The Supreme Court’s Ruling On Sex Classifications In Sports And Its Implications Beyond Athletics

Key Takeaways:

• The Supreme Court held the Equal Protection Clause permits state laws that require biological sex-based distinctions in sports.
• The Court did not address state laws or school policies that define “sex” and permit athletic participation based on gender identity.
• Federal, institutional, and private actors have already started to act on the Court’s reasoning and implications.

On June 30, 2026, the Supreme Court issued a long-awaited ruling addressing transgender students’ rights under Title IX and the Constitution. The Court upheld laws in Idaho and West Virginia that require schools to determine eligibility for women’s sports based on “biological sex.”¹

The Court’s ruling resolved two cases, Little v. Hecox and West Virginia v. B.P.J., brought by transgender female student-athletes seeking to participate in their schools’ female sports programs. In Little v. Hecox, Lindsay Hecox, a transgender woman, competed on the women’s club soccer team and wanted to run for the women’s track and cross-country teams at Boise State University. In West Virginia v. B.P.J., a then-eleven-year-old transgender girl sought to join her middle school’s cross-country team. Both plaintiffs argued that the state laws prohibiting their participation violated the rights of transgender female student-athletes under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Additionally, West Virginia v. B.P.J. argued that the law violated Title IX, the federal law prohibiting sex discrimination in educational programs. The Court rejected both arguments, effectively barring Hecox and B.P.J. from participating in school athletics.

Here, we provide some background on these cases, highlight key points from the Court’s ruling, summarize post-ruling developments, and address potential implications of the ruling outside the athletics context.

Background

Little v. Hecox challenged the constitutionality of Idaho’s Fairness in Women’s Sports Act (H.B. 500). Passed in March 2020, the Act mandates that “[i]nterscholastic, intercollegiate, intramural, or club athletic teams or sports” be organized “based on biological sex,” and that “athletic teams or sports designated for females, women, or girls shall not be open to students of the male sex.” Idaho Code Ann. § 33–6203(1)-(2) (2020). To enforce this mandate, H.B. 500 permits any individual to “dispute” the sex of any student athlete participating on a female sports team in the state of Idaho and require her to undergo an invasive medical examination to verify her sex, including gynecological exams. Id. § 33-6203(3). This “dispute” process does not apply to participants on male sports teams.

Lindsay Hecox, a transgender woman, was a freshman at Boise State University when H.B. 500 was signed into Idaho law. She had hoped to try out for the women’s track and cross-country teams at her university, but the Act barred her from doing so. In 2020, Hecox sued Idaho Governor Bradley Little, among other school officials, alleging the law violated both the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX. Hecox moved for a preliminary injunction based solely on her Equal Protection Clause claim, however, and the district court granted that request. [EN1.1][MR1.2][MB1.3][MT1.4]The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that Idaho’s use of “biological sex” as a means of delineating sports teams functioned as a form of “proxy discrimination” targeting transgender women and girls, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

In West Virginia v. B.P.J., plaintiff B.P.J., a teenager, argued that West Virginia’s “Save Women’s Sports Act,” H.B. 3923, violated her rights under the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX. Enacted in 2021, H.B. 3923 prohibits “biological males from participating on athletic teams or sports designated for biological females where competitive skill or contact is involved…” in any public secondary school, college, or university.

B.P.J., a transgender girl, was assigned male at birth but began transitioning socially and presenting as female from early childhood. When B.P.J. entered middle school, she sought to participate in the girls’ cross-country team, but H.B. 3923 prevented her from doing so. B.P.J. sued West Virginia and relevant state officials under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia initially granted B.P.J.’s request for a preliminary injunction, allowing her to participate in middle school sports. But the federal district court later granted summary judgment for West Virginia on both claims. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the Title IX ruling and remanded for further fact-finding on the Equal Protection Clause claim.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

The Court ruled unanimously that the laws enacted by Idaho and West Virginia do not violate Title IX, but divided 6-3 over whether the West Virginia law violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.

Reversing both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits and remanding for further proceedings, the Supreme Court held that Title IX allows schools to provide separate women’s and men’s sports teams defined by biological sex, and West Virginia has permissibly maintained female sports teams for biological females consistent with Title IX. Writing for the majority, Justice Kavanaugh explained that the Title IX regulations implementing the law “permit schools to maintain separate teams for ‘members of each sex.’” “The ordinary meaning of the term ‘sex’” at the time of Title IX’s enactment “was biological sex and not gender identity.” Title IX allowed for separate sports teams “precisely because of the biological differences between the sexes,” including the “inherent physical differences between biological women and biological men.”

B.P.J. argued that a reasonable interpretation of Title IX would require an exception to be made for transgender girls who have taken puberty blockers or hormones, thereby reducing any safety or competitive fairness concerns that would arise from a biological male competing in women’s sports. The majority disagreed, concluding that separate sports teams for biological males and females are reasonable in the context of competitive sports.

The Court also rejected B.P.J.’s argument that its prior ruling in Bostock v. Clayton County (2020) was applicable, explaining that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 concerns employment and generally requires that men and women “be treated without regard to their sex,” whereas, in the sports context, Title IX expressly authorizes separate women’s and men’s sports teams. Because Title IX permits separate teams, the only question before the Court was whether schools may limit women’s and girls’ teams to biological females, which Bostock expressly did not address.

The Court cited many of the same principles in holding that Idaho and West Virginia did not violate the Equal Protection Clause by maintaining female sports teams for biological females. The Court reasoned that because “the laws limit women’s and girls’ sports teams to biological females,” they are subject to “intermediate scrutiny” from the Court, which requires the states to show that a classification based on sex is substantially related to achieving an important government interest. Reasoning that both states have “interests in safety and competitive fairness” for sports teams, the Court concluded that the laws withstand constitutional scrutiny.

