Screws Loose? The CJEU Weighs In On A Trade Mark Parody Gone Political

CJEU’s judgment of 8 September 2026 in Case C-298/23, Inter IKEA Systems BV v Algemeen Vlaams Belang VZW (Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Nederlandstalige Ondernemingsrechtbank Brussel – Brussels Dutch-speaking Business Court, Belgium)

1. Summary of the facts

On 14 November 2022, the Belgian far-right political party Vlaams Belang publicly presented, at a press conference, its programme for reforming asylum and immigration policy under the name “IKEA-PLAN – Immigratie Kan Echt Anders” (“IKEA plan – Immigration really can be different”), comprising 15 political proposals described as “ready to assemble”. Inter IKEA Systems BV’s trade marks appeared in the illustrations accompanying the presentation, together with characters resembling those used in IKEA assembly instructions. A more developed version of the political plan referencing the presentation was published online, and the press conference was also promoted on Vlaams Belang’s social media channels and subsequently shared by third parties. Inter IKEA Systems BV, known to the general public for its do-it-yourself furniture supplied in kit form with instructions, (“IKEA”) is the proprietor of three Benelux trade marks and one EU trade mark, registered for various classes of goods and services.

On 22 November 2022, IKEA brought trade mark infringement proceedings before the referring court against the Vrijheidsfonds and Algemeen Vlaams Belang (two non-profit associations) and against natural persons representing Vlaams Belang. The referring court held the proceedings admissible only against the Vrijheidsfonds, which had conducted the campaign in the name and on behalf of the party or its leaders. The Vrijheidsfonds acknowledged using IKEA’s trade marks without consent and undertook to cease such use pending the referring court’s final decision, while arguing that its use of the marks’ reputation to reinforce its political message and increase its reach constituted ‘due cause’ within the meaning of Article 9(2)(c) of EU Trade Mark Regulation 2017/1001 (“EUTMR”) and Articles 10(2)(c) and 10(6) of Trade Mark Directive 2015/2436 (“TMD”).

2. The question referred and its legal essence

The referring court considered that the concept of ‘due cause’ must be interpreted consistently with the fundamental principle of freedom of expression protected under Article 10 ECHR and Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, framing the dispute as a conflict between fundamental rights of equal rank – freedom of expression and the right to property (the trade mark proprietor’s exclusive rights under Article 17(2) of the Charter). It noted that, during the legislative process leading to the TMD, the European Parliament had considered including a parody exception to the exclusive trade mark right, modelled on the US Lanham Act, but this was not adopted, leaving the treatment of parodic use of a trade mark for ‘due cause’ purposes undefined at EU level. The referring court also observed that national courts diverge on this point, with Belgian courts interpreting ‘due cause’ very restrictively, in contrast to the more expansive approach taken in the Netherlands.

The referring court therefore stayed proceedings and asked the Court of Justice whether freedom of expression, including the freedom to express political opinions and to engage in political parody, as guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR and Article 11 of the Charter, can constitute ‘due cause’ for using a sign identical or similar to a reputed trade mark within the meaning of Article 9(2)(c) EUTMR, Article 10(2)(c) and Article 10(6) TMD; and, if so, what criteria the national court should apply in balancing those competing fundamental rights.

3. The Advocate General’s opinion

In his Opinion delivered on 13 November 2025, Advocate General Szpunar proposed that the concept of ‘due cause’ under Article 10(2)(c) TMD and Article 9(2)(c) EUTMR can indeed serve as a mechanism for accommodating the requirements of freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 11 of the Charter, within trade mark law. However, on the specific facts, he concluded that the proprietor of a reputed mark cannot be compelled, absent some other valid justification, to tolerate a third party’s use of an identical or similar sign where the mark’s potential contribution to a debate of public interest does not outweigh the fact that the use amounts to riding on the coat-tails of the mark to disseminate a political programme that itself raises no issue concerning that mark, its proprietor or its goods and services.

