Duane Morris Takeaways: On August 25, 2025, in United States EEOC v. AAM Holding Corp. (In Re AAM Holding Corp.), 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 21629 (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a decision by the Southern District of New York and held the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") retains authority to investigate an EEOC charge even after the EEOC issues the charging party a right-to-sue letter and the charging party subsequently files a lawsuit in court. This ruling significantly expands the scope of the EEOC's investigative authority in the Second Circuit as it joins the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in allowing pending EEOC investigations to proceed following the agency's issuance of right-to-sue letters to a charging party who thereafter files suit. The decision is directly at odds with the Fifth Circuit's holding in EEOC v. Hearst Corp., 103 F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 1997), that the EEOC's investigative authority ceases upon the charging party's filing suit pursuant to a right-to-sue letter. The Second Circuit's opinion follows the more recent trend of courts siding with the EEOC on its assertion of expansive investigative authority and allowing the agency to continue investigating charges despite the charging party's separate private lawsuit. With the decision, the split in authority now heavily favors the EEOC's expanded authority, and employers should understand that ongoing EEOC investigations may continue in full force despite the agency's issuing a right-to-sue letter. Finally, the opinion confirmed that EEOC subpoenas must be construed generously and may properly request extremely broad categories of class-wide documents and information if the EEOC finds it relevant and in the public's interest to seek same.
Case Background
In March 2022, Eunice Raquel Flores Thomas ("Thomas"), a former dancer who worked at two Manhattan adult entertainment clubs (FlashDancers Midtown and FlashDancers Downtown (together, "the Clubs")), filed a class-based charge with the EEOC alleging widespread sexual harassment and hostile work environment at both club locations. AAM Holding Corp., 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 21629, at *3. Thomas claimed she and other women were forced to change clothes in an open back room without doors that was video-monitored, and were pressured to have sex with high-paying repeat customers in champagne rooms, fearing adverse employment actions should they refuse. Id. at *3-4.
Following the EEOC's initial notification to the Clubs that Thomas filed a charge, the EEOC requested information such as "the clubs' policies regarding relationships between customers and employees, any records of sexual harassment complaints, and pedigree information for their employees, including each employee's name, age, sex, race, position, dates of employment, and contact information." Id. at *4. The Clubs objected to the EEOC's requests as irrelevant and unduly burdensome to produce, and the EEOC thereafter issued two subpoenas demanding the employee pedigree information, which ultimately led to the EEOC petitioning the District Court for enforcement. Id. at *4-5. The District Court granted the EEOC's petition and ordered the Clubs to produce the information, explaining that the relevance requirement is a "low bar" and that courts give the term a "generous construction," allowing access to "virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations against the employer." Id. at *5 (internal citation omitted). The Clubs eventually filed a notice of appeal to the Second Circuit and moved to stay the enforcement order first in the District Court and then in the Second Circuit, both of which motions were denied. Id. at *5-6.
Meanwhile, in July 2024, while the Clubs' appeal before the Second Circuit was pending, the EEOC issued Thomas a right-to-sue letter, on the basis of which Thomas filed, in September 2024, a putative class action complaint in the District Court. Id. at *6. The Clubs then argued to the Second Circuit that the EEOC had been divested of its investigative authority (including its ability to issue subpoenas) once Thomas received her right-to-sue letter and filed suit. Id. The Clubs also reiterated their position that the underlying subpoenas' demand for pedigree information for all club employees (not just Thomas) was overbroad and unduly burdensome. Id.
The Second Circuit's Decision
The Second Circuit began its opinion by providing background about the investigative process under Title VII. It explained that the EEOC bears primary responsibility for enforcing Title VII under a multistep enforcement procedure that involves the filing of a timely charge, an investigation by the EEOC during the pendency of the charge, and, where appropriate, dismissal of the charge and issuance of a right-to-sue letter authorizing the charging party to pursue litigation. Id. at *6-8.
