A recurring theme in public affairs over the past several years has been the extent to which foreign actors have sought to influence in the United States, including over its government and government officials. While every administration has decried foreign nations seeking to insert themselves into U.S. public policy, enforcement against such activity has often been uneven.
In particular, the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) has gone from a little-known statute to a major enforcement tool in recent years. In the last several months, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) had signaled a retreat from robust use of FARA as a tool of criminal enforcement.
But recent criminal prosecutions and potential legislative developments have also demonstrated that companies and individuals working internationally still need to be mindful of the applicable legal requirements when operating on behalf of foreign actors. A failure to do so could lead to significant civil and criminal penalties.
Background on FARA
Enacted in 1938 to combat rising Nazi propaganda, FARA, 22 U.S.C. §611 et seq., is designed to promote transparency around the activities of individuals ("foreign agents") engaging in certain activities in the United States on behalf of foreign persons, entities, governments or political parties ("foreign principals"). Foreign agents are required under FARA to register with DOJ, file public disclosures regarding their activities, and retain copies of informational materials they distribute within the United States. FARA aims to enable both the U.S. public and government to factor in the agents' relationship with their foreign principal when making decisions in response to the agents' activities.
An individual qualifies as a "foreign agent" if he engages in certain activities in the United States "as an agent, representative, employee, or servant...at the order, request, or under the direction or control, of a foreign principal." 22 U.S.C. §611(c)(1).
The most significant "foreign principals" are foreign governments and political parties, but the category also includes any non-U.S. individual, partnership, association, corporation, or organization. Id. §611(b).
While many may think of lobbying as the principal activity targeted by FARA, in reality, the statute covers a wide swath of conduct, including, for example, acting as "a public relations counsel [or] publicity agent" for a "foreign principal," or "solicit[ing], collect[ing], disburs[ing], or dispens[ing] contributions, loans, money, or other things of value for or in the interest of such foreign principal." Id. §611(c)(1)(i)-(iv).
FARA Enforcement and the Bondi Memo
FARA was historically an obscure statute, and enforcement has not been robust until relatively recently. According to a 2016 report, between 1966 and 2015, DOJ brought only seven criminal FARA cases—typically for serious cases like espionage or national security threats—and did not pursue any injunctive remedies for FARA violations between 1991 and 2016. (See U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of Inspector General, Audit of the National Security Division's Enforcement and Administration of the Foreign Agents Registration Act at 8, 12 (2016)). Instead, much of the enforcement efforts during that period consisted of "encouraging voluntary compliance, rather than pursuing criminal or civil charges." (Id. at 9.)
That approach to FARA changed with Special Counsel Robert Mueller's investigation of President Trump in 2017 and was noted explicitly in 2019 when John C. Demers, the head of the Justice Department's National Security Division, announced a shift "from treating FARA as an administrative obligation and regulatory obligation to one that is increasingly an enforcement priority." See Katie Brenner, Justice Dept. to Step Up Enforcement of Foreign Influence Laws, N.Y. Times (Mar. 6, 2019). Since 2018, DOJ has indicted almost twice as many people for FARA-related crimes as in the previous five decades combined.
In the new Administration, FARA enforcement appears likely to be curbed, at least to a degree, once again. On Feb. 5, 2025, Attorney General Pam Bondi issued a series of memoranda reshaping the Justice Department's enforcement priorities. In a brief passage of one such memo, "General Policy Regarding Charging, Plea Negotiations, and Sentencing," A.G. Bondi directed DOJ to approach FARA prosecutions in a way that is much closer to its historical practices.
Bondi disbanded the Foreign Influence Task Force, which was established in 2017 to identify and counteract foreign influence operations targeting the United States. She further instructed that "[r]ecourse to criminal charges under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and 18 U.S.C. §951 shall be limited to instances of alleged conduct similar to more traditional espionage by foreign government actors." Going forward, she instructed DOJ to "focus on civil enforcement, regulatory initiatives, and public guidance" in connection with FARA.
On June 25, 2025, the DOJ filed two indictments that exemplify the types of criminal prosecutions that we may expect DOJ to still pursue under this revised approach.
In these cases, DOJ alleges that the defendants acted as agents of the Chinese Ministry of State Security ("MSS"), directed to "carry out various clandestine operations in the United States, including facilitating a [] payment of cash on behalf of the MSS, gathering intelligence about U.S. Navy Service members and bases, and assisting with efforts to recruit other potential MSS assets from within the U.S. military." See United States v. Lai, No. 4:25-cr-00186 (N.D. Cal.), ECF No. 1; United States v. Lal, No. 4:25-mj-00404 (S.D. Tex.). These allegations certainly track AG Bondi's directive that FARA enforcement focuses on cases involving "traditional espionage by foreign government actors."
At the same time, unlike the Trump Administration's priorities on crypto cases—the SEC has dropped several prominent enforcement actions, such as those against Ripple, Coinbase and Kraken—DOJ does not appear to be routinely dropping previously filed FARA prosecutions.
Former CIA analyst Sue Mi Terry was indicted during the prior administration for allegedly acting as an unregistered agent of the South Korean government when she, according to the indictment, "advocated [South Korean] policy positions, including in published articles and during media appearances, disclosed nonpublic U.S. Government information to [South Korean] intelligence officers, and facilitated access for [South Korean] Government officials to U.S. Government officials." See United States v. Terry, No. 24-cr-00427 (S.D.N.Y.).
