The Cockpit Verdict: Redefining 'Workman'

The Division Bench of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, comprising Justice Anil Kshetarpal and Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar, delivered a significant judgment in the case of King Airways v. Captain Pritam Singh & Ors. (LPA 142/2013 & connected matters), dated December 11, 2025. This verdict decisively settled a long-standing jurisprudential controversy regarding the classification of high-income professionals, specifically Pilots-in-Command (PIC), under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (ID Act). The Hon'ble Court was seized with multiple Letters  Patent Appeals challenging conflicting orders. The primary legal conundrum was whether a Pilot-in-Command, who draws a substantial salary and exercises statutory authority over an aircraft and its crew, falls within the definition of a “workman” under Section 2(s) of the ID Act or is excluded as a “supervisor” under Section 2(s)(iv). The judgment offers a comprehensive analysis of statutory interpretation, distinguishing between “operational control” mandated by safety regulations and “supervisory control” in an industrial relations context. The Hon'ble Court relied on the judgement of Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa (1978 SCC OnLine 65) to interpret the definitions under the Industrial Disputes Act (ID Act) in a “popular sense” rather than a strict dictionary sense. The Hon'ble Court used this to emphasize that the ID Act is a beneficial legislation intended to  protect labour, and statutory definitions like “industry” or “workman” must be construed with the values of social justice, avoiding narrow interpretations that exclude employees based on technicalities.

The crux of the Appellant's argument rested on the statutory exclusions provided in Section 2(s)(iv) of the ID Act. King Airways contended that the respondent pilots, appointed as Senior Commanders with a monthly salary of ₹1,00,000, were employed in a supervisory capacity. To substantiate this, the Appellant relied heavily on Rule 141 of the Aircraft Rules, 1937, which explicitly states that the Pilot-in-Command shall “supervise and direct” other crew members and maintain flight discipline. Furthermore, the Appellant cited the Operations Manual of U.P Airways (Sections 4.4 and 4.5), which vested the Captain with final authority regarding the disposition of the aircraft and the safety of passengers. The Appellant argued that these duties were inherently managerial and supervisory, thereby triggering the exclusion clause which disqualifies any person employed in a supervisory capacity drawing wages exceeding the statutory threshold.

While pronouncing the judgement, the Hon'ble Court dismantled the Appellants's reliance on the Aircraft Rules by applying the “doctrine of dominant purpose.” The Hon'ble Bench reasoned that the definition of a “Pilot-in-Command” under Rule 3(42) and their duties under Rule 141 are aimed specifically at ensuring flight safety and operational efficiency, not at conferring administrative or managerial power over the crew. The Hon'ble Court observed that while the aircraft commander does exercise authority during the flight, such “supervision” is merely ancillary to their principal technical duty, which is flying the aircraft. The Hon'ble Court further elucidated that the term “supervise” in the industrial context implies control over employment conditions, such as granting leave, taking disciplinary action, or assigning duties, which in this case, were vested in the “Operations Manager” and not the pilots. Therefore, the statutory authority granted for the limited purpose of flight safety could not be conflated with the supervisory capacity contemplated under the industrial legislation. The Hon'ble Court cited the landmark judgement of S.K. Maini v. Carona Sahu Company Limited (1994 SCC OnLine SC 132) which established the “Primary Duties Test.” The Hon'ble Court used it to hold that the designation of an employee is not determinative of their status. If an employee (like a pilot) performs mainly technical duties but incidentally performs some supervisory tasks, they remain a “workman.” Conversely, only if the primary work is supervisory does the exclusion apply.

A pivotal aspect of the judgment was the Hon'ble Court's treatment of the “salary test.” The Appellant had vehemently argued that a salary of ₹1,00,000 per month inherently placed the pilots outside the bracket of ordinary workmen. The Hon'ble Court, however, dismissed this argument as a “red herring” and clarified the structural interpretation of Section 2(s), noting that the definition of “workman” expressly includes persons employed to do “technical” work. The exclusion based on salary limits applies only if the employee falls within the “supervisory” category. Since the Hon'ble Court had already determined, based on the nature of duties, that a pilot is essentially a “technical” worker and not a supervisor, the quantum of salary became legally irrelevant. The Hon'ble Court relied on the precedent set by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Cedri Dsilva (supra), which held that pilots are highly skilled technical workers whose primary job is to drive the aircraft, and thus they remain workmen regardless of their remuneration.