The Second Circuit also addressed the Clubs' argument that the EEOC's investigative authority stops once it issues a right-to-sue letter and the party files suit. Specifically, it addressed the Clubs' reliance on the Fifth Circuit's opinion in EEOC v. Hearst Corp., 103 F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 1997), which held that the initiation of a private suit by an aggrieved party marks the end of the investigation stage and thus terminates the EEOC's investigative authority. Id. at *8-9.
Disagreeing with the Fifth Circuit's holding in Hearst, the Second Circuit found no support in the text or structure of Title VII, instead citing Title VII's broad grant of authority to the EEOC, which provides that the agency "'shall at all reasonable times have access to . . . evidence . . . that relates to unlawful employment practices . . . and is relevant to the charge under investigation.'" Id. at *9 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a)) (emphasis added). The Second Circuit determined that Title VII did not place any "strict temporal limit" on the EEOC's authority to issue and enforce subpoenas and obtain evidence through the enforcement process, and that, in fact, the requirement that the EEOC complete its investigation within 120 days applies only "so far as practicable," which the Court held does not establish "a hard stop." Id. at *10.
Moreover, the Second Circuit observed that the Supreme Court has held that the EEOC retains independent administrative "responsibility of investigating claims of employment discrimination" and therefore retains the right to file its own civil lawsuit even after the 180-day window, which does not end its responsibility or ability to investigate a charge. Id. at *11 (citing Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 368 (1977)).
The Second Circuit further reasoned that a central part of the EEOC's "broad public interest and role" in fighting employment discrimination is pursuing the public interest by enforcing the law even when that interest is distinct from or exceeds the private interest of the aggrieved charging party. Id. at *11. It noted the possibility that the EEOC could issue a right-to-sue letter only to have the charging party file suit and settle for nominal damages, a scenario in which, the opinion states, the agency would still be free to continue investigating ongoing unlawful discrimination that may be remedied by unique EEOC mechanisms like conciliation or public litigation. Id. at *12. Those mechanisms also include the EEOC's ability to initiate class-wide enforcement actions without certification of a class representative under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, as well as its ability to pursue injunctive relief. Id. at *12-13.
Ultimately, the Second Circuit opined on these bases that the EEOC retains its authority to investigate, including issuing and enforcing administrative subpoenas, after it issues a right-to-sue letter and the charging party files a lawsuit. Id. at *13-14. The Second Circuit supported its holding by noting that, "[w]hen the EEOC determines that public resources should be committed to investigating and enforcing a charge, the statutory text unambiguously authorizes it to proceed," citing to similar holdings (without dissent) in both the Ninth Circuit (EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., 558 F.3d 842, 854 (9th Cir. 2009) and the Seventh Circuit (EEOC v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 867 F.3d 843, 850-51 (7th Cir. 2017)). Id. at *13-14 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
The opinion also held the EEOC's subpoena for pedigree information was not overbroad or unduly burdensome. Id. at *14. The Second Circuit determined the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that: (i) the materials were relevant to Thomas's claims of widespread sexual harassment at the Clubs; and (ii) the Clubs failed to show that producing responsive documents and information would be unduly burdensome, rejecting the Clubs' assertion, without factual detail, that the production would take approximately 300 hours of work. Id. at *15-19.
Implications For Employers
The Second Circuit's decision means the EEOC's investigative authority does not end when a charging party requests and receives a right-to-sue letter and thereafter files a suit. Instead, the EEOC may, in its discretion, determine that the public's interest either diverges from or exceeds the interests of the private charging party and may continue its ongoing investigation by issuing class-wide records and information requests.
Companies must be keenly aware of the EEOC's broad, ongoing investigatory powers in dealing with the charging party and the EEOC throughout the time after a charge is filed. Employers should also be aware that courts are reluctant to deny the EEOC's subpoena requests when the agency makes a showing of relevance, which is generously interpreted by courts in the EEOC's favor. While situations may arise in which the agency's requests are truly overbroad or unduly burdensome in scope, businesses should assume they will have an uphill battle objecting to or greatly limiting any such requests, even after the charging party files a separate private lawsuit.
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