The plight of schools has been a major concern throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. Initially, stakeholders constantly weighed the ills of remote learning versus the risk of spreading the virus. More recently, public policy has turned its attention to the COVID vaccines. In particular, Ontario now requires school boards to implement a vaccine policy that is subject to provincially imposed minimum standards. For school boards, this de facto mandate has undoubtedly mitigated a contentious issue. As will be discussed, mandates from the government provide better indemnity than ones imposed by an employer. However, even government vaccine mandates, including the concomitant indemnity they provide school boards, are not foolproof. Correspondingly, this article explores the limiting principles that govern a provincial vaccine mandate. It also attempts to gauge the degree of "legal immunity" the current regime provides, and to what extent school boards may expect it to withstand legal challenge. Similarly, the article considers the degree of indemnity school boards will receive when they are directed by their local public health units to impose a vaccine mandate that is more stringent than the provincial mandate in place. Lastly, the article offers a précis of the statutory and common law hurdles that would likely plague a COVID- or vaccine-injury-based claim for damages.

Le sort des écoles a été une préoccupation majeure tout au long de la pandémie de COVID-19. Au départ, les parties prenantes ont constamment pesé les maux de l'apprentissage à distance par rapport au risque de propagation du virus. Plus récemment, la politique publique a tourné son attention vers les vaccins COVID. En particulier, l'Ontario exige désormais des conseils scolaires qu'ils mettent en Suvre *2 une politique de vaccination assujettie à des normes minimales imposées par la province. Pour les commissions scolaires, ce mandat de facto a sans aucun doute atténué une question litigieuse. Comme nous le verrons, les mandats du gouvernement offrent une meilleure indemnité que ceux imposés par un employeur. Cependant, même les mandats gouvernementaux en matière de vaccins, y compris l'indemnité concomitante qu'ils offrent aux conseils scolaires, ne sont pas infaillibles. En conséquence, cet article explore les principes limitatifs qui régissent un mandat provincial en matière de vaccins. Il tente également d'évaluer le degré d'<< immunité juridique >> offert par le régime actuel et dans quelle mesure les conseils scolaires peuvent s'attendre à ce qu'il résiste à une contestation judiciaire. De même, l'article examine le degré d'indemnisation que les conseils scolaires recevront lorsqu'ils seront dirigés par leurs bureaux de santé publique locaux pour imposer un mandat de vaccination plus strict que le mandat provincial en place. Enfin, l'article propose un résumé des obstacles statutaires et de common law qui entraveraient probablement une demande de dommages-intérêts basée sur le COVID ou le vaccin.

Though nothing can be immortall, which mortals make; yet, if men had the use of reason they pretend to, their Common-wealths might be secured, at least, from perishing by internall diseases.

--Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan


In September 2021, students in Ontario returned to in-person learning after COVID-19 had forced the closure of schools.1 School boards, like countless employers throughout Canada, have grappled with different policy options to safely reopen their doors.2 However, by virtue of September 2021 instructions issued by the provincial Chief Medical Officer of Health ("CMOH"), Ontario school boards, unlike many other employers, have effectively had the controversial mandatory vaccine issue decided for them. The instructions outline minimum standards for a given school board's mandate. Essentially, child- facing staff must get vaccinated, provide a valid medical exemption, or attend an educational session about vaccines. Moreover, staff relying on the latter two options must undergo weekly antigen tests.

*3 For many school boards, the instructions come as a blessing. There are two obvious benefits to having board employees vaccinated. First, according to provincial health experts, "vaccines reduce COVID-19 transmission, either by preventing infection by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARSCoV-2), or by reducing the incidence of symptomatic and asymptomatic disease."3 Of equal, if not greater importance, the instructions will likely indemnify boards from vaccine-related grievances. However, the scope, as well as the origin of a provincial vaccine mandate, invariably influences whether it will pass judicial scrutiny. Put another way, how a mandate comes into being will determine whether it provides lasting indemnity for Ontario's school boards.

Therefore, to add a fresh perspective to the vaccine-mandate conversation, this article will examine the degree of protection Ontario's school boards may anticipate from the current provincial mandate, as compared to or in conjunction with a mandate imposed by a public health official. The article will also explore COVID-related liability for boards considering a supplementary mandate of their own.


