Today's Deep Diveis 1,016 words and a 6-minute read.
Over the last week, reports have indicated that a ceasefire deal between Israel and Hizballah may be within reach. With senior diplomats from the US, France, Israel and Lebanon on the ground, the parties appear to be nearing an agreement that could curb further damage and displacement in Lebanon and free Israel from escalating involvement on its northern border. Outcomes will rely on political will within Israel's government, the backing of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the perception by all parties of the utility of striking a deal during President Biden's lame duck period.
Reality on the Ground
Israel's ground invasion of southern Lebanon on October 1 was driven primarily by the Israeli security cabinet's decision in September to elevate the goal of returning the roughly 60,000 internally displaced Israelis to their northern communities to one of Israel's four "official" war goals, alongside destroying Hamas militarily, securing the release of all hostages in Gaza, and ensuring that the coastal enclave "will no longer present a threat to Israel." The status of the 60,000 internally displaced Israelis from areas near the Lebanese border places significant political pressure on Prime Minister Netanyahu, including from his ultra-right-wing coalition partners who have consistently called for more forceful military action against Hizballah to ensure the security of northern communities since October 7. To ensure their return, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is seeking to push Hizballah north of the Litani River, located 30 kilometers north of the Israel-Lebanon border, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, destroy Hizballah missile and tunnel infrastructure throughout southern Lebanon, and neutralize as many senior and mid-level Hizballah operatives as possible.
However, doubts about whether seeking further strategic victories over Hizballah outweighs the risk of getting bogged down on another front, and internal domestic pressure for Netanyahu to seek a negotiated end to the conflict, is making a ceasefire deal more and more attractive for Israel. Optimistic statements from senior US and Lebanese officials suggest that the parties may be close to an agreement. US Special Envoy Amos Hochstein is on the ground, visiting Beirut and Jerusalem in an effort to reach a deal. Hizballah is represented by Lebanese Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, the leader of the Shiite Amal Movement, who is closely aligned with Hizballah. Senior Israeli and French diplomats are also involved.
There have been several roadblocks to a ceasefire deal in previous negotiating rounds. Israel has presented maximalist demands, including the ability to enter Lebanese territory at any time to interdict Hizballah and other militant groups' activities, a demand which was met with some degree of skepticism from senior French and Lebanese diplomats. It is also unclear if a viable mechanism to enforce any ceasefire agreement exists, especially given Israel's deep distrust of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and their ability and willingness to confront Hizballah.
Nevertheless, details of negotiations that have been made public point to a possible agreed framework which will include the following elements: a Hizballah withdrawal beyond the Litani River (which acts as an informal border for southern Lebanon in UN considerations); the establishment of an international monitoring and enforcement mechanism led by the American and French militaries; and the ability for Israel to enter Lebanese territory only if the enforcement mechanism fails to resolve the outstanding issue.
Road Ahead for Israel
The IDF's leadership is cognizant that destroying Hizballah as a military and political entity is highly unlikely. Despite Israel's ground invasion and decapitation of the group's military and political leadership, Hizballah continues to pose a significant risk to Israel and has demonstrated its ability to continue military operations on a decentralized basis. October was the second deadliest month for the IDF since Hamas'attack last year, with the IDF suffering at least 36 fatalities in southern Lebanon alone. Meanwhile, Hizballah's rockets continue to kill civilians in Israel, with ten civilians killed since early November. Furthermore, Hizballah remains deeply ingrained in Lebanese Shia society, with its sophisticated political, social, and media programs enhancing its popular image as a military "resistor" to Israel. As such, Israel's primary – and most realistic – near-term goal in southern Lebanon is to push as many Hizballah fighters as possible north of the Litani River and destroy most of the group's missile infrastructure. Even if Israel succeeds in achieving these two goals, it would continue to face the risk of Hizballah's long-range missiles, and how to keep Hizballah from returning to the south remains an unresolved question.
In the longer term, Israel does not seek to reoccupy swaths of southern Lebanon, as it did for 18 years following the 1982 Lebanon War. Israel's senior political and military leadership, some of whom participated in the 1982 conflict and subsequent occupation of the buffer zone, clearly remember the difficult human, military, and political toll the occupation inflicted on Israel. Meanwhile, Israel faces an open-ended military campaign in Gaza, where Hamas continues to operate in areas previously cleared by the IDF, placing a significant operational burden on the IDF and high financial strain on the Israeli economy. In such a scenario, Israel is likely to continue to conduct targeted ground incursions and airstrikes in southern Lebanon to destroy remaining Hizballah fighters and missile infrastructure sites once initial military operations subside.
The willingness of the far-right Israeli government to move forward, as well as the Islamic Republic of Iran's backing of a deal, may not be repeated any time soon. The window is also closing down on the Biden Administration's term in office, which presents an opportunity to strike a deal before Donald Trump becomes president. Iran and Hizballah may be concerned that they would get a worse deal under President Trump, spurring them to move more quickly. In any case, missing the opportunity at present will delay a resolution of the conflict in Lebanon, by at least a few more months or perhaps well into 2025. Therefore, the next few days will be critical in determining the direction of the war in Lebanon. If the US effort fails, the Israel-Hizballah confrontation is bound to intensify.
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