
property.”
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