Key Takeaways
- The Supreme Court of the United States unanimously held in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services that a plaintiff who is a member of a majority group does not need to show additional "background circumstances" to make a prima facie showing of employment discrimination under Title VII.
- The decision remedies a circuit split and clarifies the law on "majority-group" claims.
- A separate opinion by Justice Thomas suggests that employers' burdens at the summary judgment stage are too low and indicates growing willingness to allow employees' claims beyond that stage.
Background
Marlean Ames worked at the Ohio Department of Youth Services since 2004. In 2019, she applied and interviewed for a management position that a different candidate—a lesbian woman—ultimately got. The agency demoted Ames a few days later to the role she had when she first joined the department, which came with a significant pay cut. The agency then hired a gay man to fill the newly vacant position that Ames held prior to her demotion. Ames sued under Title VII, alleging that she had been denied the management position and demoted because of her sexual orientation.
The district court applied the three-step McDonnell Douglas framework for disparate-treatment claims and granted summary judgment to the department. Under U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit precedent, because Ames was a majority-group member, she had to show at the first step additional "background circumstances" suggesting that the agency was "the unusual employer who discriminates against the majority." (Those circumstances could include evidence that members of the relevant minority group made the employment decision or statistics showing a pattern of discrimination against the majority group.) The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reinforcing its position with the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits in the circuit split over this heightened burden on majority-group plaintiffs.
Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court of the United States resolved the circuit split by holding that majority-group plaintiffs no longer need to establish "background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority." In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, the Court held that at the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, a member of a majority group need only show that "she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." The Court reasoned that the heightened "background circumstances" requirement went against the text of Title VII and the Court's precedents.
Looking Ahead
The Supreme Court's decision means that employees from a majority group who claim disparate treatment under Title VII do not need to make an additional showing of "background circumstances" to make out a prima facie case. This will make it easier for employees of majority groups to bring claims of so-called "reverse discrimination" in the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits.
The concurring opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas questions the overall McDonnell Douglas test and suggests that the Court consider whether it is an appropriate tool to evaluate Title VII claims at summary judgment. Stating that the test is a "judge made" rule, Justice Thomas writes that the test is too complex and not supported by the text of Title VII. If the Court disposes of the McDonnell Douglas test at the summary judgment stage, employers will likely be less successful at disposing of cases before trial.
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