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1. Introduction
In a significant development shaping the contours of judicial oversight in criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court of India has delivered a landmark ruling in Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (SLP (Crl.) No. 13424 of 2025). The decision clarifies the extent to which High Courts may exercise their writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution when petitions seek quashing of First Information Reports ("FIRs") or charge sheets, particularly when a charge sheet is filed while such a writ petition is pending.
The judgment reaffirms the delicate balance between constitutional remedies and statutory mechanisms under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 ("BNSS") and draws a jurisprudential boundary around the "cognizance stage", now reaffirmed as the watershed moment dividing constitutional and statutory remedies.
The Court held unequivocally that once a judicial order taking cognizance intervenes, High Courts cannot invoke Article 226 to nullify such judicial action. Instead, litigants must invoke Section 528 BNSS (inherent powers, successor to Section 482 CrPC). Additionally, when a petition invokes both Article 226 and Section 528, High Courts retain jurisdiction to mould relief, even after a charge sheet has been filed.
The ruling also overturns a Bombay High Court decision that had dismissed a writ petition as "infructuous" merely because a charge sheet was filed during pendency, holding that such dismissal amounted to a failure of justice.
2. Background of the Case
The controversy arose from an FIR bearing C.R. No. 648/2024, registered on 12 September 2024 at M.I.D.C. Police Station, Solapur alleging offences under Sections 420, 406, 409 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
The petitioner approached the Bombay High Court with a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 528 BNSS seeking quashing of the FIR. While the petition remained pending, the police completed their investigation and filed a charge sheet on 14 May 2025.
The High Court thereafter dismissed the writ petition on 1 July 2025 holding that the filing of the charge sheet rendered the petition infructuous. In doing so, it relied on the Supreme Court's earlier ruling in Neeta Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2024).
However, unlike Neeta Singh, the present petition expressly invoked both Article 226 and Section 528 BNSS. The High Court reserved liberty to file a discharge application before the trial court but refused to consider the quashing plea. The petitioner thereafter approached the Supreme Court via Special Leave Petition.
3. Issues Before the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court considered a foundational procedural question: Does the filing of a charge sheet automatically render a writ petition under Article 226 for quashing an FIR infructuous?
Further, the Court examined whether the High Court is duty bound to consider relief under Section 528 BNSS, even if the writ petition was originally styled under Article 226 alone.
4. Supreme Court's Observations
The Supreme Court's reasoning centres on three key pillars: (i) the factual dissimilarity from Neeta Singh (ii) the role of Section 528 BNSS and (iii) the critical distinction between pre cognizance and post cognizance stages.
4.1 Misreading of Neeta Singh
The Supreme Court noted that the Bombay High Court had incorrectly treated the petition as infructuous by misapplying Neeta Singh. There was "distinct factual dissimilarity" between the two cases, which the High Court overlooked.
The Supreme Court observed that Neeta Singh was materially different because the petition there had been filed only under Article 226, without invoking the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC (now Section 528 of the BNSS). Further, in Neeta Singh, the magistrate had already taken cognizance of the offence, which meant that the High Court could not exercise writ jurisdiction to interfere with a judicial act. In contrast, in the present case, the Bombay High Court did not ascertain whether cognizance had been taken and overlooked the critical fact that the petitioner had invoked both Article 226 and Section 528 BNSS, thereby giving the High Court broader jurisdiction to mould relief rather than dismissing the petition as infructuous.
4.2 High Court's Jurisdiction Under Section 528 BNSS
The Supreme Court held that the High Court had ample jurisdiction to mould relief under Section 528 BNSS, "Since its jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS was also invoked, the relief claimed could have been suitably moulded..."
Section 528 of the BNSS preserves the High Court's inherent jurisdiction, enabling it to intervene in exceptional situations to prevent abuse of the judicial process, ensure that justice is not defeated by procedural or technical lapses and secure the broader ends of justice. This provision empowers the Court to issue necessary orders not only for quashing FIRs and charge sheets but also for setting aside cognizance orders, as long as such judicial orders are specifically pleaded and challenged. In doing so, Section 528 functions as a vital corrective mechanism, allowing the High Court to address cases where continued prosecution would amount to injustice or misuse of the criminal justice system.
