ARTICLE
14 November 2025

Ecosystems And Legal Systems: Recent Apple Cases In The EU And The UK

PC
Perkins Coie LLP

Contributor

Perkins Coie is a premier international law firm with over a century of experience, dedicated to addressing the legal and business challenges of tomorrow. Renowned for its deep industry knowledge and client-centric approach, the firm has consistently partnered with trailblazing organizations, from aviation pioneers to artificial intelligence innovators. With 21 offices across the United States, Asia, and Europe, and a global network of partner firms, Perkins Coie provides seamless support to clients wherever they operate.

The firm's vision is to be the trusted advisor to the world’s most innovative companies, delivering strategic, high-value solutions critical to their success. Guided by a one-firm culture, Perkins Coie emphasizes excellence, collaboration, inclusion, innovation, and creativity. The firm is committed to building diverse teams, promoting equal access to justice, and upholding the rule of law, reflecting its core values and enduring dedication to clients, communities, and colleagues.

The judicial and regulatory scrutiny of Apple's iOS and App Store ecosystem continues, with a judgment from the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT)...
United States Antitrust/Competition Law
Miranda L. Cole’s articles from Perkins Coie LLP are most popular:
  • within Antitrust/Competition Law topic(s)
  • in United States
Perkins Coie LLP are most popular:
  • within Family and Matrimonial, Transport and Real Estate and Construction topic(s)

Key Takeaways

Introduction

The judicial and regulatory scrutiny of Apple's iOS and App Store ecosystem continues, with a judgment from the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) in the United Kingdom, as well as decisions from authorities in the European Union and UK (under the EU Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the UK Digital Markets, Competition, and Consumers Act (DMCC), respectively) in recent months. While they broadly focus on the "Apple ecosystem," their analytical approaches, enforcement scope and tools, and potential remedies notably differ.

In this Update, we take stock of recent judgments and decisions, noting similarities and points of convergence, in key jurisdictions under antitrust law and the developing patchwork of global regulation, which have the potential to reshape the economics and governance of Apple's ecosystem.

The Apple Docket: Select Key Cases From the EU and UK

Apple DMA "Steering" and Alternative Distribution (EU)

On April 23, 2025, the European Commission (EC) adopted a noncompliance decision fining Apple €500 million. It found that Apple's restrictions on steering breach Article 5(4) DMA because Apple does not allow business users to freely communicate, promote offers, and contract with end users through alternative distribution channels outside its App Store.

Separately, the EC issued preliminary findings in its investigation into Apple's contract terms for alternative app distribution, including its "Core Technology Fee," eligibility thresholds, and the multistep installation and user‑warning flows. The final decision is pending.

In addition, in March 2025, the EC adopted a specification decision under Article 6(7) DMA setting out how Apple must handle requests for effective interoperability with iOS/iPadOS features. Apple has appealed the specification decision; it also incorporated arguments against the resulting interoperability obligations in the oral pleadings in its separate, ongoing appeal against the decision designating it as a gatekeeper under the DMA. The appeal argues, essentially, that increasing access for third parties to its iOS/iPadOS features by means of interoperability obligations amounts to disproportionate intervention into its IP rights.

App Store Class Action (UK)

In October 2025, the CAT held that Apple abused its dominant position in the markets for iOS app distribution and in-app payment services in a collective action brought on behalf of approximately 36 million UK consumers as class members. The class action covered purchases on the UK App Store between October 1, 2015, and November 15, 2024.

The CAT rejected Apple's framing of a "single systems market" encompassing device sales and iOS app distribution, finding that Apple held a dominant (de facto monopoly) position and concluding that exclusivity for App Store distribution and mandatory use (i.e., tying) of Apple's in-app payment system foreclosed competition. The CAT also found Apple's commissions to be excessive and unfair, leading to unlawful overcharges to developers that were passed on to iOS device users.

Estimating fair, nonabusive fees at 17.5% for distribution and 10% for payment services, it awarded aggregate damages to consumers. Apple has indicated that it will appeal. A separate opt-out claim on behalf of UK developers concerning overcharges is ongoing.

