India v Singapore As Enforcement Forums: Pro-enforcement Rhetoric And Evolving Judicial Practices

In summary

Both India and Singapore publicly espouse a pro-arbitration and pro-enforcement approach to arbitral awards. However, beneath the shared rhetoric, their judicial practices have evolved in markedly different ways. Singapore courts intervene only on narrow procedural grounds, treating the finality of arbitral awards as a core institutional value. India has historically adopted a broader supervisory role, though the 2015 legislative reforms and subsequent Supreme Court decisions have significantly narrowed this. This article traces that evolution through a series of key decisions from both jurisdictions and considers what the divergence means for parties selecting a seat or enforcement forum.

Discussion points

• “Public policy” varies by jurisdiction; not defined by the New York Convention.
• Singapore courts: very limited grounds to challenge awards.
• India broadened review (Saw Pipes, Western Geco), but 2015 reforms narrowed it.
• Now, India restricts “patent illegality” to domestic cases only.
• Supreme Court: Wednesbury review scrapped; limited powers to modify awards.
• Singapore: more predictability and finality; India: reforming, but still inconsistent at lower levels.

Referenced in this article

Cases:

• AKN and another v ALC and others [2016] 1 SLR 966 (Singapore Court of Appeal)
• Associate Builders v Delhi Development Authority (2015) 3 SCC 49 (Supreme Court of India)
• CBX and another v CBZ and others [2020] SGHC(I) 17 (Singapore International Commercial Court)
• Gayatri Balasamy v ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited 2025 INSC 605 (Supreme Court of India)
• Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v Impregilo SpA [2006] 1 AC 221 (House of Lords)
• ONGC Ltd v Saw Pipes Ltd (2003) 5 SCC 705 (Supreme Court of India)
• ONGC Ltd v Western Geco International Ltd (2014) 9 SCC 263 (Supreme Court of India)
• PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA [2007] 1 SLR(R) 597 (Singapore Court of Appeal)
• PT First Media TBK v Astro Nusantara International BV [2014] 1 SLR 372 (Singapore Court of Appeal)
• Renusagar Power Co Ltd v General Electric Co 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644 (Supreme Court of India)
• Soleimany v Soleimany [1999] QB 785 (English Court of Appeal)
• Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co Ltd v National Highways Authority of India [2019] SCC OnLine SC 677 (Supreme Court of India)

Legislation:

• Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (India), sections 34, 34(2-A), 34(2)(a)(iii), 34(2)(b)
• Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act 2015 (India)
• International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed) (Singapore), sections 12(5)(b) and 20
• New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958, article V(2)(b)
• UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, article 34

Other:

• Amit Kumar Kashyap and Kanya Saluja, ‘Judicial Review of Arbitral Award: A Policy Review on Delimitation of Patent Illegality in India’ (2022) 8(24) Law and World 8
• Law Commission of India, 246th Report on Amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (2014)

Introduction

Over the past two decades, both India and Singapore have publicly embraced a pro-arbitration and pro-enforcement stance. Courts in both jurisdictions regularly emphasise the limited scope of judicial intervention in arbitral awards and the importance of party autonomy. However, despite this similarity in rhetoric, judicial practice in the two jurisdictions has evolved in markedly different ways, in part reflecting the scale, diversity and complexity inherent in India’s legal and commercial ecosystem.

Singapore has developed a reputation as a predictable and arbitration-friendly enforcement forum, where courts intervene only in exceptional circumstances and consistently defer to arbitral tribunals on questions of fact, law and contractual interpretation. India, by contrast, has historically adopted a more interventionist approach, particularly through expansive judicial interpretations of the “public policy” ground for setting aside arbitral awards.

Although India has undertaken substantial reforms to its arbitration framework, most notably through the 2015 amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, the development of judicial practice continues to evolve across jurisdictions. Recent jurisprudence demonstrates that Indian courts continue to engage more extensively with the merits of arbitral awards, particularly when reviewing domestic awards under section 34 of the Act. There have been recent cases, where the Supreme Court has once again laid out the scope of judicial interference and reinforced a more arbitration-friendly, pro-enforcement approach. That said, given the scale and diversity of India’s judicial system, some variations in application remain, highlighting the continued evolution of the country’s arbitration jurisprudence. The recent judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Gayatri Balasamy v ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited¹ addressed a significant issue under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, namely, whether Indian courts have the power to modify an arbitral award. The Court examined this question in the context of section 34 of the Act, which expressly permits courts to set aside an award on limited grounds but does not provide for modification. Drawing on the framework of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, the decision highlights the legislature’s intent to ensure minimal judicial intervention and promote efficient dispute resolution through arbitration, while clarifying the scope of judicial powers under the Act.

