California Supreme Court Strikes Down Penal Code Section 148.6 Provisions Penalizing False Misconduct Complaints Against Peace Officers As Unconstitutional

For nearly 20 years, California law has criminalized the act of knowingly filing a false complaint against a peace officer and required that agencies provide a written notice advising complainants that making a false complaint may result in criminal prosecution. Specifically, the statute requires law enforcement agencies to print the following text in all capital letters and boldface type above the signature line of a complaint form:

The California Supreme Court recently published a landmark decision in Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles (Nov. 10, 2025) __ Cal.5th __ [2025 Cal. LEXIS 7261] (LAPPL) addressing the constitutionality of requiring a complainant to read this admonishment and sign an acknowledgement that the act of knowingly filing a false complaint alleging misconduct by a peace officer constitutes a misdemeanor criminal offense. The Supreme Court found that these requirements, in concert, are an impermissible restriction on the free speech rights of complainants reporting police misconduct.

As of this decision, the criminal penalty for filing a false complaint of misconduct against a peace officer has been struck down, law enforcement agencies may not include the above language on complaint forms, nor may complainants be required to sign an acknowledgement under penalty of criminal prosecution.

Discussion

The California Supreme Court previously decided on this issue in the landmark 2002 case, People v. Stanistreet (29 Cal.4th 497) (Stanistreet). In Stanistreet, the Supreme Court ruled that Penal Code section 148.6(a)'s requirements do not violate the First Amendment. However, since 2002, federal district courts have routinely held that section 148.6(a) does, in fact, violate the First Amendment as a content based restriction. (See, e.g., Chaker v. Crogan (9th Cir. 2005) 428 F.3d 1215; Hamilton v. City of San Bernardino (C.D. Cal. 2004) 325 F.Supp.2d 1087; Eakins v. Nevada (D. Nev. 2002) 219 F.Supp.2d 1113 [striking down a similar Nevada state statute].)

In light of these decisions, in 2011 the City of Los Angeles entered into a consent decree that barred the City from requiring individuals complaining of police misconduct to acknowledge and sign the section 148.6(a) advisory. Even though the consent decree expired in 2013, the City continued its practice of not requiring the signature or acknowledgement.

In 2017, the labor association representing rank-and-file LAPD Officers, the Los Angeles Police Protective League (the "League"), filed a lawsuit against the City of LA, seeking an injunction that would require the city to comply with section 148.6(a)'s requirements as decided by the Supreme Court in Stanistreet. In other words, the League wanted the City to require the signature and acknowledgment of anyone complaining against an officer. The City refused and relied upon the various federal court rulings interpreting section 148.6(a) to be an unconstitutional regulation of free speech in violation of the federal First Amendment.

After litigating this case through the lower courts, the issue of the constitutionality of section 148.6(a) returned to the California Supreme Court. In LAPPL, the California Supreme Court ruled that section 148.6(a)'s provisions requiring a complainant to sign an admonishment acknowledging that they may be prosecuted for knowingly filing a false complaint and providing for criminal penalties for making a false report, together, violated the First Amendment and struck down these provisions.

In a 90-page decision, the Supreme Court analyzed an enormous number of U.S. Supreme Court, federal, and state court decisions to answer the issue. As part of its analysis, the Supreme Court determined that the statute must be measured under strict scrutiny. Ultimately, the majority concluded that section 148.6(a)'s provisions, "exhibit numerous characteristics that, considered together, sufficiently burden a protected form of speech—namely, truthful (or at least well-intentioned) complaints of police misconduct—so as to warrant heightened constitutional scrutiny." (LAPPL at p. 6.) These features include:

• Singling out for criminal treatment knowingly false allegations of misconduct that are filed against a category of government official whose job duties are of particular concern to the public;
• Asymmetrically criminalizing knowingly false allegations that are filed against law enforcement, while leaving unregulated false statements that witnesses might make in support of law enforcement during the course of the ensuing investigation that is required under section 832.5 [requiring investigation of complaints against peace officers];
• Barring law enforcement from accepting a formal complaint of police misconduct unless complainants agree to read and sign an admonition warning that they can be criminally prosecuted if their claims are disbelieved;
• Providing complainants ill-defined and inconsistent descriptions of what specific types of false statements might trigger criminal liability; and
• failing to require that the statements actually be material to an actionable type of misconduct or that they cause any harm to the falsely accused.

(LAPPL, at p. 6.)

Specifically, the majority found that section 148.6(a) was likely well-intended by the Legislature and there is a significant government interest in regulating speech that may falsely lead to employment actions against an officer. However, the way section 148.6(a) communicates this intent is not narrowly tailored, as required under a strict scrutiny evaluation of the First Amendment.

The Court's analysis determined that these requirements "threaten censorship of ideas by dissuading individuals from making truthful (or at least well-intentioned) complaints. (LAPPL, at p. 56.)

In Associate Justice Goodwin H. Liu's 25-page dissent, he notes that; "section 148.6 is no more unconstitutional than laws that make it a crime to commit perjury, file a false police report, submit a false document to a public agency, or lie to a government official concerning an official matter. Such laws 'protect the integrity of [g]overnment processes, quite apart from merely restricting false speech.'" (Citing United States. v. Alvarez (2012) 567 U.S. 709, 721.) "They belong to one of the 'historic and traditional categories [of expression]' where 'content-based restrictions on speech have been permitted.'" (Id. at p. 717.) Justice Liu also notes that; "[t]oday's opinion invalidates section 148.6 on the ground that it 'deter[s] citizens from filing truthful (or at least not knowingly false) complaints of police misconduct.' [cite] But that rationale rests on speculative assertions and does not withstand scrutiny."

Despite striking down section 148.6(a) as unconstitutional, the Supreme Court has left room for the Legislature to amend the statute to make it constitutional. The Court specifically called out that the application of strict scrutiny was a result of the combination of a harsh, aggressive warning along with criminal penalties. Hypothetically, the Legislature could cure the defects in the statute by criminalizing all knowingly false statements related to a complaint of misconduct that results in a demonstrable injury, and provide other methods of warning complainants about filing false reports.

Takeaway

Law enforcement agencies should be mindful that enforcement of Penal Code section 148.6(a), in its current form, is unconstitutional and should consider removing the 148.6(a)(2) admonition from their complaint forms.

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