In the Advocate General’s assessment, an association’s use of a reputed trade mark to promote a political programme unrelated to that mark, its proprietor or its goods and services cannot benefit from the enhanced protection normally afforded to expression contributing to a matter of general interest, and — absent other justification — does not amount to ‘due cause’. He also rejected the argument that the trade mark’s reputation should weaken the protection owed to it.

On the question of “political parody” specifically, the Advocate General observed that the notion has no autonomous legal meaning within the EU, but drew on the case-law on parody to identify two defining features: the use must evoke an existing mark while showing appreciable differences from it, and it must be humorous or mocking in character — leaving it to the referring court to assess whether the signs used were perceptibly different from IKEA’s marks and genuinely satirical. He added that the parodic form of an expression is subsidiary to its contribution to a public-interest debate: a genuine link to such a debate may justify some exaggeration or distortion, but parody alone cannot substitute for that link.

While framed as a matter of principle open to freedom-of-expression defences, the Opinion’s practical thrust favoured IKEA on the facts, since the political programme at issue did not concern the IKEA brand itself, its proprietor or its goods or services.

4. The Court’s judgment

The Court held that Article 9(2)(c) EUTMR and Article 10(2)(c) and (6) TMD, read together with Articles 11 and 17(2) of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that a third party’s freedom of expression, including the freedom to express political opinions and to engage in political parody, may constitute ‘due cause’, provided that it prevails, in the balancing of the rights at issue, over the trade mark proprietor’s exclusive right. For the purposes of this assessment, the national court must take into account all relevant circumstances, in particular the third party’s intention and good faith, whether the use contributes to a debate of general interest, whether it is commercial in nature, and the consequences of the use for the proprietor or for the very substance of the exclusive right.

The Court first recalled that a trade mark proprietor’s property right is not absolute and must be balanced against the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 11 of the Charter. However, it cautioned that a bare invocation of freedom of expression is not sufficient to constitute ‘due cause’: the third party must set out the concrete reasons for its use and show that they prevail over the proprietor’s rights, failing which the concept of ‘due cause’ would be deprived of substance. The balancing exercise rests on two strands: first, the third party’s intention and good faith (the use must convey an idea linked to the mark, engage a debate of general interest, or serve some other necessity such as linguistic meaning); second, the actual weighing of the intellectual property right against freedom of expression, taking into account the use’s contribution to a debate of general interest, its commercial or non-commercial character, its potentially satirical or parodic form, and its consequences for the proprietor (intensity, extent, similarity of signs, and the risk of suggesting the proprietor’s endorsement of the political message). As regards Article 10(6) TMD, under which Member State are allowed to protect trade marks against the use of a sign for other purposes than that of distinguishing goods or services where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark, the Court held that the same analytical framework applies, while noting that use outside the strictly commercial sphere may benefit from broader protection under the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (Cour EDH, 10 janvier 2013, Ashby Donald et autres c. France, CE:ECHR:2013:0110JUD003676908), so the outcome of the balancing exercise need not be identical to that reached under Article 10(2)(c).

Guidance given to the referring court in the case at hand

Although the Court formally left the referring court to verify all relevant circumstances, it carried out a detailed application of the criteria to the facts: the IKEA acronym has no semantic meaning that would necessitate its use, it does not appear to have become a public cultural reference, the immigration debate had no connection with the IKEA marks as such, the Vrijheidsfonds used highly similar signs (including the typography and colour palette), the use was repeated and widely disseminated online, and it could not be excluded that the public might perceive IKEA as endorsing the political message. On that basis, the Court concluded that it did not appear that this use, made with the sole aim of profiting from the marks’ reputation to reinforce and spread the political message, could prevail over the proprietor’s rights so as to amount to due cause. Although framed as subject to verification, this analysis quite clearly signals that the Court was steering the referring court towards a decision in IKEA’s favour, in line with Advocate General Szpunar’s Opinion.

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