This article examines these divergent approaches by analysing key decisions from both jurisdictions. It argues that while both India and Singapore espouse pro-enforcement principles, their courts apply these principles differently in practice and that the gap, while narrowing, remains a material consideration for parties selecting a seat or enforcement forum.

The concept of public policy in award review

The public policy ground has historically been the most significant source of divergence between India and Singapore in arbitration enforcement. Under the New York Convention, courts may refuse recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award if enforcement would be contrary to the public policy of the enforcing state.² However, the Convention does not define the scope of public policy, leaving its content to be determined by domestic courts. The result is a doctrine that, across jurisdictions, ranges from the very narrow to the strikingly expansive.

Most arbitration-friendly jurisdictions construe this ground narrowly, limiting it to fundamental violations of justice or morality that would offend the most basic legal values of the enforcing state. Singapore follows this restrictive interpretation as a matter of settled judicial policy. India, historically, has adopted a substantially broader approach. One which, taken to its extreme, permitted courts to set aside awards for errors of law and contractual misinterpretation.

Singapore’s approach: narrow and predictable judicial intervention

Singapore courts have consistently adopted a strictly limited approach to reviewing arbitral awards, rooted in a clear institutional objective: maintaining Singapore’s position as a reliable and internationally respected arbitration hub.

A leading example is PT First Media TBK v Astro Nusantara International BV,³ where the Singapore Court of Appeal addressed the relationship between jurisdictional objections and enforcement proceedings. The Court emphasised that arbitration law must respect party autonomy and the finality of awards, holding that parties must raise jurisdictional objections promptly in arbitral proceedings rather than holding them in reserve for use at the enforcement stage.

The Court also articulated the “choice of remedies” principle: a party that fails to challenge an award at the seat of arbitration may still resist enforcement, but cannot use enforcement proceedings as a vehicle for a de facto appeal on the merits. Critically, the Court reiterated that national courts should not revisit the substantive reasoning of arbitral tribunals, even where the tribunal may have erred. This deferential stance reflects a judicial philosophy that treats the finality of the arbitral process as a value in itself.

Singapore courts have repeatedly stressed that arbitration would lose its utility if losing parties could routinely relitigate disputes before national courts. This has produced a body of jurisprudence that is notable for its consistency and predictability – qualities that are themselves commercially valuable to parties choosing a seat.

CBX v CBZ: limits of the public policy exception clarified

The decision of the Singapore International Commercial Court in CBX and another v CBZ and others⁴ provides a detailed and instructive illustration of how Singapore courts approach the limits of their supervisory jurisdiction. The case arose from a series of ICC arbitration proceedings concerning sale and purchase agreements for shares in a Thai company involved in wind farm development. Following two phases of arbitration, the claimants applied to set aside parts of the tribunal’s partial awards on three grounds: excess of jurisdiction, denial of natural justice and contravention of Singapore public policy.

Jurisdiction and natural justice: a party cannot withhold its own case

On the question of excess of jurisdiction, the plaintiffs argued that the tribunal had gone beyond the matters submitted to it by ordering payment of the “Remaining Amounts” due under Schedule 5 of the agreements, when (they said) this issue had never properly been placed before the tribunal. Reyes IJ rejected this argument, finding that payment of the Remaining Amounts had been squarely in issue throughout Phase II. The defendants had expressly pleaded, even if only as a subsidiary position, that those amounts would become due and payable by the expected time of the award.

Of broader significance was the court’s treatment of the plaintiffs’ related natural justice and unfair prejudice arguments. The plaintiffs contended that the Remaining Amounts Orders had prejudiced their position in a separate, subsequently commenced arbitration (the ALRO arbitration) in which they were arguing that a fundamental premise of the agreements had been vitiated by regulatory changes affecting Thai agricultural land, rendering payment of those amounts impossible. The court dismissed this argument on notably robust grounds.