While some of the allegations in the Terry case arguably track A.G. Bondi's reference to "traditional espionage," DOJ has maintained other prosecutions that do not clearly do so. For example, the prosecutions against Congressman David Rivera for alleged lobbying to remove a Venezuelan principal from the U.S. sanctions list (United States v. Rivera, No. 4-cr-00570 (D.D.C.)), and against two Russian nationals for working to fund pro-Russian media (United States v. Kalashnikov, No. 24-cr-00519 (S.D.N.Y.)) both remain pending.
DOJ also recently defeated a motion to dismiss brought by Linda Sun, who served in many roles in the New York government between 2012 and 2023, including as deputy chief diversity officer for Andrew Cuomo and deputy chief of staff to Kathy Hochul. See United States v. Sun, 2025 WL 1296456 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2025).
Sun is alleged to have acted on behalf of the Chinese government while in those roles; for example, Sun allegedly "worked to prevent representatives of the Taiwanese government from meeting with highly-ranked NYS officials," "worked...to shape the public statements of Politican-1 and Politician-2 to align with the PRC government's political priorities," "obtained and publicly presented an official NYS proclamation for PRC Official-1 without authorization from her employer," and "attempted to arrange visits by Henan provincial officials to the United States to meet with NYS officials, as well as a visit by Politician-2 to the PRC." (Id. at *3.)
She is alleged to have continued acting on behalf of activity even after the "FBI advised Sun that her activities could be a violation of FARA" during a voluntary interview in 2020. (Id. at *7.)
Unlike the prosecutions in Lal and Lai, Sun's alleged conduct sounds less in the vein of traditional espionage described in AG Bondi's memorandum, and more like the lobbying at issue in other FARA cases.
Legislation
While the Attorney General's memo will no doubt change DOJ's approach to FARA enforcement, it is not the only shifting piece of the landscape. Rather, legislative changes to the substantive requirements of FARA may also be on the horizon. FARA reform is a perennial and often bipartisan effort in Congress, and the current session is no exception. Earlier this year, members of Congress, with bipartisan support, introduced several FARA-related measures, which remain in committee. Versions of these bills were introduced in prior sessions, and some passed in the Senate, but none have made it to the President's desk yet.
The Foreign Agents Transparency Act (H.R.3229, S.981) would authorize DOJ to retroactively require FARA registration. This bill is designed to overturn Att'y Gen. of United States v. Wynn, 104 F.4th 348 (D.C. Cir. 2024), in which the D.C. Circuit held that there is no continuing obligation to register under FARA if representation of a foreign principal has ceased. Thus, if this act were to pass, individuals and companies that previously acted on behalf of foreign actors within the past five years may be required to register under FARA.
The Lobbying Disclosure Improvement Act (H.R.1887, S.865) seeks to narrow the so-called Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) exemption, which permits an individual to avoid registering under FARA if they have registered under the LDA, so long as they are not an agent of a foreign government or political party. LDA registration is often perceived as being less onerous than FARA registration, and this exemption has been criticized as little more than a loophole to FARA. This bill would not eliminate the exemption, but would require individuals who seek to avoid FARA registration by registering under the LDA to disclose as much in their LDA registration. The practical effect of this amendment would be to highlight for DOJ individuals who are seeking to lobby on behalf of foreign governments without providing the full panoply of information under FARA, which may trigger suspicion in certain circumstances (such as work on behalf of certain foreign governments).
The Disclosing Foreign Influence in Lobbying Act (H.R.1883, S.856) would also amend the LDA, and require registrants to disclose that foreign governments or political parties are involved in the "direction, planning, supervision, or control of any lobbying activities of the registrant." This bill is designed to prevent foreign governments and political parties from using organizations registered under the LDA as undisclosed proxies.
State legislatures have also gotten in on the game. Arkansas, Texas, Nebraska and Louisiana have all passed so-called "Baby FARA" laws in 2025, and Arizona, California, Georgia, Oklahoma, and Tennessee introduced similar bills in 2024. These laws borrow from FARA, but often differ in significant ways.
The laws enacted in Arkansas, Texas, Nebraska and Louisiana, for example, only apply to agents from certain countries, such as China, Russia, Iran, Cuba, and North Korea. And many of the enacted and proposed laws also do not contain the same exemptions, such as the LDA exemption discussed above, or the commercial exemption, under which trade or commercial interest of a foreign principal benefit from the exemption "so long as the activities do not directly promote the public or political interests of the foreign government." 28 CFR §5.304(b).
In other words, even if activities may be exempt from registration under federal law and thus not subject to federal enforcement under FARA, they may still trigger obligations under state law that could lead to enforcement by state authorities.
Conclusion
FARA appears to be at yet another moment of flux in its 85‑year evolution. On the enforcement side, the DOJ is signaling a retreat from broad criminal application, but may still maintain aggressive civil enforcement, especially if DOJ goes forward with its proposed narrowing of the commercial exemption (which we wrote about in January).
Proposed federal legislation may increase registration requirements, and an increase in state legislation may open entirely new areas of compliance concerns for companies. As a result, it would be a mistake to take Attorney General Bondi's memo as a free pass, and companies and individuals involved with foreign interests—whether commercial or political—must remain vigilant.
And of course, as history has shown repeatedly, how FARA is deployed can shift based on the administration in power.
As a result, companies would be wise to stay attuned to regulatory and legislative outcomes, and consult legal counsel to ensure that their compliance programs properly address the shifting regulatory terrain.
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