Qualified Immunity May Be Available For Case Of Police Brutality

Estate of Ford v. Ramirez 2002 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9704

Jeffrey Ford was an inmate at the psychiatric unit of the California Medical Facility in Vacaville, California. His cellmate was James Diesso. These two men had been cellmates on previous occasions without incident, but Diesso had previously stabbed another inmate. In addition, Diesso was considered to be a "Category J" prisoner - sufficiently mentally ill to not be housed with the general population, but generally medication compliant. Diesso had been previously characterized as extremely violent and dangerous as far back as 1995 and had been involved in a number of attacks on guards and inmates between 1993 and 1997. These and other incidents led to a correctional officer adding an "S" sub-classification to Diesso's records on June 6, 1998, indicating he should not be double celled with any other inmates.

By June 9, 1998, Diesso had been scheduled for a transfer to a special handling unit at Corcoran State Prison reserved for extremely dangerous inmates. On June 23, 1998, Diesso appeared before prison officials for a 30 day review, and it was determined that he should stay at Vacaville pending his transfer and that he was permitted to be double-celled with another inmate.

Although Diesso was involved in another altercation with another inmate on June 27, Jeffery Ford was transferred to Diesso's cell on June 27. On June 29, Diesso attacked and killed Ford. Reports indicated the walls of the cell were covered with bloody hand prints and smears and the words "die demon" were written in blood on the wall.

The Estate of Ford alleged a number of causes of action against prison officials that were ultimately dismissed, leaving the claim that Associate Warden Edward Caden, Correctional Lieutenant Eric Arnold, and Correctional Sergeant Robert Williams violated Ford's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Each of the defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity. The district court ruled that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether Caden knew about Diesso's history of violent and bizarre behavior. The court also held that Arnold had not shown either that he investigated whether Ford and Diesso should have been celled together, or that he believed his subordinates had done so. The court also found that Williams had not shown the absence of an issue of fact as to whether he was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to Ford when he advised Arnold that Diesso and Ford be allowed to cell together. The court denied qualified immunity and the defendants timely appealed.

Whether the denial of qualified immunity was appropriate in this case turned on whether the case of Hamilton v. Endell (1992) 981 F.2d 1062 remained good law in light of the case of Saucier v. Katz (2001) 533 U.S. 194. In Hamilton, the 9th Circuit held that a finding of deliberate indifference (or of a triable issue as to it) necessarily precludes a finding of qualified immunity. In Saucier, the 9th Circuit held that in a case involving a claim of excessive force used during an arrest, summary judgment based on qualified immunity was inappropriate because the constitutional inquiry - whether unreasonable force was used in the arrest - and the inquiry on qualified immunity were the same. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, observing that the goal of qualified immunity would be undermined if summary judgment were denied every time a material issue of fact remains on an excessive force claim. The key point that Saucier makes is that the qualified immunity inquiry is separate from the constitutional inquiry.
The defendants argued that the rationale of Saucier applies to this case as well because for a prudent prison official to be able to determine whether the Eighth Amendment compels him to take a particular action to protect an inmate, he must not only know the facts giving rise to the risk but must also be able to determine whether the risk is "substantial." This, they argued, was inherently nebulous. The Estate of Ford countered that the Eighth Amendment claims are different, because any Fourth Amendment excessive force claim is determined by a purely objective test of reasonableness while the Eighth Amendment claims must also establish that a prison official had the requisite state of mind of deliberate indifference. Therefore, even if Saucier applies, the question remains whether a reasonable prison official could have believed it would be lawful to consciously disregard the substantial risk of harm posed by double-celling Diesso with Ford.

The court found that a reasonable prison official understanding that he cannot recklessly disregard a substantial risk of serious harm, could know all the facts yet mistakenly, but reasonably, perceive that the exposure in any given situation was not that high. In these circumstances, he would be entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court concluded that Hamilton has been undermined by Saucier and courts must follow Saucier's framework.

The Court then considered whether the facts of this case show that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right. After a lengthy discussion of Supreme Court precedent concerning this issue, the Court found that although defendant Caden's decision allowed Diesso to be double celled led to unfortunate consequences, and defendant Arnold's approval upon defendant Williams's advice to allow Diesso to be double celled with Ford was an unfortunate judgment, the court refused to say that a reasonable correctional officer would have clearly understood that the risk of serious harm was so high that he should not have authorized the double-celling.

The Court finally held that Hamilton's approach must give way to Saucier's in Eighth Amendment cases. A court may not simply stop with a determination that a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether the prison officials were deliberately indifferent; instead, the qualified immunity inquiry is separate from the constitutional inquiry, and the courts must undertake the qualified immunity analysis separately. Having done so, the Court concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because it would not have been clear to a reasonable correctional officer knowing what each of the defendants knew that double-celling Diesso, or even double-celling him specifically with Ford, posed such a substantial risk of serious harm that doing so would be constitutionally impermissible.