Reyes IJ found that the plaintiffs had been given ample opportunity to raise their actual position on the Remaining Amounts during the Phase II hearing, including at the closing exchange when the tribunal had expressly drawn attention to the chief witness’s evidence that he intended to honour the payment obligations. The plaintiffs had not only failed to correct the tribunal’s understanding at that point but had, through counsel’s submissions and the witness’s evidence, actively reinforced it. All the relevant regulatory events said to have vitiated the payment conditions had occurred well before the substantive hearing, yet the plaintiffs had said nothing that would have put the tribunal on notice of their true position. As the court observed, a party cannot keep its arguments in reserve for use in other proceedings depending on the outcome of an existing arbitration.

The court drew on the Singapore Court of Appeal’s observation in AKN v ALC⁵ that, where a question is squarely in issue in an arbitration, a party must raise all its arguments on that question in those proceedings, absent special circumstances. Any prejudice flowing from the plaintiffs’ failure to do so was therefore of their own making and could not be attributed to the tribunal.

The public policy challenge: error of law is not enough

The most doctrinally significant part of the judgment concerns the public policy challenge to the Compound Interest Orders. The tribunal had awarded 15% interest compounded annually on the Remaining Amounts. By the time of Phase II, both parties’ Thai law experts had agreed that Thai law did not permit the contractual provision authorising compound interest to be enforced. The tribunal, through what the Correction Decision later described as a “regrettable oversight”, nevertheless awarded compound interest – having failed to appreciate the change in the parties’ positions and the effect of the revised expert evidence.

The plaintiffs argued that the Compound Interest Orders should be set aside as contrary to Singapore public policy because they contravened mandatory Thai law on public order and good morals, and that international comity required Singapore to decline to uphold them. Reyes IJ rejected this argument comprehensively. Drawing on the distinction in Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v Impregilo SpA⁶ between a tribunal purporting to exercise a power it does not have and one erroneously exercising a power it does have, the court held that the tribunal’s error fell squarely into the second category. Under Singapore’s International Arbitration Act, an arbitral tribunal has express statutory power to award compound interest.⁷ The tribunal had not exceeded its jurisdiction by doing so; it had simply applied that power incorrectly.

On the public policy argument, Reyes IJ drew a careful distinction between the concept of “public order” or ordre public under domestic Thai law and the narrower concept of “public policy” as used in the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law.⁸ The fact that the compound interest provision was unenforceable under Thai domestic law did not automatically mean that an award giving effect to it would be refused enforcement as a matter of public policy in international arbitration. An enforcing court would have to balance the demands of domestic public order against the international principle of finality of arbitral awards.

The court also declined to engage in reasoning backwards from a prediction about what a Thai court would do on enforcement. Outside of obvious criminality of the kind at issue in Soleimany v Soleimany⁹ (a case involving a smuggling contract), Singapore courts should not anticipate foreign enforcement outcomes and use those predictions as a basis for setting awards aside. The “palpable and indisputable illegality” threshold requires conduct of an obviously criminal nature. Since the parties had agreed to the interest provision in good faith, originally believing it compatible with Thai law, there was no criminality to condone.

Taken together, the two strands of the decision illustrate a consistent judicial philosophy. Singapore courts scrutinise setting-aside applications rigorously, but the scrutiny is directed at the integrity of the arbitral process rather than the substantive correctness of the tribunal’s conclusions. Procedural fairness matters; the right answer does not, at least not as a ground of review.

India’s expansive public policy doctrine: ONGC v Saw Pipes and its consequences

India’s arbitration jurisprudence developed against a different institutional backdrop. For much of the period following the enactment of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, Indian courts interpreted the public policy ground broadly, often treating the section 34 setting-aside procedure as a quasi-appellate jurisdiction over arbitral awards.

The foundational question of how broadly “public policy” should be construed had initially been addressed in Renusagar Power Co Ltd v General Electric Co,¹⁰ which gave the term a relatively narrow, three-limbed meaning in the context of enforcing foreign awards: an award violated public policy only if it was contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law, the interests of India or justice and morality. That framework, however, was developed to govern the enforcement of awards that had already attained finality, where international comity demanded a restrained approach.

