Germany's Top Civil Court Sets The Rules For Mass Competition Claims

What happens when a single lawsuit bundles 70,000 individual antitrust damages claims? Germany's Federal Court of Justice has now answered that question, with important implications for competition litigation and litigation funding alike.

On 12 May 2026, the Cartel Senate of the German Federal Court of Justice (FCJ) (Bundesgerichtshof) handed down its long-awaited judgment in case KZR 6/24, setting out the ground rules for mass antitrust damages actions brought by debt collection companies. The decision confirms that bundling assigned claims in a single lawsuit is permissible in principle. However, the FCJ draws clear lines where the sheer volume of claims threatens to overwhelm the courts and where conflicting interests between assignors or with a litigation funder may arise.

Background

Between 1997 and 2011, the European Commission found that European truck manufacturers had coordinated gross list prices for medium and heavy trucks, as well as the timing and passing-on of costs relating to emission compliance technology in the European Economic Area.

A registered debt collector (Inkassodienstleister) brought a lawsuit on the basis of assigned claims against four truck manufacturers, seeking joint and several liability for (alleged) antitrust damages in connection with the purchase of approximately 70,000 trucks over 15 years. The debt collector had obtained assignments from 3,266 individuals and companies across 21 countries, as well as third-party funding. The assignors agreed to a 33% contingency fee on any damages recovered, at no cost to assignors if the case failed.

The case has a tortuous procedural history. The Regional Court (Landgericht) Munich I dismissed the action and the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) Munich largely reversed that decision on appeal. The truck manufacturers then appealed to the FCJ, which overturned the appellate judgment and remanded the case back to the Higher Regional Court Munich.

Legal Issues

The Cartel Senate of the FCJ mainly addressed four questions:

1. Can a debt collector legitimately bundle antitrust damages claims from thousands of claimants in a single lawsuit?
2. What happens if that bundling makes it practically impossible for a court to adjudicate the claims properly?
3. Does mixing claimants from different market levels of the supply chain automatically create a disqualifying conflict of interest?
4. Can the involvement of a litigation funder create a disqualifying conflict of interest?

The Judgment: Limits on bundling and funding

Admissibility: The FCJ confirmed that competition claims can, as a matter of principle, be pursued in a collective action by a registered debt collector using the "assignment model". There is nothing inherently abusive about a debt collector bundling a large number of claims, using a contingency fee structure, or pursuing claims primarily through litigation.

Limits of bundling: However, where the manner in which claims are bundled makes it practically impossible for courts to provide effective judicial protection, the responsibility of structuring the proceedings can shift from the court to the claimant. The court may issue directions to the claimant to prepare the necessary separation of proceedings within a maximum timeframe of six months. Failure to comply with such directions constitutes an abuse of procedural rights, rendering the claim inadmissible. The FCJ was blunt about the arithmetic: processing 70,000 individual transactions at one hour per transaction, with 1,800 working hours per year, would occupy a single judge for approximately 38 years – a timeframe plainly incompatible with the constitutional requirement of justice within a reasonable time.

Conflicts of interest between assignors: The grouping of assignors from different market levels of the supply chain (for example, direct and indirect purchasers) in a single collective action does not automatically (but can) constitute a structural conflict of interest voiding the assignments – at least where the debt collector is contractually obliged to bundle only claims of a "similar nature". Any potential conflicts of interest will have to be addressed in the course of the required separation of proceedings.

Conflicting interests due to litigation funding: The FCJ held that the Higher Regional Court Munich had wrongly refused to order disclosure of the funding agreement. Due to the lacking disclosure of the funding agreement, the FCJ was unable to assess whether its terms create a structural conflict of interest capable of rendering all assignments void (for example by granting relevant settlement veto rights to the litigation funder). This issue has been remitted to the Higher Regional Court Munich for fresh consideration in light of the full funding agreement.

Takeaways for Practitioners

This judgment is a landmark for German collective redress in competition litigation and an interim win for the defence side.

While it in principle validates the "assignment model" used by debt collectors as a legitimate vehicle for mass competition claims (as the FCJ has previously confirmed for non-competition mass claims), the FCJ places real procedural constraints on how that model may be deployed.

• A debt collector that dumps tens of thousands of heterogeneous claims into a single, poorly organised lawsuit risks being ordered to restructure the proceedings within only a six-month deadline, failing which the entire action may be dismissed as inadmissible.
• For litigation funders, the FCJ’s considerations regarding conflicts of interest are a warning shot. The terms of the funding agreement, particularly any influence the litigation funder may exercise over the proceedings and settlement decisions, will face heightened scrutiny and transparency.

This judgment will likely shape the future bundling of claims by debt collectors. The separation of proceedings will increase the overall costs and funding requirements, as the claimant will derive less benefit from the statutory fee cap applicable at a claim value of EUR 30 million. This heightened risk may, in turn, prompt litigation funders to seek greater protection for their increased investment – creating an inherent tension with the FCJ's requirements on conflicts of interest.

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