On September 7, 2021, the CMOH provided rules stating that every "covered organization," which includes school boards as defined by the Education Act,4 "must establish, implement, and ensure compliance with a COVID-19 vaccination policy requiring"

  1. proof of full vaccination against COVID-19; or
  2. written proof of a medical reason, provided by a physician or registered nurse in the extended class that sets out: (i) a documented medical reason for not being fully vaccinated against COVID-19, and (ii) the effective time-period for the medical reason; or
  3. prior to declining vaccination for any reason other than a medical reason, proof of completing an educational session about the benefits of COVID-19 vaccination .... The approved session must, at minimum, address:
    1. how COVID-19 vaccines work;
    2. vaccine safety related to the development of the COVID-19 vaccines;
    3. the benefits of vaccination against COVID-19;
    4. risks of not being vaccinated against COVID-19; and
    5. *4 possible side effects of COVID-19 vaccination.5

Importantly, this policy is applicable only to child-facing staff. Moreover, section 2 of the instructions specifies that individuals who are required to get vaccinated and opt to rely on a medical or educational session exemption must undergo weekly testing.

Put simply, Ontario wants school board employees vaccinated. At the same time, the province's mandate provides an alternative mechanism for employees incapable of, or uninterested in, receiving the COVID vaccine. For school boards, this vaccine mandate provides a wellspring of indemnity. Unlike an internally imposed mandate, a vaccine mandate that comes from the province, either legislatively or through a public health order, is better suited to indemnification of school boards from litigation initiated by unionized employees who remain unvaccinated. As articulated by Member Goodfellow in the Ontario arbitration decision of North Bay General Hospital v. C.U.P.E., Local 139,6

It is trite law that obligations imposed by a collective agreement are subordinate, and must give way, to the terms of a statute and its regulations. The fact that the statute law may be subject to a constitutional challenge, that the challenge may have merit, that other employers in the province may have chosen (or felt operationally compelled) not to comply with the law, that non-compliance with the law, in the circumstances, may not have raised any substantial concerns or consequences for the party to whom it applies (in this case, the Hospital) or the public, and any of the many other factors relied on by the Union, are [sic] irrelevant.7

Moreover, other recent labour arbitration decisions reflect the inherent uncertainty that is endemic to internal COVID vaccine mandates. On the one hand, Arbitrator Von Veh had no problem upholding a strict COVID vaccine mandate (human rights codes-based exemptions only) in UFCW, Local 333 and Paragon Protection Ltd. (Covid-19 Vaccination Policy), Re.8 Most notably, the collective agreement in this grievance had previously established that employees must get vaccinated if inoculation was required to access worksites. Furthermore, the employees in question were security guards who were regularly contracted to work at sites that had their own COVID vaccine requirements in place. Unsurprisingly, the employer's mandate was considered reasonable. On the other hand, in E Electrical Safety Authority and Power *5 Workers' Union (ESA-P-24), Re,9 the union successfully challenged an employer's vaccine policy. In this decision, Arbitrator Stout found the policy unreasonable because the majority of the work had been effectively transitioned to remote work, the vast majority of the employees were vaccinated, the employer's previous policy of having regular testing as an alternative to vaccination was sufficient, and unvaccinated employees were not significantly interfering with the company's business.

Taken together, these two decisions show that an internal mandate's validity is subject to the requirements of the job, the terms of the collective agreement, and the surrounding general circumstances. As Arbitrator Stout observed in ESA, "It must also be noted that circumstances at play may not always be static. The one thing we have learned about this pandemic is that the situation is fluid and continuing to evolve. What may have been unreasonable at one point in time is no longer unreasonable at a later point in time and vice versa."10 Such a pronouncement, while understandable, hardly provides clear guidance for school boards. The greater certainty afforded by regulations (compared to collective agreements) likely explains why the president of the Ontario Public School Boards' Association sent Premier Ford a letter on August 13, 2021, requesting that the province impose a vaccine mandate on public school staff.11

That said, legislative mandates cannot be carelessly imposed on employees. After all, the province must take countervailing interests into consideration (e.g., bodily autonomy, accommodation, privacy, alternative safety measures, etc.). The following sections will explore principles that may limit vaccine mandates imposed by the province or a public health official, with a mind to determining whether the current mandate falls within the permissible range of such possible limitations, and whether a supplementary mandate imposed by a local health unit would similarly fall within it.