The Supreme Court decisively departed from this framework in ONGC Ltd v Saw Pipes Ltd.¹¹ The Court reasoned that Renusagar had addressed the enforcement of a final, executable award; a fundamentally different exercise from a validity challenge under section 34. Accordingly, it added a fourth ground: an award could be set aside if it was patently illegal, meaning illegal in a manner going to the root of the matter. Patent illegality was understood to encompass violations of Indian law, errors apparent on the face of the award and findings inconsistent with the terms of the contract. In effect, this gave courts licence to scrutinise both the legal reasoning and the contractual interpretation adopted by the tribunal.

ONGC v Western Geco: expansionism reaches its height

The expansionist trajectory of Saw Pipes reached a high-water mark in the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in ONGC Ltd v Western Geco International Ltd.¹² The dispute arose from a contract awarded in 2000 for the technical upgradation of ONGC’s seismic survey vessel, the MV Sagar Sandhani. The contract required Western Geco to supply and install streamers fitted with hydrophones. The tender specifications had not stipulated the national origin of the hydrophones. When Western Geco subsequently communicated that it could not supply hydrophones of US origin as originally contemplated and sought to substitute an alternative, ONGC conditionally accepted the variation but purported to deduct liquidated damages for what it characterised as a breach. The arbitral tribunal held that ONGC was not entitled to make those deductions and directed that the withheld sums be refunded.

The Supreme Court set aside the award. In doing so it went considerably beyond the patent illegality ground as articulated in Saw Pipes. A three-judge bench held that the “fundamental policy of Indian law” (ie, one of the limbs of public policy inherited from Renusagar) was itself a broad and composite concept encompassing three distinct juristic principles.¹³ First, the tribunal was required to adopt a “judicial approach”: its decision-making had to be informed by reason and not be arbitrary. Second, it was bound to observe the principles of natural justice. Third, and most expansively, the tribunal was subject to the Wednesbury standard of rationality – a standard drawn from English administrative law – meaning that an award based on a finding that “no reasonable person could have arrived at” would contravene the fundamental policy of Indian law and could be set aside.

This was a dramatic expansion of judicial oversight. The Wednesbury irrationality limb in particular transformed the public policy ground into something closely resembling a full merits review: any award resting on a finding that a reasonable decision-maker could not have reached was now open to challenge. The court applied this standard to the tribunal’s factual and legal analysis of the liquidated damages deductions and, finding the reasoning insufficiently rational, overturned the award and allowed ONGC to retain the deducted sums.

The doctrinal consequences of Western Geco were significant and troubling. By importing Wednesbury rationality into the section 34 framework, the court had effectively blurred the line between supervisory review and appellate jurisdiction. A court exercising supervisory review asks whether the process was lawful; an appellate court asks whether the outcome was correct. The Wednesbury test, particularly as articulated by the Supreme Court, operated much closer to the latter. The resulting body of litigation, in which parties routinely characterised adverse factual and legal findings as “irrational” in order to invoke the public policy ground, was one of the direct catalysts for the Law Commission’s 246th Report and the 2015 legislative reforms that followed.¹⁴ Indeed, it was precisely the Western Geco expansion, alongside Saw Pipes and Associate Builders v Delhi Development Authority,¹⁵ that the 2015 amendments were specifically designed to address.

The cumulative effect on India’s reputation as an arbitration seat was significant. Parties, particularly foreign ones, became wary of Indian-seated arbitrations and the expansion of the public policy ground came to be seen as a structural impediment to India’s ambitions as a neutral dispute resolution forum.

India’s post-2015 reforms and the narrowing of Public Policy: Ssangyong and Gayatri Balasamy

Recognising the potential damage caused by excessive judicial intervention, the Indian Parliament undertook a comprehensive reform of the arbitration framework in 2015. The amendments were designed to reorient Indian arbitration law toward international norms, reduce delays in arbitral proceedings and, most significantly, constrain the scope of judicial review available under section 34.