Furthermore, the Hon'ble Court scrutinized the termination of the pilots, characterizing it as an act of victimization. The evidence revealed that the pilots were terminated swiftly after they issued a demand notice for unpaid salaries and flying allowances. The Hon'ble Court found this action to be punitive and in gross violation of the principles of natural justice, as no domestic inquiry was conducted prior to the severance. In addressing the relief granting full back wages, reliance was placed upon the Hon'ble Supreme Court's guidelines in Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya ((2013) 10 SCC 324). The Hon'ble Bench affirmed that when a termination is void ab initio due to statutory violations, full back wages are the normal rule unless the employer can affirmatively prove that the workman was gainfully employed during the intervening period. The Appellant failed to produce any evidence regarding the pilots' alternative employment, thereby justifying the Hon'ble Tribunal's award of full back wages.

A critical pillar of the airline's defense is the economic reality of the pilots' employment. King Airways emphasizes that the respondents were Senior Commanders drawing salaries in excess of ₹1,00,000 per month (a substantial sum at the time of the dispute). The airline contends that Section 2(s)(iv) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which excludes supervisors drawing wages above a certain threshold, was specifically designed to prevent high-ranking, high-income professionals from claiming protections meant for vulnerable labor. King Airways considers the Hon'ble High Court's dismissal of the salary argument as a “red herring” to be legally flawed. In the corporate view, high executive compensation is inextricably linked to accountability and decision-making power; treating a six-figure earner on par with a factory floor worker defeats the legislative intent of the Act. The most glaring critique is that the judgment effectively renders Section 2(s)(iv) of the ID Act nugatory for technical industries. By ruling that “technical duties” (flying) always overshadow “supervisory duties” (commanding the crew), the court creates a precedent where no technical lead, whether a Chief Surgeon, a Lead Architect, or a Senior Commander, can ever be classified as a supervisor, regardless of how many subordinates they direct. This interpretation hollows out the statutory exclusion meant for “technical supervisors,” conflating “skill” with “rank” in a way that the legislature likely did not intend. The Hon'ble Court's dismissal of the salary component as a “red herring” is legally precarious. While salary alone does not determine workman status, it is a vital indicator of bargaining power and status. The Industrial Disputes Act is social welfare legislation designed to protect those with weak bargaining power against capital. Extending this “protective umbrella” to pilots earning significantly more than middle-management executives creates an economic distortion. It diverts judicial resources and statutory protections to “gold-collar” professionals who have the financial means to negotiate contracts or seek civil remedies, rather than the “blue-collar” workforce the Act was designed to shield. Practically, the ruling introduces a dangerous conflict of interest. If Commanders are “workmen,” they can legally form unions and strike alongside the very co-pilots and cabin crew they are legally mandated to supervise. This erodes the chain of command essential for flight safety. A Commander cannot effectively discipline a subordinate for safety lapses if that subordinate is a “comrade” in the same trade union, potentially compromising the strict discipline required in the cockpit. 

Ultimately, the Hon'ble High Court set aside the Hon'ble Single Judge's order in LPA 618/2015, which had remanded the matter for fresh evidence, and upheld the Hon'ble Tribunal's findings in favor of the workmen. The judgment establishes that the designation of “Commander” or “Captain” is merely nomenclature dictated by aviation regulations and does not alter the fundamental “technical” character of the pilot's employment. By prioritizing the “true nature of duties” over statutory designations and salary scales, the Hon'ble Court reaffirmed that the protective umbrella of the Industrial Disputes Act extends to highly skilled professionals, provided their primary function remains the execution of technical tasks rather than administrative supervision. The Hon'ble Court referred to the judgement in Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Ninth Industrial Tribunal & Ors. (2005(3)CHN481 (Calcutta High Court) to support the view that a pilot's principal employment is flying (a skilled technical job). Even if a pilot performs ancillary supervisory functions or is designated as a “check pilot” or “examiner,” it does not alter their fundamental character as a workman. This ruling serves as a critical precedent for the aviation sector, ensuring that safety-related command authority is not misused to deny pilots their statutory employment rights. Nevertheless, we look forward to further judicial pronouncements along the same lines which shall provide more clarity and encourage to frame guidelines for regulation purposes. 

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