ARTICLE
1 July 2025

In Re: OpenAI Inc., Copyright Infringement Litigation

LL
Loeb & Loeb LLP

Contributor

Loeb & Loeb is a premier law firm focused on helping organizations and individuals innovate, grow and evolve in a changing world. Our market-leading practice and industry teams deliver practical insight and strategic solutions in complex deals, high profile disputes, cutting-edge regulatory issues and other matters critical to our clients’ success. The firm has approximately 450 lawyers across eight offices in the United States and Asia. This material may be considered attorney advertising.

District court denies motion to reconsider dismissal of claims that OpenAI removed copyright management information in violation of Digital Millenium Copyright Act, holding that inconsistency between dismissal order...
United States Intellectual Property

District court denies motion to reconsider dismissal of claims that OpenAI removed copyright management information in violation of Digital Millenium Copyright Act, holding that inconsistency between dismissal order and ruling in another action in consolidated multidistrict litigation does not amount to "extraordinary circumstance" required for reconsideration of final order.

News organizations Raw Story Media Inc. and AlterNet Media Inc. brought suit against OpenAI Inc. and related entities, alleging OpenAI's chatbot ChatGPT was trained on a "scrape" of the internet that includes thousands of their copyrighted works of journalism stripped of their copyright management information (CMI), and that removal of their CMI from plaintiffs' works prior to training ChatGPT violated the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).

In November 2024, Judge Colleen McMahon granted defendants' motion to dismiss and denied plaintiffs' motion for leave to replead without prejudice, holding that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because they failed to allege any harm stemming from the alleged DMCA violation. Specifically, the district court held that plaintiffs could not show that they suffered a concrete injury-in-fact that had a close historical or common law analogue to a harm traditionally recognized as a basis for a lawsuit in American courts. (Read our summary of the district court's decision here.)

Following the dismissal order, the case was transferred to Judge Sidney Stein in the same district for inclusion in a multidistrict litigation (MDL), where plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of Judge McMahon's order. In the MDL, plaintiffs argued that Judge McMahon's ruling was inconsistent with a decision that Judge Stein had issued on the same legal issue in another action in the MDL, New York Times v. Microsoft Corp. In that decision, the court found that traditional copyright law provided a sufficient historical analogue for claims under the DMCA, supporting plaintiffs' standing. (Read our summary of the court's decision here.) Plaintiffs argued that the inconsistency between the two rulings warranted reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), which allows relief from a final judgment in "extraordinary circumstances."

The district court denied the motion for reconsideration, holding that although Judge McMahon's order was inconsistent with Judge Stein's ruling in New York Times v. Microsoft Corp., that inconsistency alone does not justify reconsideration. The court explained that because Judge McMahon's ruling is a final order, the strict standard of Rule 60(b) applied to the reconsideration motion. By contrast, reconsideration of nonfinal orders is considered under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)'s more permissive standard. The court noted that a number of the cases plaintiffs cited involved motions for reconsideration of nonfinal orders and were therefore inapplicable to plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of a final order under Rule 60(b).

In applying the strict Rule 60(b) standard, the court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the inconsistency between the district court rulings constituted an extraordinary circumstance, as plaintiffs' remedy was to appeal Judge McMahon's order to the Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The court distinguished this case from others where extraordinary circumstances were present, such as where procedural barriers prevented appellate review of a district court's decision. The court also rejected plaintiffs' argument that the interest in consistency in the MDL context specifically warranted reconsideration. While consistency is a valid concern in MDL proceedings, the court explained, it does not override the stringent requirements of Rule 60(b)(6). As a result, the district court held that an appeal to the Second Circuit from Judge McMahon's order, rather than reconsideration, is the appropriate way to resolve the inconsistency between the district courts.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

Mondaq uses cookies on this website. By using our website you agree to our use of cookies as set out in our Privacy Policy.

Learn More