The legislative response to Saw Pipes and Western Geco was direct. Explanation 1 to the amended section 34(2)(b) redefined the public policy ground in substantially more restrictive terms. An award would henceforth conflict with public policy only if it had been induced by fraud or corruption, was in contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian law, or was in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice. A further explanation made explicit that courts could not set aside an award merely because it involved an erroneous application of the law or because the court would have reached a different conclusion on the facts. This second explanation was a targeted legislative repudiation of the Wednesbury irrationality standard introduced in Western Geco: a court that considers the tribunal’s conclusion unreasonable or wrong on the facts is no longer entitled to interfere on that basis alone.

Critically, the patent illegality ground was not abolished but reconceived. It was preserved as a separate, standalone basis for challenge under the newly inserted section 34(2-A),¹⁶ but confined exclusively to domestic arbitrations. For international commercial arbitrations seated in India, patent illegality no longer provides any basis for setting aside an award. This was a deliberate legislative choice, reflecting a recognition that the standards applicable to domestic awards need not be imported into international proceedings.

The Supreme Court provided authoritative guidance on the effect of these amendments in Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co Ltd v National Highways Authority of India.¹⁷ The case arose from a construction contract under which NHAI had issued a circular unilaterally modifying the contractual formula for price adjustment. The majority arbitral tribunal upheld the application of the circular, relying in part on Ministry of Commerce guidelines that had never been placed on record and on which the appellant had been given no opportunity to comment.

The Court held the award invalid on two grounds. First, the tribunal’s reliance on undisclosed materials had denied the appellant a fair opportunity to present its case, engaging section 34(2)(a)(iii). Second, and of broader doctrinal significance, the tribunal had effectively rewritten the contract by substituting the agreed price formula with one derived from a circular the appellant had expressly rejected. The Court held that enforcing a unilateral alteration to a contract on an unwilling party violated the most basic notions of justice – a standard it emphasised was reserved for truly exceptional cases where the conscience of the court is genuinely shocked, not merely where the court disagrees with the tribunal’s analysis.

In addressing the Western Geco legacy specifically, the Court in Ssangyong made clear that the Wednesbury irrationality standard no longer forms part of the “fundamental policy of Indian law” concept under the amended Act. Post-amendment, a court cannot set aside an award merely on the basis that no reasonable person could have arrived at the tribunal’s conclusion. That ground of review has been expressly legislated away.

The recent decision of Gayatri Balasamy illustrates the continuing evolution of this framework. The Court was confronted with the question of whether a court exercising jurisdiction under section 34 may modify an arbitral award rather than confining itself strictly to setting aside the award. While the majority reaffirmed the general principle that judicial interference must remain limited and that courts should not lightly disturb arbitral outcomes, the decision recognised that in certain narrowly circumscribed situations a court may grant limited corrective relief where doing so would avoid the inefficiency of setting aside the award entirely and requiring the parties to recommence arbitral proceedings. The case therefore reflects the broader trajectory of Indian arbitration jurisprudence: an ongoing effort to balance the principle of arbitral finality with a pragmatic concern for procedural efficiency and substantive justice.

Taken together, these developments represent a meaningful and deliberate shift in India’s arbitration jurisprudence. The trajectory is clearly toward greater deference to arbitral tribunals and a narrower conception of the court’s supervisory role. However, this is not at the expense of substantive justice.

Comparing judicial philosophy: Singapore v India

A comparison of Singapore and Indian jurisprudence reveals three key and persisting differences in judicial approach.

Approach to contractual interpretation

Singapore courts consistently treat the tribunal’s interpretation of the contract as final, even where the court might have reached a different conclusion. The correctness of contractual interpretation is simply not a ground of review. Indian courts, despite post-2015 reforms, have historically been more willing to intervene where they consider the tribunal to have misread the agreement. While Ssangyong sought to arrest this tendency, traces of it persist in practice.

Scope of merits review

Singapore courts treat arbitral awards as final determinations of both fact and law, subject only to narrow procedural safeguards. CBX v CBZ exemplifies this: even where an error in the award was not seriously disputed, and even where foreign law rendered the relevant contractual provision unenforceable, the court declined to interfere. India’s post-2015 position is formally similar for international arbitrations, but the legacy of the Wednesbury rationality standard introduced by Western Geco – and its residual influence on lower court practice despite its legislative abrogation – continues to generate uncertainty.

