Due Diligence Over Due Process? Analysing The Karnataka High

I. Introduction

On September 24, 2025, the Karnataka High Court pronounced its judgment in X Corp (formerly Twitter) v. Union of India, rejecting X Corp's constitutionality challenge against Rule 3(1)(d) of the 2021 IT Rules and the government's Sahyog portal (dubbed the "censorship portal" by X Corp in its petition). The Court dismissed X Corp's writ petition, holding that Rule 3(1)(d), read with Section 79 of the IT Act, is not ultra vires, vague or arbitrary, but a valid due-diligence obligation that intermediaries must observe. It also rejected X Corp's argument that Section 79(3)(b) is merely an exemption provision that does not permit the issuance of takedown or blocking orders, which it asserted must instead be issued only under Section 69A, IT Act read with the 2009 Blocking Rules. The Court described the Sahyog portal – a centralized online platform through which authorised government agencies can issue content removal directions and user data requests to intermediaries – as a facilitation mechanism, not a tool for censorship. The Court further held that X Corp, being a foreign entity, cannot claim Article 19 free-speech rights, which are citizen-centric.

Contextually, X Corp's petition before the Karnataka High Court followed related proceedings before the Delhi High Court in Shabana v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi. There, the Court was, among other issues, examining the operationalisation of the Sahyog portal. X Corp refused to onboard and pressed its objections, but many major intermediaries expressed their willingness to co-operate with the Government and onboard onto Sahyog. The cooperating platforms were discharged from further appearance by the Delhi High Court (unless specifically summoned at a later stage), whereas X Corp's refusal necessitated its continued presence in the Shabana proceedings and formed part of the factual backdrop to its constitutional challenge against Rule 3(1)(d) and Sahyog in Karnataka.

In this case comment, the authors analyse the Karnataka High Court's ruling, focusing on its implications on India's intermediary liability regime and the manner in which the State exercises its censorial powers in the digital sphere. The comment traces the parties' key submissions, crystallises the Court's findings on the main issues considered, and concludes with the authors' reflections on the judgment.

II. Parties' rival contentions

The Petitioner, X Corp, contended that the content removal framework created under Section 79(3)(b), IT Act read with Rule 3(1)(d), and its proposed implementation through the Sahyog portal, would confer sweeping discretion on executive authorities (including law enforcement agencies in different States) to decide what constitutes "unlawful information". This would enable arbitrary removal of content hosted on intermediaries' platforms, due to the absence of procedural safeguards. Such a regime would, in practice, operate as a parallel mechanism for content removal outside Section 69A of the IT Act and the 2009 Blocking Rules, which the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal had upheld as the only constitutionally permissible route for blocking online speech. X Corp further argued that Section 79(3)(b), being merely a condition for retaining intermediary safe harbour, cannot serve as a legal basis for creating or implementing any blocking or takedown mechanism, as it is not an enabling provision authorising content removal.

The State contended that India's internet landscape has changed dramatically since Shreya Singhal, justifying updated mechanisms like the Sahyog portal for efficient coordination between intermediaries and authorised agencies. It further argued that Article 19 rights apply only to citizens, and hence a foreign intermediary, like X Corp, cannot rely on them. The State argued that nodal officers appointed under Rule 3(1)(d) act in a statutory capacity. They do not issue takedown directions arbitrarily, and can only target content already defined as unlawful under existing law.

In rejoinder, X Corp reiterated that even if Article 19 protections are not directly available to it as a foreign entity, the impugned framework remains vulnerable to challenge under Article 14, as authorising arbitrary executive censorship. The Intervenors supplemented this contention, arguing that Article 19 free speech protections continue to vest in Indian users and content creators whose speech could be directly curtailed by takedown directions under the impugned framework, in an opaque manner.

III. Key judicial findings

Although the Court outlined a broad range of issues touching upon history, comparative jurisprudence, and the scope of constitutional protections, the Court's findings of the principal issues involved are summarised below:

1. Constitutionality of Rule 3(1)(d): The Court upheld the validity of Rule 3(1)(d) of the 2021 IT Rules, holding that it is clear, unambiguous, and consistent with the IT Act. It distinguished between Section 69A, which governs blocking orders through a detailed procedure, and Section 79, which, read with Rule 3(1)(d), merely imposes due-diligence obligations on intermediaries as a condition for retaining safe-harbour protection. Rejecting the plea of vagueness, the Court held that "unlawful information" derives meaning from existing laws and that the Rule falls within the scope of Article 19(2). The Court also declined X Corp's request to read down Rule 3(1)(d), reasoning that reading down is warranted only to save a provision from unconstitutionality, and since Rule 3(1)(d) was found to be constitutionally sound, there was no occasion to do so.
2. Relevance of Shreya Singhal in the context of the 2021 IT Rules:The Court observed that in 2011 IT Rules considered in Shreya Singhal have since been replaced by the 2021 IT Rules, which impose substantially broader due-diligence obligations on intermediaries. As the 2021 IT Rules framework marks a significant departure from the earlier regime, its validity may require independent and fresh interpretation.
   
