D. Mass. Patent Litigation Update: August 2026

This is part of a series of articles discussing recent orders of interest issued in patent cases by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.

In Omni Continuum LLC v. NKT Photonics Inc., et al., No. 1:24-cv-11007-IT, Judge Talwani issued a claim construction order for a patent directed to a Raman-effect light source capable of shifting between wavelengths. Four of the disputed terms are discussed as follows:

1. “infrared light source”

The Court rejected Omni’s contention that “the phrase ‘infrared light source’ is not limiting”, explaining that the preamble limits the invention if it recites essential structure or steps, or if it is “necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality” to the claim. The term “infrared light source” provides a positive limitation on the claimed invention and does not merely state a purpose or intended use.

Therefore, the Court agreed with NKTP’s proposal and construed “infrared light source” to mean “source of light that emits light with a wavelength between approximately 750 nm and 1 mm.”

2. “substantially different wavelength”

The Court found that although relative terms such as “substantially” do not render a claim per se indefinite, neither the claim language nor the specification provided any indication of what it means to be “substantially different.” Although the specification discloses an embodiment that supports wavelengths having an 80 nm distance or greater, there was not enough evidence to support that a “substantially different” wavelength requires differences of 80 nm or greater. The Court observed that wavelengths could differ by only 10 nm, and the patent does not clarify whether such wavelengths are “substantially different.”

Therefore, the Court found the term “substantially different wavelength” to be indefinite.

3. “substantially different waveguide structure”

The Court found that this term, viewed in light of the specification, fails to inform those skilled in the art with reasonable certainty as to what materials, shapes, or sizes would be considered substantially different. Although the specification includes examples of different materials for waveguide structures, the Court noted that there was not enough information to clarify what materials are “substantially different” as opposed to being merely “different,” or what shapes or sizes would be considered substantially different from others.

Therefore, the Court found the term “substantially different waveguide structure” to be indefinite.

4. “shift”

The Court found that the Defendant’s construction would improperly import limitations into the claims from the specification. The parties agreed that a shift would lead to some change in wavelength of the light but disputed whether a shift can exclude broadening. Since there were various instances in the specification demonstrating that a shift can take place with or without broadening, the Court found that requiring broadening would result in an improper narrowing of the claim.

Therefore, the Court agreed with Omni’s proposal and construed “shift” to mean “to change the wavelength of light.”

In Cogmedia LLC v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 25-cv-12127-BEM, Judge Murphy issued a claim construction order addressing several disputed terms in patents directed to graphical user interfaces using “information objects” and “cards.” Three of the disputed terms are discussed as follows:

1. “vote function”

The parties’ dispute centered on whether a “vote” is limited to a decision, and the Court found that the intrinsic evidence did not limit voting in that way because the specification and prior art references contemplated broader concepts, including user reactions, ratings, and preferences. The Court explained that, in the context of the patents, voting reflected a user’s inpidual response to an information object rather than solely the ultimate outcome of a decision-making process. Accordingly, the Court construed “vote function” as “function that expresses a preference, choice, or reaction.”

2. “instant messaging function”

The Court rejected Meta’s argument that instant messaging was categorically distinct from commenting, observing that the claim language itself contemplated messages associated with information objects. Because the parties disputed the scope of the term, the Court provided a construction and defined “instant messaging function” as “function which allows for the instantaneous transmission of computer-based or electronic communications.”

3. “copy function” / “replicate function”

The Court found that Meta’s proposed construction would improperly import a duplication requirement into the claims, and noted that the specification described embodiments in which copied information objects could be modified, synchronized, or converted into other forms, suggesting a broader concept than simple duplication. Because the Court found that their plain and ordinary meanings were clear, it concluded that both terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning.

In InMode Ltd. v. BTL Industries, Inc., No. 1:24-cv-12955-PBS-JDH, Magistrate Judge Hedges denied Defendant’s motion for a protective order and denied non-party Dr. Katherine Atkinson’s motion to quash a subpoena seeking documents and deposition testimony. The Court also declined to rule on subpoenas issued to three other non-party physicians because compliance was required in other districts.

The case involves claims that BTL directly and indirectly infringed InMode’s patent. During discovery, InMode served subpoenas on four of BTL’s physician customers seeking information concerning their communications with BTL, training on the accused products and methods, and use of those products and methods.

As a threshold matter, the Court held that BTL’s motion, although styled as a motion for a protective order, effectively sought to quash the subpoenas served on the out-of-district physicians. Because motions to quash must be decided in the district where compliance is required, and those courts had already addressed or were considering those subpoenas, the Court declined denied BTL’s motion.

Turning to the subpoena on Dr. Katherine Atkinson, the Court held that the requested discovery was relevant and proportional to InMode’s indirect infringement claims. The Court explained that inducement and contributory infringement require proof of direct infringement by third parties and that information regarding how physicians learned about, purchased, and used the accused products was likely to reside with the physicians themselves.

The Court also rejected objections based on patient confidentiality, finding that a HIPAA-compliant protective order adequately addressed concerns regarding protected health information.

The Court further concluded that the subpoena did not impermissibly seek an unretained expert opinion because it sought factual testimony based on Dr. Katherine Atkinson’s first-hand knowledge and experience rather than “asking Dr. Atkinson to draw upon that knowledge to provide expert opinions.”

Finally, the Court found that the subpoena was not cumulative or overly broad because it sought information uniquely within Dr. Katherine Atkinson’s knowledge concerning her interactions with BTL and use of the accused products and methods. Accordingly, the Court denied both motions.