Institutional objectives

Singapore’s arbitration jurisprudence reflects a clear and consistently applied policy goal: maintaining its status as a leading global arbitration hub by offering parties a reliable, final and commercially predictable process. India’s courts, while increasingly supportive of arbitration as a policy matter, have historically balanced this objective against a broader concern for the substantive correctness of legal outcomes.

Conclusion

Both India and Singapore publicly endorse a pro-enforcement approach to arbitration. Both jurisdictions are signatories to the New York Convention and courts in each regularly invoke the language of party autonomy, finality, and minimal curial intervention. However, their judicial practices reveal a significant and persistent divergence that goes beyond mere rhetoric.

Singapore courts maintain a consistently deferential stance, intervening only where fundamental procedural violations occur or where enforcement would offend core values of justice. The decision in CBX v CBZ reinforces this: even where an error in the award was not seriously disputed, and even where foreign law rendered the relevant contractual provision unenforceable, the court declined to interfere. The supervisory function is reserved for process, not outcome. This predictability has reinforced Singapore’s reputation and commercial attractiveness as an arbitration seat.

India presents a more complex picture. As while the majority opinion in Gayatri Balasamy reiterates the importance of minimal judicial interference in arbitration, the decision simultaneously brings to the fore the continuing debate regarding the precise contours of judicial intervention under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. The judgment reflects the broader judicial intent to align India’s arbitration regime with internationally accepted standards. At the same time, the decision underscores that while the policy orientation toward minimal intervention is well recognised, its practical application across cases must consistently reflect that objective. The debate also reveals a competing school of thought: that in certain limited circumstances, a carefully calibrated degree of judicial intervention, such as addressing manifest errors or ensuring procedural fairness may in fact serve the broader goal of delivering timely and equitable justice without forcing parties into prolonged re-arbitration or fresh proceedings.

From the perspective of India’s evolving arbitration jurisprudence, the decision therefore highlights both progress and continuing development in the country’s pro-enforcement framework. It also raises the possibility that targeted legislative clarification, particularly on whether and to what extent courts may modify an arbitral award could further harmonise the objectives of arbitral finality, efficiency and judicial oversight in exceptional cases.

From a practitioner’s standpoint, it bears remembering that arbitration is ultimately a human process. Arbitrators, like judges, may occasionally get things wrong. A carefully calibrated degree of judicial supervision, such as that contemplated in certain strands of Indian jurisprudence, is therefore not necessarily inconsistent with a pro-arbitration framework. In appropriate cases, limited judicial oversight may serve a corrective function that enhances the legitimacy and reliability of the arbitral process rather than undermining it.

Ultimately, the divergence between India and Singapore may be understood less as a conflict of philosophy and more as a difference in institutional calibration. Both jurisdictions remain broadly committed to the enforcement of arbitral awards, even if they pursue that objective through slightly different judicial approaches.

Footnotes

1 2025 INSC 605 (Supreme Court of India).

2 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958, article V(2)(b).

3 [2014] 1 SLR 372 (Singapore Court of Appeal).

4 [2020] SGHC(I) 17 (Singapore International Commercial Court).

5 [2016] 1 SLR 966, [59] (Singapore Court of Appeal).

6 [2006] 1 AC 221, [24] (Lord Steyn).

7 International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed) (Singapore), sections 12(5)(b) and 20.

8 PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA [2007] 1 SLR(R) 597, [59].

9 [1999] QB 785 (English Court of Appeal).

10 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644.

11 ONGC Ltd v Saw Pipes Ltd (2003) 5 SCC 705 (Supreme Court of India).

12 (2014) 9 SCC 263 (Supreme Court of India).

13 Amit Kumar Kashyap and Kanya Saluja, “Judicial Review of Arbitral Award: A Policy Review on Delimitation of Patent Illegality in India” (2022) 8(24) Law and World 8, citing Western Geco at paragraphs 34, 35, 38 and 39.

14 Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act 2015 (India).

15 Associate Builders v Delhi Development Authority (2015) 3 SCC 49 (Supreme Court of India).

16 Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (India), s 34(2-A), inserted by the 2015 Amendment.

17 Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co Ltd v National Highways Authority of India [2019] SCC OnLine SC 677.

Originally published by Global Arbitration Review: The Asia-Pacific Arbitration Review 2027, 14 May 2026