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We have all said things we regret saying, and modern social media and technology only give people a more convenient way to do so. However, a post made in frustration, a heated text message, or even a comment left by a fake account may result in federal criminal charges.
The introduction of new charges under the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) has now criminalised a vast range of conduct that many Australians likely engage in frequently, and is centred on the use of a “carriage service”. This includes common mediums like social media, text messaging, and phone calls.
The relevant offences that this article will focus on are Criminal Code sections 474.15 – using a carriage service to make a threat, and 474.17 – using a carriage service to menace, harass, or cause offence. The majority of charges stem from this legislation.
While carriage services have certainly incited real hatred and violence in some capacities, the unique drafting of these laws may also risk encroaching on the civil liberties of everyday Australians.
The Rise of Carriage Service Charges in Australia
Following the introduction of these offences, enforcement has immediately and sharply increased. In October 2025, AFP Commissioner Krissy Barrett announced the National Security Investigations (NSI) team, created to target individuals causing high levels of harm to ‘social cohesion’.
Those teams, alongside Special Operation Avalite – which laid its first charges against a Blacktown man in January 2025 over alleged death threats posted to a Jewish association’s social media page – have steadily been prosecuting for these offences.
While charges like these make headlines, the overwhelming majority of offending is linked to relationship breakdowns, family law disputes, and abusive behaviour to government agencies. This reflects the mundaneness and accessibility of these offences: anyone can do it, with very little equipment.
Section 474.15 — Using A Carriage Service To Make A Threat
Under s 474.15(1), a person commits an offence if they use a carriage service to make a threat to kill another person (or a third person), intending that person to fear the threat will be carried out. The maximum penalty is 10 years’ imprisonment.
Under s 474.15(2), the same structure applies to a threat to cause serious harm. The maximum penalty is 7 years’ imprisonment.
Importantly, this offence does necessitate the accused actually wanting someone to feel the fear of their threats – this is called a specific intent.
However, the legislation makes expressly clear the prosecution does not need to prove that the person actually did fear the threat would be carried out. The law here is concerned with what the accused intended the relevant party to feel and is unconcerned with whether they really did feel it. ‘Fear’ is a somewhat nebulous term, but the provision explicitly includes apprehension, though courts are not limited to only this.
Importantly, the threat may be directed at a third party rather than the recipient of the message. So, someone could be liable for a conversation with someone where they are threatening someone else.
Section 474.17 — Using A Carriage Service To Menace, Harass Or Cause Offence
Section 474.17(1) is far broader. A person commits the offence if they use a carriage service and do so in a way (whether by the method of use, the content of the communication, or both) that reasonable persons would regard as being, in all the circumstances, menacing, harassing or offensive. This ‘reasonable person’ test is inherently ambiguous and is the bone of contention in most charges.
The maximum penalty is 5 years’ imprisonment, which was increased from three years by new legislation in 2022.
Crucially, there is no requirement that anyone in fact be menaced, harassed or offended: the test is objective. The fault element, supplied by s 5.6(2) of the Code, is intention. This means that the prosecutor must only prove the accused intended to ‘use a carriage service’: there is no need to prove it was intended in a menacing, harassing, or offensive way.
‘Carriage service’ is defined by the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) to be ‘a service for carrying communications by means of guided and/or unguided electromagnetic energy’. This captures phone calls, SMS, email, social media, messaging apps and internet posts, among much more.
Whether communication is ‘offensive’ is perhaps the most contentious limb, but legislation provides guidance. Courts can consider, but are not limited to, the following: (a) the standards of morality, decency and propriety generally accepted by reasonable adults; and (b) the literary, artistic or educational merit (if any) of the material; and (c) the general character of the material (including whether it is of a medical, legal or scientific character).
This still leaves one questioning, what does “offensive” here actually mean? The definition of offensive here can be found in Monis and Another v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 231, namely, it’s meaning is in the higher ranges of seriousness carrying a greater degree of criminality than those created by legislation such as section 4 of the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW). The word “offensive” is used in conjunction with the words “menacing” and “harassing” suggesting that the word is directed to conduct more serious than using a postal service to hurt or wound the feelings of a recipient. It is necessary that the use be calculated or likely to arouse significant anger, significant resentment, outrage, disgust, or hatred in the mind of a reasonable person in all the circumstances. It is not sufficient if the use would only hurt or wound the feelings of the recipient, in the mind of a reasonable person.
This construction reflects, the use of the word “offensive” in conjunction with the “menacing” or “harassing”, takes into account that it extends to private communications and reflects the level of criminality envisaged by the prescribed maximum penalty. This also strikes an appropriate balance between the implied freedom of political communication and the rights of persons to be protected from the misuse of the postal service.
‘Menacing’ and ‘harassing’ behaviour is not explained by the statute, but case law explains that it should not only be linked to the threat of physical violence – but it can also be, and often is, broader.
Objections To the Laws
The most compelling criticism of these laws concerns their clash with our constitutionally implied freedom of political communication. While Australia does not have an explicit Bill of Rights that grants us the freedom of expression, we do nonetheless have mechanisms that fiercely protect it. A recent example was the striking down of unconstitutional PARD laws in New South Wales.
Since these ‘carriage services’ offences do not require anyone to be actually affected, or for the impugned conduct to even be acknowledged, many think the laws overreach and are excessively restrictive to communication. This becomes especially important when considering that so many prosecutions have involved political messaging responding to contemporary issues.
Further, the fault elements of the offences are relatively low. As explained, an accused does not even need to intend to conjure any feelings or fear in their ‘victim’, but only intend to actually use the carriage service – that is, to text, to post, etc. This catches a person peacefully expressing their political thoughts to a close friend or social media account with no followers, with no intention of causing any unrest.
Conceived this way, our freedom of political expression could be overburdened, especially at a time when social inequality and injustices run rampant.
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.
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