A New Mexico district court granted an aircraft owner's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the federal statute that protects aircraft owners, lessors and secured parties preempted a state law claim for vicarious liability. The action arose out of a December 2022 ground collision between two aircraft, one owned by the plaintiff and the other by the defendant. At the time of the accident, the defendant's aircraft was en route to California for delivery to a buyer and had landed at a New Mexico airport for refueling. In the process of "hand propping" the engine (because the engine did not have an electric starter), one of the operators lost control. The defendant's aircraft hit the plaintiff's aircraft, causing significant damage.
A plaintiff may seek to file claims against owners, lessors or secured parties in jurisdictions where there are state laws, whether based in statute or common law, that permit vicarious liability. Potential application of these state laws may lead to forum-shopping by plaintiffs, especially where the only basis for a court's jurisdiction is the presence of an owner, lessor or secured party in the state. In this instance, the plaintiff brought a claim of vicarious liability against the owner of the aircraft. The owner moved for summary judgment to dismiss on the basis that the claim was preempted pursuant to a federal statute, 49 U.S.C. 44112(b), which provides:
Liability.-- A lessor, owner, or secured party is liable for personal injury, death, or property loss or damage only when a civil aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller is in the actual possession or operational control of the lessor, owner, or secured party, and the personal injury, death, or property loss or damage occurs because of –
- the aircraft, engine, or propeller; or
- the flight of, or an object falling from, the aircraft, engine, or propeller.
At the time of the accident, the sale was not yet completed and, thus, the defendant was still the registered owner. He was not involved in arranging the delivery of the aircraft to the buyer, nor did he "direct, control, advise, or instruct" as to the method, route or manner of transport. He was not present when the accident occurred and not involved in the "hand-propping" procedure.
The New Mexico federal court noted that several courts have concluded1 that the statute preempts or bars a plaintiff's state law claims against an owner, lessor or secured party for personal injury, death or property damage when the aircraft was not in their actual possession or control at the time of the accident.2 As a result, the owner would be shielded from liability unless there was evidence of actual possession or operational control. Quickly finding there was no evidence of "actual possession," the court turned to whether the owner had "operational control" – defined in 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 as "the exercise of authority over initiating, conducting, or terminating a flight." Although the owner had given approval for the aircraft's flight to the buyer, the court determined that granting permission to fly did not establish that the owner had any manner of operational control.
Footnotes
1. See, e.g., Matei v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 35 F.3d 1142 (7th Cir. 1994) (predecessor statute to 49 U.S.C. § 44112 and Illinois bailment law precluded liability against the aircraft owner because the owner did not retain possession or control of the aircraft and did not have knowledge of the alleged defects); In re Lawrence W. Inlow Accident, 2001 WL 331625 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 7, 2001) (49 U.S.C. §44112 precluded liability of the sublessor of a helicopter following the death of a passenger hit in head with the rotor while disembarking); Mangini v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 2005 WL 3624483 (Conn. Super. Dec. 7, 2005) (49 U.S.C. § 44112 preempted negligence claims on behalf of a deceased passenger against an owner whose aircraft made an emergency landing and crashed); Esheva v. Siberia Airlines, 499 F. Supp. 2d 493, 499 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (stating in dicta that an aircraft lessor would be "absolutely immune for such liability in the United States" for claims of derivative liability brought on behalf of passengers of an airplane that crashed); Escobar v. Nevada Helicopter Leasing LLC, 2016 WL 3962805 (D. Haw. July 21, 2016); Lu v. Star Marianas Air, Inc., 2015 WL 2265464 (D.N.Mar.I. May 12, 2015).
2. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 clarified that there is preemption for claims made by or on behalf of persons whether or not they are onboard the accident aircraft. Prior to that amendment, courts in a minority of jurisdictions had limited the preemptive effect of the statute to instances where the individuals and property were not onboard the aircraft. See, e.g., Vreeland v. Ferrer, 71 So. 3d 70 (Fla. 2011), reh'g denied (Sept. 13, 2011), cert denied, 132 S. Ct. 1557 (U.S. 2012); see also Storie v. Southfield Leasing, Inc., 282 N.W.2d 417 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979), aff'd sub nom and Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. 320 N.W. 843 (1982).
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