Supreme Court Invalidates Limits On Political Party Coordinated Expenditures

In a 6–3 decision, the Supreme Court in National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Elections Commission held that the Federal Election Campaign Act’s (“FECA”) limits on “coordinated party expenditures”—spending by political parties on campaign activities conducted in consultation with candidates—violate the First Amendment. Justice Kavanaugh, writing for the Court and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett, concluded FECA’s limits are “disproportionate” and not “necessary and narrowly tailored” to the Government’s anti-circumvention interest.

National party committees of both parties (the DNC, RNC, DSCC, NRSC, DCCC, and NRCC) may now spend without limit in coordination with Federal candidates. The Court’s decision does not disturb base contribution limits to candidates, FECA’s earmarking rules, or statutory disclosure requirements, and the Court expressly did not reach coordinated expenditures by super PACs or other non-party outside groups.

Background

FECA allows national party committees and the Federal accounts of state parties to make “coordinated party expenditures,” i.e., expenditures on campaign activities that are conducted “in cooperation, consultation or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate.” 52 U.S.C. §30116(d); 11 C.F.R. §109.20(a). Unlike independent expenditures, which parties may make without limit, coordinated expenditures allow a Federal candidate to direct the spending decisions of the donating committees. FECA had capped these amounts: $130,600 to $4,071,800 for Senate candidates (varying by state), $65,300 to $130,600 for House candidates, and $32,392,200 for the most recent presidential nominee. 91 Fed. Reg. 10393–10394 (2026); 89 Fed. Reg. 5536 (2024).

In 2001, in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 533 U.S. 431 (2001) (“Colorado II”), the Court upheld these limits under a deferential standard that tolerated “unskillful tailoring” and rested on an “undue influence” theory of corruption. Since then, the Court in decisions like McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014), and FEC v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U.S. 289 (2022), tightened the standard of review for Federal campaign finance law and largely confined the permissible justification to quid pro quo corruption alone, leaving Colorado II on increasingly unstable footing.

The decision

In 2022, the NRSC, NRCC, then-candidate J.D. Vance, and former Representative Steve Chabot sued the FEC, challenging the coordinated party expenditure limits as unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The Federal Government declined to defend the limits, and the DNC, DSCC, and DCCC intervened, with the Court appointing Roman Martinez as amicus. En banc, the Sixth Circuit upheld the limits under Colorado II. The Supreme Court granted cert and heard arguments December 9, 2025.

In its June 30 decision, the Court struck down FECA’s limits on coordinated party expenditures as unconstitutional under the First Amendment, allowing national party committees and state committees to spend unlimited funds to support individual Federal candidates—and, crucially, in coordination with those candidates. Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion expressly endorsed a “closely drawn scrutiny” standard, under which a contribution limit must be “necessary” and “narrowly tailored,” and not “disproportionate” to its purpose. The Court reiterated that the only Constitutionally-valid interest for campaign finance restrictions is preventing quid pro quo corruption (i.e., “dollars for political favors”) and that “undue influence,” access, and ingratiation cannot justify restrictions on political speech. The Court found FECA’s limits to fail this stricter “closely drawn scrutiny” test.

The Court found that three existing safeguards already address the corruption risks raised by defending appellees, namely (1) base contribution limits, (2) earmarking rules treating directed funds as contributions to the candidate, and (3) disclosure requirements, especially as strengthened by modern technology. The coordinated-expenditure caps are thus, the Court decided, a “fourth line of defense” that imposes a disproportionate restriction on speech. The majority further noted that most states permit unlimited party coordinated spending in state races with no resulting evidence of corruption.

The Court also addressed the anti-circumvention rationale, i.e., that theory that bad actors might circumvent contribution limits and engage in quid pro quo corruption via coordinated party spending, articulated in, and foundational to, Colorado II. The Court held that “this Court has since retreated from [the anti-circumvention] rationale” as a valid basis upon which to impose campaign finance restrictions because purported circumvention through parties “is one significant step removed from actual quid pro quo corruption.” Colorado II’s reliance on this ostensibly antiquated legal foundation was sufficient to overrule it.

The dissent, authored by Justice Kagan and joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, argued that FECA’s coordinated-expenditure caps are narrowly tailored to prevent circumvention of the base contribution limits and “pass that test with flying colors.” In the dissent’s view, striking the limits allows a party to function as “an alternative checking account for a campaign,” because coordinated expenditures are “as useful to the candidate as cash.” Justice Kagan would have adhered to Colorado II under stare decisis, characterizing the majority’s decision as the latest in a series of campaign-finance overrulings.

Key takeaways and practical implications

The core tenets of Court’s decision—a stricter “closely drawn scrutiny” test, a weakened anti-circumvention rationale, and quid pro quo corruption as the only Constitutionally-valid basis to impose campaign contribution limits—suggest a number of important, practical takeaways:

• Unlimited party coordination is now permitted. National, senatorial, and congressional party committees of both parties may spend without limit on campaign activities coordinated with their federal candidates. The dollar caps in 52 U.S.C. §30116(d) are unenforceable.
• Base contribution limits, earmarking rules, and disclosure remain intact. The Court relied on these three mechanisms as adequate anti-circumvention safeguards. Donors remain subject to per-candidate and per-committee contribution limits, and parties remain bound by earmarking prohibitions and reporting obligations.
• Outside groups are unaffected. The decision expressly does not reach coordinated expenditures by Super PACs, corporations, or other non-party entities. Those restrictions remain governed by existing law.
• Spending power will shift toward party committees. Because parties—unlike super PACs—can now coordinate directly with candidates on spending decisions, campaign spending power (particularly for television advertising) will likely shift toward the national and congressional party committees and away, comparatively, from independent-expenditure groups.
• Joint fundraising committees (“JFCs”) are likely to play a greater role. JFCs are likely to become more significant vehicles for channeling larger contributions into coordinated party spending on behalf of individual candidates.
• Magnitude remains uncertain. The shift may represent a reshuffling of where political money flows rather than a dramatic increase in total campaign spending. Whether coordinated party advertisements qualify for the candidate “lowest unit charge” broadcast rate is an open, disputed question.
• Rigorous scrutiny signals future vulnerability. The Court’s insistence on quid pro quo corruption as the sole valid interest—coupled with proportionality-sensitive review—may expose other campaign-finance restrictions to renewed challenge, including limits on direct party-to-candidate contributions.
• Regulatory guidance may be slow. The FEC has lacked a quorum since April 2025 and cannot currently initiate enforcement actions or issue binding regulations or advisory opinions. Stakeholders should consult counsel as the practical framework takes shape.