Must Meta Open WhatsApp To Competing AI Assistants?

By a decision of June 9, the Commission obliged Meta to provisionally restore access to WhatsApp for competing AI assistants. While such interim measures are imposed in a separate procedure, they are closely linked to the main investigation into the alleged abuse of Meta's dominant position under Article 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which is ongoing. The decision on interim measures is based on Article 8 Regulation 1/2003, allowing the Commission to intervene on a provisional basis during the investigation to prevent serious and irreparable harm to competition until a final decision is adopted.

Facts of the Case

In October 2025, Meta introduced a policy under the WhatsApp Business Terms and Conditions that excluded general-purpose third-party AI assistants from the WhatsApp Business API, leaving only Meta's own AI assistant, "Meta AI," available. Following the Commission's intervention, Meta reinstated access for third parties in March 2026, subject to a fee which, according to the Commission's preliminary assessment, effectively results in the same exclusionary effect as the previous outright ban. The proceedings against Meta developed rapidly: the formal investigation was opened in December 2025, followed in February 2026 by a statement of objections indicating the possible imposition of interim measures. In April, a supplementary statement of objections further signaled the intended adoption of a decision, which was issued on June 9.

Interim Measures in EU Competition Law

Such interim measures require the Commission to demonstrate, on a prima facie basis, a possible infringement of competition law and the urgency of protective action due to the risk of serious and irreparable harm. The burden of proof threshold is fairly high, which is why this power has been exercised only rarely. The recourse to this instrument against Meta illustrates that in digital markets the Commission attaches particular importance to the speed of enforcement to keep up with market developments. Harm arising in an emerging market can usually not be effectively remedied by a final decision adopted years later, as competitive structures may already have become entrenched by that time. This reasoning builds on the Broadcom decision, in which the Commission clarified that its power to impose interim measures also covers harm resulting from gradual market developments and is not limited to situations of immediate threat.

Key Elements of the Commission's Rationale for use of Interim Measures in this Case

Three points in the preliminary assessment are noteworthy:

• First, the Commission considers that Meta holds a dominant position on the European Economic Area (EEA)-wide market for consumer communications applications since at least January 2023, with WhatsApp as the main product. This is based on the platform's large user base in Europe and strong network effects, which the Commission considers make it difficult for users to switch and create high barriers to entry for competing services. In the Commission's view, this makes WhatsApp an important access point for providers of digital services, including AI-based applications.
• Second, the Commission considers the exclusion of competing AI assistants from the WhatsApp Business API as a potential abuse of a dominant position in the form of a refusal to supply. What is important here is that Meta is not refusing access for the first time but has withdrawn access that was already granted. In cases of a first-time refusal to supply, an abuse of a dominant position can generally only be found when access is indispensable for competitors. By contrast, where a previously granted access is withdrawn, especially in relation to infrastructure that had been voluntarily opened to third parties, the threshold for finding an abuse can be met more easily.
• Third, the Commission finds that there is an urgent need to prevent serious and irreparable harm to the competitive structure of an emerging market for general purpose AI assistants. In this market, smaller firms and new entrants still compete with established players, while access to key distribution channels is crucial. The Commission considers that early foreclosure effects could strengthen certain market positions in a way that may be difficult to reverse. The Commission alleges that losing an important access route to users could irreversibly strengthen Meta's position before a final decision is taken, so that later remedies may not fully restore competition.

As per the decision, Meta is required to restore access to the WhatsApp Business API for third parties on the same terms as those in place before October 15, 2025, free of charge, and to maintain such access until a final decision is adopted. Compliance is required within five working days. This deadline has expired, but it has not yet been publicly confirmed whether access has been restored or not.

Sanctions for Non-compliance

Noncompliance with this interim obligation may give rise to two distinct sanctions serving different purposes. The Commission may either impose a fine of up to 10% of the undertaking's worldwide turnover in the preceding business year to serve both as punishment and deterrence, or periodic penalty payments of up to 5% of the average daily turnover for each day of noncompliance to compel compliance with the interim obligation.

Opportunity for Appeal

The June 9 decision may be challenged separately by Meta before the General Court of the EU and the company has already announced its intention to do so. In this context, Meta may argue that the conditions for interim measures are not satisfied, e.g. no urgency or no risk of serious and irreparable harm to the competitive structure in the form of a possible tipping point in an emerging market for AI assistants. When the Commission imposed interim measures in 2001 against IMS Health, the Court suspended them within a few months, finding that the Commission's legal assessment was seriously open to doubt and the harm was not irreparable. Commission ultimately withdrew the measures entirely.

The interim measures remain valid until the Commission adopts a decision in the ongoing main proceedings against Meta, in which the Commission will have to establish the access refusal up to the full standard of proof. The decisive questions will be whether access to the WhatsApp Business API is genuinely indispensable for competing assistants, rather than just attractive input, and whether withdrawing it eliminates effective competition.

A Case for the DMA?

A further point of interest is the fact that the Commission did not rely on the Digital Markets Act (DMA) in this case. Although Meta is a designated gatekeeper and the DMA has its interim measure empowerment in Article 24, the Commission relied on Article 102 TFEU. The DMA is based on a given list of obligations (in its Articles 5, 6 and 7), and interim measures can be imposed only in case of a prima facie breach of these obligations. However, in the Meta case, none of them fit properly. For example, the interoperability duty in Article 7 concerns opening the service to rival communications providers, not admitting AI assistants to the Business API.

Conclusion

In its decision in the Meta case, the Commission confirms that early access to a channel with the reach of WhatsApp may be decisive for determining which AI assistants gain users and data, granting them competitive advantages that can no longer be fully neutralized afterwards. This led to an urgent situation where – in the Commission's view – competition could be irreparably damaged absent prompt intervention in the form of interim measures.

From this perspective, the use of interim measures may evolve from a rarely used exceptional power into a more targeted enforcement tool, particularly in digital markets, potentially alongside interventions through the DMA.

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