   
3. Legality of the Sahyog portal: The Court held that the Sahyog Portal is not ultra vires the IT Act. It found that the portal is a facilitative mechanism designed to implement intermediaries' obligations under Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act and Rule 3(1)(d) of the 2021 IT Rules. The portal creates no new powers of blocking or censorship and merely streamlines communication between authorities and intermediaries. It was therefore held to be a legitimate tool and an "instrument for public good", for the State to effectively tackle the "growing menace" of cybercrime. The Court also noted that while X Corp complies with comparable takedown regimes under U.S. law, it unjustifiably objects to India's legal requirements.
   
   
4. Eligibility of foreign entities to free speech rights: The Court held that free speech protections under Article 19 are citizen-centric and cannot be invoked by foreign juristic entities such as X Corp. While Articles 14 and 21 apply to all persons, the right to free speech under Article 19(1)(a) is confined to Indian citizens. Consequently, the petitioner, a foreign corporation without legal presence in India, could not invoke Article 19, either directly or indirectly under the guise of an Article 14 violation claim, to challenge domestic legislation.

IV. Comments

1. Sahyog onboarding; expectation without mandate: Drawing from the government's submissions in both the present case and the ongoing Shabana proceedings, the onboarding of intermediaries onto the Sahyog portal appears integral to advancing the portal's stated objective of seamless coordination and effective implementation of lawful directions. Neither the current judgment nor the Shabana orders issued thus far establish onboarding as a due-diligence requirement or a statutory mandate. However, given the government's consistent position that Sahyog serves as the centralised channel for coordination, an intermediary's refusal to onboard may be perceived as inconsistent with the expectations underlying Rule 3(1)(d), even if it does not amount to formal non-compliance.
2. Procedural safeguards and transparency in content blocking:By upholding the validity of Rule 3(1)(d) and the Sahyog framework, the judgment effectively reinforces a dual takedown regime under the IT Act. While Section 69A and the 2009 Blocking Rules embed procedural safeguards such as user notice, reasoned orders, and opportunities for review, the Rule 3(1)(d) mechanism, operationalised through Sahyog, lacks equivalent guardrails. While the Court viewed Sahyog as a mere facilitation platform, it did not engage with the structural absence of transparency or user participation in this process. In practice, this creates a strong institutional incentive for authorities to favour the more procedurally unconstrained Rule 3(1)(d) route, where orders are directed to intermediaries rather than users. This shift may limit the ability of impacted users to know when and why their content is removed, diminishing transparency, contrary to the Supreme Court's ruling in Anuradha Bhasin, requiring government orders restricting communication to be published to ensure accountability and enable challenge.
3. Free speech and the Question of Intermediary Standing: The Court reaffirmed that the protection of Article 19 is confined to Indian citizens and cannot be invoked by foreign entities. This reasoning mirrors the Karnataka High Court's earlier finding in Twitter Inc. v. Union of India (2023) concerning blocking orders and may carry persuasive value in other constitutional challenges brought by social media intermediaries. In such cases, where intermediaries have relied on user-based fundamental rights arguments, the present judgment may be cited to question their standing, influencing how future courts assess the representative role of platforms in defending user rights.

V. Conclusion

The Karnataka High Court's judgment marks a significant moment in India's evolving intermediary liability framework, affirming the government's regulatory authority under the IT Act while clarifying the limits of constitutional protections available to foreign entities. By upholding Rule 3(1)(d) and the Sahyog framework, the Court has effectively endorsed a model that prioritises coordination between authorised government authorities and intermediaries over procedural safeguards. While the ruling provides regulatory certainty, it also raises important questions about transparency, due process, and digital rights. X Corp. has publicly indicated that it intends to appeal the decision, suggesting that the constitutional and structural issues surrounding India's takedown architecture are likely to receive further judicial scrutiny in the coming months.

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