Key Takeaways
The Tiger court held that a possible increased risk of harm from occupational lead exposure is insufficient to establish Article III standing for medical monitoring and abatement, reaffirming the importance of the threshold injury-in-fact and standing inquiry in medical monitoring cases.
In February, a federal district court in western Pennsylvania dismissed an occupational lead exposure medical monitoring class action, holding that the plaintiff failed to allege an injury-in-fact sufficient to establish Article III standing. Tiger v. Verizon Commc'ns Inc., 2025 WL 437019 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2025). Plaintiff's allegations were "too conjectural and speculative," especially given "naturally occurring lead levels in the environment and in our bodies." Id. at *4, 7.
Plaintiff offered three theories of injury, and the court rejected each. First, the court rejected plaintiff's argument that his exposure as a utility pole worker to defendant's lead-sheathed telecommunications cables was sufficient on its own to state an injury-in-fact because "no level of lead exposure" is safe. Id. at *3. The court held that mere exposure to or presence of lead in the body was not concrete enough for standing, emphasizing that lead occurs naturally in the environment and exposure does not always cause injury. Id. at *4.
Second, the court held that plaintiff's allegations of "common ailments," such as headaches, nausea, and fatigue, "could . . . be associated with a range of other medical conditions independent of lead exposure." Id. Plaintiff also failed to allege "the amount or extent of [his] exposure to lead" or "whether there is a dangerous amount of lead in his body," and thus could not plead that he was "at imminent and substantial risk of suffering an illness" from lead exposure. Id. At most, plaintiff's allegations "raise[d] the mere possibility of an increased risk of developing a disease," but this was "not enough to confer standing." Id. at *5.
Third, the court held that plaintiff did not have standing for his state law cause of action for medical monitoring based on his allegations of economic injury from a purported "present need to obtain medical testing." Id. While the injury in medical monitoring cases is "the cost of medical care," plaintiff had not actually incurred any medical expenses, so there could be no economic injury. Id. at *5-6. And to satisfy injury-in-fact with unrealized economic injury "conflates the standing inquiry with the underlying state-law claim." Id. at 5.
The court also determined that plaintiff lacked standing to pursue an abatement claim requiring defendant to dispose of its lead cables. Plaintiff's alleged future injury from continued exposure to lead was "too conjectural," including because he had not alleged "what amount of exposure and what blood lead level is likely to manifest in disease." Id. at *6-7.
Plaintiffs increasingly seek medical monitoring based on alleged risk of future injuries from exposure. As we have previously reported, at least twenty-eight states, including Delaware, have declined to recognize a cause of action for no-injury medical monitoring. Going forward, where state law permits such claims, we may see federal courts following Tiger's lead by giving teeth to the injury-in-fact requirement. Particularly where the claims involve substances like lead that are found in the environment and in human bodies, plaintiffs must do more than allege mere exposure to survive dismissal.
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