Apple Mobile Ecosystem SMS Decision (UK)

On October 22, 2025, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) designated Apple's "mobile platform" as having strategic market status (SMS) under the DMCC. The five-year designation (effective October 23, 2025, to October 22, 2030) treats iOS and iPadOS, native app distribution via the App Store (including App Store Connect and deployment APIs), and Safari/WebKit as a single grouped digital activity. The designation emphasizes the App Store's "must‑have" status, persistent barriers to alternative distribution, and WebKit's role as a gatekeeping lever limiting browser‑engine competition.

The decision is not a finding of wrongdoing; it establishes a five‑year framework for faster, tailored requirements for Apple's mobile ecosystem. The CMA published a roadmap for potential measures and consultation in July 2025 and is expected to reengage on these measures shortly.

Points of Convergence Between Decisions and Jurisdictions

Between these decisions and judgments, the App Store is considered to be the essential pathway for developers to reach iOS users and monetize digital content on iOS devices. Each judgment/decision addresses the constraints that Apple imposes on developers, distribution exclusivity, and tied in-app payment processing.

The EC and the CAT both treat Apple's rules as impeding effective competition with the App Store—the former under the DMA obligation to permit steering and the latter under rules prohibiting abuse of dominance. While the CMA's SMS decision is broader in scope, it also centrally considers the competitive position and impact of the App Store.

European authorities and courts are conscious of other cases. For example, the CAT explicitly addresses the probative value of Apple-related decisions. In addition to referencing the CMA's Apple mobile ecosystem decision, the CAT regards the EC decision as a serious and probative context. However, the CAT emphasizes that liability must be determined based on UK evidence that is tested at trial. The EU and UK regulators do not "import" each other's rules, but there is clear cross‑regime learning on contestability, steering, and alternative distribution. The SMS designation decision does not extensively cite the DMA noncompliance decision, yet the analytical approaches are consistent, and the EC and CMA are engaging in ongoing monitoring and dialogue.

Points of pergence: Doctrines, Markets, and Remedies

That said, necessarily, there are some notable points of pergence.

Regulatory Concepts

The DMA and the DMCC are ex ante regulations designed to address entrenched platform power by imposing clear obligations on designated gatekeepers/SMS firms, intended to alleviate concerns regarding delays inherent in abuse-of-dominance investigations. They combine relatively fast procedures (in terms of deadlines, supervision, and iterative specifications) with targeted presumptions (e.g., steering and interoperability mandates) to restore contestability. The DMA prohibits steering constraints outright; for example, the EC is scrutinising the proportionality of Apple's "Core Technology Fee" and user journey design for sideloading.

In contrast, the CAT judgment relates to alleged abuse of dominance. Further, it addresses redress for UK consumers who suffered damage as a result of Apple's conduct (rather than specifically restricting Apple's conduct).

Framing of Services and Issues

The DMA leads to designation of specific core platform services and imposes specific obligations (e.g., anti-steering and interoperability requirements). The CMA SMS decision, in contrast, considers App Store rules to be part of Apple's entire mobile platform (spanning OS, native app distribution, and browser/engine control) on functional and consumption grounds. Apple had argued for a narrower approach (using the DMA approach), but the CMA has adopted an intermediary‑function concept at OS level (including "middleware," APIs, and enabling frameworks) to capture the functional interfaces that condition downstream competition.

The CAT judgement identifies more "traditional" aftermarkets for iOS distribution and iOS in-app payment processing, rejecting Apple's argument for a broader "systems market" that would integrate device competition and upstream platform investments into the same market.

Remedies

The EC noncompliance decision both imposed a fine for anti-steering conduct and required Apple to propose changes to its product design. As noted above, in the UK, the SMS designation does not address remedies; however, the CMA published a remedies roadmap in July 2025 and will consult on conduct requirements for Apple's mobile platform shortly. The CAT's judgment focuses on pricing, setting out indicative fair commissions for damages granted to class members, but has no structural implications.

Final Thoughts

There is clearly significant enforcement activity, but the real question is the effectiveness of the cases to date. Apple's services revenue—including App Store-related fees—continues to grow strongly, as recent earnings make clear. The remedies deployed to date span fines and ongoing conduct restrictions with obligations on Apple to modify its conduct. Notably, the DMA required steering, alternative distribution, and interoperability be permitted. Against that backdrop, the EU's power to address systemic noncompliance (with structural options) hovers in the background.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

Mondaq uses cookies on this website. By using our website you agree to our use of cookies as set out in our Privacy Policy.

Learn More