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The present Article analyses how the Supreme Court held that the meaning of "a party" under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”) cannot be contextually modulated depending on the outcome of the Arbitral Proceedings, effectively overruling the Bombay High Court's restrictive interpretation in Dirk India. The availability of interim relief under Section 9 at the post-award stage has long been a contested terrain in Indian arbitration law. Where an Arbitral Tribunal has rendered its award and one party emerges unsuccessful, may that party nonetheless invoke the court’s jurisdiction under Section 9 to seek interim measures of protection?
This question, which had generated conflicting jurisprudence across multiple High Courts, has now been authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court of India in Home Care Retail Marts (P) Ltd. v. Haresh N. Sanghavi (2026 SCC OnLine SC 670). Supreme Court has now drawn a clear and deliberate distinction between Sections 9, 34, and 36 of the Act, holding that they "operate in distinct spheres" and has held that “any party” to an arbitration agreement including the unsuccessful party may invoke Section 9 at the post-award stage, thereby disapproving the restrictive line of authorities from various High Courts.
Earlier, the Bombay High Court in Dirk India Pvt. Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Electricity Generation Co. Ltd. (2013 SCC OnLine Bom 481), the Delhi High Court in Nussli Switzerland Ltd. v. Organizing Committee Commonwealth Games, 2010 (2014 SCC OnLine Del 4834) and National Highways Authority of India v. Punjab National Bank (2023 SCC OnLine Del 4810), the Madras High Court in A. Chidambaram v. S. Rajagopal (OA No. 843 of 2024), and the Karnataka High Court in Smt. Padma Mahadev v. Sierra Constructions Private Limited (COMAP No. 2 of 2021) had held that a party unsuccessful in arbitral proceedings cannot maintain a petition under Section 9 at the post-award stage. Their reasoning proceeded on the premise that the purpose of Section 9, post-award, is confined to safeguarding the “fruits of arbitral proceedings” and since an unsuccessful party holds no enforceable award, there are no fruits to protect.
On the other hand, the Telangana High Court in Saptarishi Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. National Institute of Tourism & Hospitality Management (2019 SCC OnLine TS 1765), the Gujarat High Court in GAIL (India) Ltd. v. Latin Rasayani Pvt. Ltd. (2014 SCC OnLine Guj 14836), and the Punjab & Haryana High Court in DLF Home Developers Ltd. v. Orris Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (FAO-CARB-51-2024, dated 21 February 2025) took a contrary view, holding that interim measures are available to all parties who demonstrate a bona fide apprehension of injury or dissipation of the subject matter pending Section 34 proceedings.
Before the Supreme Court, the substantial question of law that arose for consideration in the Judgment was whether a petition under Section 9 of the Act at the post-award stage, by a party that has lost in the Arbitral Proceedings and had no enforceable award in its favour, was maintainable in law.
The Supreme Court resolved the conflict decisively in favor of the unsuccessful party’s entitlement to seek Section 9 relief. In the detailed judgment passed by the Apex Court, after considering the plethora of judgments passed by various High Courts across various jurisdictions, the issue of maintainability of interim proceedings by unsuccessful party has been resolved as follows:
Firstly, by applying the principle of literal interpretation, the Court held that where the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, the court is bound to construe them in their natural and grammatical sense. Section 9 of the Act employs the expression “a party,” which is defined under Section 2(h) of the Act as “a party to an arbitration agreement.” Neither provision draws any distinction based on the outcome of Arbitral Proceedings. It was held that to assign a narrower meaning post-award i.e. by confining it to the successful party alone would amount to judicial amendment of the statute, which “lies beyond the province of the Court.” The Court relied upon Firm Ashok Traders v. Gurumukh Das Saluja (2004) 3 SCC 155, which had interpreted the term “party” under Section 9 as referring to any party to the arbitration agreement, without qualification.
Secondly, the Court examined the object and purpose of Section 9 in the broader statutory framework. Unlike Article 9 of the UNCITRAL Model Law which confines interim measures to the pre-arbitration and during-arbitration stages, the Indian Parliament consciously expanded the scope of Section 9 by introducing a post-award stage during which interim relief may be sought. This deliberate departure, the Court reasoned, demonstrates legislative intent to preserve the right of parties to approach the court for interim measures until the judicial process has reached its finality.
Thirdly, the Court held that Sections 34, 36, and 9 of the Act operate in distinct spheres. Sections 34 and 36 provide remedies against an Award or its stay, whereas Section 9 ensures protection of the subject matter or the amount in dispute. An unsuccessful party cannot secure protection of its claim under Section 34 or Section 36 alone; to deny interim relief under Section 9 would leave such a party entirely remediless. The Court emphasized that the ultimate outcome of Section 34 proceedings may alter the rights of parties, and therefore the distinction between a “winning” and “losing” party cannot limit the right to interim protection.
Fourthly, the Court made a significant departure from the assumptions underlying the Dirk India line of authority. The premise that a court exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 may only uphold or set aside an award was held untenable in light of the Constitution Bench decision in Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 986, which affirmed that courts possess the power to modify an arbitral award where it is severable—by excising the invalid portion, correcting clerical or computational errors, and modifying post-award interest. Additionally, the Court noted that an award may be quashed, leaving parties free to recommence arbitration de novo. In such circumstances, an unsuccessful party may, upon modification or setting aside of the award, require interim protection to preserve the subject matter.
Therefore, we note that by way of the present judgment, the Supreme Court while upholding the right of unsuccessful parties under Section 9 of the Act has clarified that the threshold for granting such relief will be higher keeping in mind the established principles of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and likelihood of irreparable harm. In fact, in the Judgment, the Court have advised extra care, caution and circumspection while entertaining Section 9 applications by unsuccessful parties.
In conclusion, the Judgment represents a significant development in Indian arbitration law and carries substantial implications for commercial litigation. By conclusively settling a long-standing inter-court conflict, the decision provides much-needed certainty on the scope of post-award interim relief. For parties challenging adverse Arbitral Awards under Section 34, the judgment opens a vital avenue of protection that was previously foreclosed in several major commercial jurisdictions including Bombay, Delhi, and Madras.
The Court’s emphasis on a “higher threshold” and the invocation of “care, caution and circumspection” signals that frivolous or tactical Section 9 applications by losing parties are unlikely to succeed. The decision also reinforces the growing significance of Gayatri Balasamy in reshaping the post-award remedial landscape if awards can be modified, the classification of parties as “winners” and “losers” becomes less tenable, and the case for preserving the status quo pending final adjudication becomes significant.
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.