4.3 Pre-Cognizance vs. Post-Cognizance: The Legal Watershed
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the stage at which cognizance is taken represents the decisive boundary for determining whether a petitioner may invoke the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 226. At the pre cognizance stage, the High Court retains wide powers to quash FIRs or charge sheets if the facts warrant such intervention, as no judicial application of mind has yet occurred. However, once cognizance is taken, the legal landscape changes, the judicial act of taking cognizance cannot be undone through Article 226, because writ jurisdiction cannot be used to nullify a judicial order. At that point, the appropriate remedy lies exclusively under Section 528 of the BNSS, which empowers the High Court to quash not just the FIR or charge sheet but also the cognizance order itself, provided it is specifically challenged with proper pleadings.
The Court explained: "So long cognisance of the offence is not taken, a writ... could be issued under Article 226, however, once a judicial order taking cognisance intervenes, the power under Article 226... is not available."
4.4 Failure of Justice
The Supreme Court, after identifying a clear and substantive error in the High Court's reasoning, held that the Division Bench had fundamentally misunderstood and incorrectly applied the precedent in Neeta Singh. The Court observed that the High Court had "misread Neeta Singh, misapplied the ratio, and in doing so, caused a failure of justice." This strong finding underscores that the High Court not only overlooked critical factual distinctions but also failed to exercise the jurisdiction available to it under Section 528 BNSS, thereby depriving the petitioner of a remedy the law expressly provides.
5. Legal Principles Emerging From the Judgment
5.1 High Court Powers Under Article 226
Article 226 undoubtedly vests the High Courts with wide and flexible discretionary powers, enabling intervention in situations involving a violation of fundamental rights, jurisdictional errors, arbitrary or mala fide executive action or instances of manifest injustice or abuse of process. However, this extraordinary jurisdiction is not designed to override or replace statutory mechanisms provided under criminal procedure. Crucially, the High Court's power under Article 226 becomes significantly restricted once a criminal court has taken cognizance of an offence, because the act of taking cognizance is itself a judicial determination and judicial orders cannot be quashed in writ jurisdiction. At that stage, the appropriate remedy lies within the statutory framework, specifically under Section 528 of the BNSS, which enables the High Court to address grievances arising from such judicial acts.
5.2 Scope of Section 528 BNSS (Former Section 482 CrPC)
Section 528 of the BNSS serves as a statutory safeguard that preserves the High Court's inherent jurisdiction to intervene in exceptional situations where justice demands it. This provision empowers the Court to give effect to orders under the BNSS, to prevent abuse of the judicial process and to secure the ends of justice in circumstances where continued prosecution would be unfair, oppressive or contrary to law. It functions as a corrective mechanism, ensuring that procedural technicalities or investigative excesses do not impede substantive justice.
Importantly, unlike Article 226, which becomes limited once a magistrate takes cognizance, Section 528 continues to operate even after cognizance has been taken, allowing litigants to challenge not only FIRs and charge sheets but also cognizance orders, which are judicial acts. However, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the exercise of this inherent power is not automatic, petitioners must properly plead and specifically assail the orders they seek to challenge. Without such precise pleadings, Section 528 cannot be invoked to its full effect, reinforcing the need for carefully drafted petitions that expressly articulate the relief sought.
5.3 Duty of High Courts to Mould Relief
The Court emphasised that when a petitioner invokes multiple jurisdictions, such as Article 226 along with Section 528 BNSS, the High Court cannot mechanically dismiss the matter without deeper examination. It is duty bound to assess the stage of the criminal proceedings, the precise nature of the relief sought and whether the statutory inherent powers available under Section 528 can be exercised to grant appropriate relief. The Supreme Court made it clear that a dismissal based merely on technicalities, without evaluating the availability and scope of statutory jurisdiction, is impermissible. High Courts must therefore meaningfully engage with the jurisdiction invoked and mould relief where necessary, rather than evading consideration on procedural grounds.
6. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's ruling in Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra is a robust reaffirmation of the architecture of constitutional and statutory remedies in criminal law. By clearly distinguishing between the pre cognizance and post cognizance stages and by demarcating the respective domains of Article 226 and Section 528 of the BNSS, the Supreme Court has established a coherent and structured doctrinal framework for quashing proceedings. This calibrated approach promotes fairness to litigants, who can now navigate the appropriate remedies with greater certainty, it enhances uniformity in judicial practice by guiding High Courts on how to exercise constitutional and statutory powers in harmony and it reinforces the statutory architecture of criminal procedure, ensuring that inherent powers are invoked only at the correct procedural stage without undermining the legislative design of the BNSS.
The decision will have a wide reaching impact on how quashing petitions are drafted, heard and adjudicated. It ensures that procedural technicalities do not extinguish substantive rights and that the High Court's inherent powers remain a vibrant safeguard against misuse of the criminal justice system.
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