Finally, the Court addressed the argument that the Idaho and West Virginia laws unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of transgender identity and status. The majority disagreed, ruling that the laws made their classifications based on biological sex.

What Comes Next

The Court’s decision answers one question: whether schools can determine eligibility for women’s and girls’ sports based on biological sex. The answer is yes. The majority repeatedly emphasizes the unique nature of athletics in reaching this conclusion. In addition, the Court makes clear that the decision does not overrule Bostock or eliminate Title VII protections for employees based on sexual orientation or transgender status.

Yet the decision leaves open a number of questions, such as whether state or local laws can use “biological sex” as a means of separating individuals in spaces like bathrooms, locker rooms, or living facilities. Title IX regulations already allow institutions to maintain sex-based discrimination in these spaces. And while sports’ competitive fairness, zero-sum logic does not apply to bathrooms, locker rooms, or dorms, the ruling could support arguments advanced by proponents of such restrictions that institutions should be allowed to exclude transgender women from these intimate spaces to address purported safety concerns. The decision also did not address whether states may affirmatively permit transgender girls and women to join athletic teams designed for biological women, or whether state laws allowing sports teams based on gender identity are unconstitutional.

Post-Ruling Developments

In the weeks following the decision, federal, institutional, and private actors have taken action to address how the ruling might apply in these other contexts.

For example, the White House characterized the ruling as reinforcing the administration’s February 2025 executive order barring transgender athletes from women’s sports, although the decision stated no position regarding schools and states that permit transgender students to participate in teams aligned with their gender identity. The White House touted continued enforcement activity by the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”), including four new Title IX investigations opened against the State of Maryland and local school districts in the week of the ruling alone.

On the same day as the ruling, the Department of Education announced it would partner with the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division to pursue enforcement action against the Kansas City, Kansas Public School District for FERPA and Title IX violations, including a district policy directing staff not to disclose a student’s transgender status to parents and allowing transgender students to use facilities matching their gender identity. This followed an April 2026 Department of Education finding that the district violated federal law, and a June 2026 interagency agreement between the Department of Education and DOJ specifically designed to speed up joint enforcement of parental-rights and civil-rights laws. Secretary of Education Linda McMahon stated the goal was to ensure “districts are held accountable and fully honor parents’ rights.” This is part of a broader pattern of DOJ-initiated Title IX lawsuits against educational entities allowing transgender athletes to compete, with cases pending in California, Maine, and Minnesota.

The NCAA, which revised its transgender-participation policy in February 2025 to align with the administration’s executive order, confirmed after the ruling that it does not intend to change its current policy limiting women’s sports to athletes assigned female at birth. NCAA President Charlie Baker indicated that the national standard already reflects the outcome the Court reached, meaning the decision is unlikely to immediately alter competition rules for most member institutions.

Litigants on both sides have also begun to recalibrate. In New Hampshire, two transgender student-athletes voluntarily dismissed their challenge to the administration’s “Keeping Men Out of Women’s Sports” executive order shortly after the ruling, citing both personal hardship and the Supreme Court’s decision as reasons for withdrawing their case.

Lower courts have already begun interpreting the decision outside the athletics context. In mid-July 2026, a federal district court in Illinois noted that the Supreme Court’s decision had no impact on its ruling rejecting a claim that a school district’s policy permitting a transgender student to use the girls’ restroom violated the Equal Protection Clause or Title IX.²

The ruling may also generate momentum for potential federal legislation. At a press conference following the decision, West Virginia Attorney General JB McCuskey, who led the defense of his state’s law, urged congressional leadership to consider codifying a nationwide rule given the ruling’s limitations. 

Practical Considerations for Institutions

Given the pace of these developments, colleges, universities, and K-12 schools that receive federal funding should consider taking the following steps:

• Review current athletic eligibility policies and any applicable state law to confirm they reflect the Court’s holding that Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause permit, but do not require, biological-sex-based eligibility criteria.
• Assess the interplay between the ruling, applicable state law, and any conflicting NCAA, conference, or athletic association rules, particularly for institutions located in states without a biological-sex-based sports law.
• Monitor OCR’s continued Title IX enforcement priorities and any pending or new investigations, and evaluate potential federal funding risks.
• Recognize that the ruling does not resolve questions concerning restrooms, locker rooms, or housing, or whether schools may permit (as opposed to require) participation based on gender identity, and continue to track developing case law in these areas.
• Consult with counsel before revising athletics, facilities, or nondiscrimination policies to help ensure consistency with Title IX, the Equal Protection Clause, and applicable state law.

Foley Hoag’s Education practice group is closely monitoring these developments and is available to help institutions navigate the evolving legal landscape following the Court’s decision.

Summer associate Madeleine Tutwiler and SEO Intern Abigail Farah also contributed to this alert.

Footnotes

1. For the purposes of this client alert, we use the phrase “biological sex” to refer to sex assigned at birth.

2. See F.F. v. Valley View Comm. Unit School Dist. 365U (N.D. Ill.) (“The Court’s decision is not impacted by B.P.J., however, because the Supreme Court explicitly limited its decision to the sports context. See (slip op. at 14) (‘the only question here is whether schools may limit women’s and girls’ sports to biological females.’). Furthermore, even if the decision in B. P. J. were applicable in this context, which it is not, it only holds that states may maintain separate sports teams based on biological gender, it does not hold that states are required to do so.”).