The Supreme Court Rules That Individuals Who No Longer Hold Or Seek To Hold A Job Do Not Have Standing To Sue Under The ADA For Intentional Discrimination

On June 20, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court (SCOTUS) held in Stanley v. City of Sanford, Florida that a retired employee who could no longer hold or seek to hold her job could not sue under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for the denial of postemployment benefits. The ruling affirmed the decision by the 11th Circuit and resolved a circuit split on whether retirees have standing to sue over alleged disability discrimination.

The plaintiff, Karyn Stanley, was a firefighter for the city of Sanford, Florida (City). During her employment, the City changed its health insurance offering such that those who retired after 25 years of service could receive health insurance up to age 65, but those who retired due to a disability could only receive health insurance for 24 months. Stanley retired before reaching 25 years of service because she was diagnosed with Parkinson's disease. While retired and after the 24 months elapsed, she lost her insurance and brought a lawsuit alleging that the City's differential treatment between those who reached 25 years of service and those who retired due to disability violated the ADA. The issue facing the Court was not whether the ADA protects against potential discriminatory decisions by employers with respect to retirement benefits (it does), but rather whether Stanley could be the one to bring such a suit. The Court in an 8-1 decision held she could not.

Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote the opinion for the majority and took a textual approach. Under the ADA, employers are prohibited from discriminating against "qualified individuals." A "qualified individual" is a person who "can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires" with or without reasonable accommodation. The Court held that there is a temporal requirement under the ADA that limits the definition of a "qualified individual" to current or prospective employees — and not former employees who already retired. In this regard, the Court relied on how the statute's usage of specific present-tense verbs such as "holds," "desires" or "can perform" show how the ADA was meant to protect only those who are either currently employed or actively seeking employment at the time they allegedly experienced discrimination. The Court also relied on how certain examples of reasonable accommodations afforded under the ADA that may help a disabled employee perform their job — which include "job restructuring," "modifying existing facilities used by employees" and "altering training materials or policies" — only make sense when applied to current employees or applicants and not retirees who do not hold or seek to hold a job. The Court also found it instructive that the ADA's anti-retaliation provision protects against "any individual" rather than "qualified individuals" and therefore is a reminder that the ADA's anti-retaliation provision does extend to retirees. The Court further contrasted the ADA with other federal statutory schemes, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which also addresses employment discrimination and qualified individuals but does not contain the present-tense limiters throughout the ADA. Since Stanley was retired and disabled at the time she brought her lawsuit, she could not perform the essential functions of her job as a firefighter and therefore was not protected under the anti-discrimination provision of the ADA.

With the Stanley decision, the Supreme Court aligns with the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and 11th Circuits on whether retirees are qualified individuals under the ADA. But for the Second and Third Circuits, Stanley marks a change. This change, however, should not have much of an effect on employers, because retirees are afforded protection under other statutes, and even under the ADA so long as they can show that there was a period of time when they were subject to an alleged discriminatory policy while they were employed (as addressed by a plurality of the Court and which Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson agreed with in her dissent). Stanley actually fell into that category during the last two years of her employment but simply did not know of the City's policy change to bring a lawsuit prior to retiring, creating the potential that she may now successfully amend her complaint. For employers in New York, the Stanley decision will not have an effect for the additional reasons that the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law prohibit discrimination against any "individual" with a disability and not just "qualified" individuals like the ADA does. Employers should thus still exercise caution when making changes to retirement or other postemployment benefits, to ensure any changes do not discriminate against former employees with disabilities or other members of a protected class.