(a) Vaccine Mandates and Paramedics

Paramedics are a prime example of unionized workers who have been subject to a legislative vaccine mandate. Section 6(1)(h) of O. Reg. 257/00 provides that

[a]n emergency medical attendant and paramedic employed, or engaged as a volunteer, in a land ambulance service shall, hold a valid certificate signed by a physician that states that the person is immunized against diseases listed in Table 1 to the document entitled "Ambulance Service *6 Communicable Disease Standards", published by the Ministry, as that document may be amended from time to time, or that such immunization is contra-indicated.12

The jurisprudence specifically dealing with the province's authority to require this mandate is sparse. However, Kotsopoulos v. North Bay General Hospital13 provides some insight. In this case, a paramedic who was fired because he was unvaccinated for influenza sought an interlocutory injunction reinstating him to his position with the respondent hospital.14 Justice Karam framed the case as "whether the [influenza vaccine] requirement creates a Charter breach."15 However, because this was an injunction application rather than a formal challenge under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,16 Justice Karam subjected the applicant's claim to the RJR-MacDonald test.17 Importantly, the third step of the test--whether granting the injunction would create a greater inconvenience for the applicant or the respondent--was, ab initio, tilted in favour of the provincial intervener. As observed by the court, "In the case of a public authority, the onus of demonstrating irreparable harm to the public interest is less than that of a private applicant."18 In coming to his decision to deny the injunction, Justice Karan remarked that he was

satisfied on the basis of the evidence provided to [him], that influenza is an extremely infectious disease, often leading to hospitalization and death. It is particularly dangerous to the elderly. There is no question that paramedics in the course of their duties are often confronted with health situations involving the elderly. This regulation is clearly designed for no other purpose than to control the disease by taking steps to control its spread. Influenza vaccine is the primary defence in preventing its spread. Immunizing health care workers is one step in that direction.19

However, the court fell short of an unqualified endorsement of vaccine mandates:

*7 The real issue is whether the applicant should be required, against his wishes, to expose himself to immunization, in the interests of what the Province sees as the necessity to protect the public. Whether the legislation can be justified on the basis that it intrudes upon the rights of an individual not to have substances introduced into his body against his will is a very important issue, but not one that can properly be dealt with on an interlocutory application.20

Although provincially imposed COVID vaccine mandates for school boards are somewhat distinguishable, the Kotsopoulos decision is nonetheless revealing. The Superior Court upheld the government's authority to mandate the influenza vaccine despite this regulation's stark incongruities. As the applicant pointed out, no other medical, emergency, or critical care personnel were required by statute or regulation to obtain a flu shot. Moreover, the applicant paramedic had three unvaccinated colleagues who were permitted to work around elderly patients because the influenza vaccine was deemed medically contra-indicated given the paramedics' health situations.21 While acknowledging that an in-depth hearing was the appropriate forum to hear the constitutionality of the regulation, the court remained unwilling to reinstate the applicant as it "would clearly interfere with the approach that has been adopted toward universal immunization."22 Put another way, the Superior Court saw the mandate as a public good with an admirable goal. As such, the court forgave the regulation's myriad inconsistencies and ultimately found that the government's objective trumped the inconvenience of the individual paramedic. One can fairly assume that similar rationales would come into play if a unionized teacher attempted to challenge the current provincial mandate.

(b) Vaccine Mandates and the Charter

Although predicting the future is typically a fool's errand, especially in the case of future litigation, it is certainly plausible that someone will challenge COVID vaccine mandates under section 7 or 2(a) of the Charter.23 The former, which provides "the right to life, liberty and security of the person," is the section on which the applicant in Kotsopoulos intended to rely.24 The latter section provides "freedom of conscience and religion." Freedom of conscious is a particularly attractive argument for Charter applicants considering the broad definition that courts have historically given it. For example, in the Supreme Court of Canada's judgment in R. v. Videoflicks Ltd., Chief Justice Dickson stated that the purpose of section 2(a) is "to ensure that society does not interfere with profoundly personal beliefs that govern one's perception of oneself, *8 humankind, nature, and, in some cases, a higher or different order of being. These beliefs, in turn, govern one's conduct and practices."25 In Syndicat Northcrest c. Amselem, the Court further emphasized the subjective component of section 2(a) by explaining that

[t]he emphasis then is on personal choice of religious beliefs. In my opinion, these decisions and commentary should not be construed to imply that freedom of religion protects only those aspects of religious belief or conduct that are objectively recognized by religious experts as being obligatory tenets or precepts of a particular religion. Consequently, claimants seeking to invoke freedom of religion should not need to prove the objective validity of their beliefs in that their beliefs are objectively recognized as valid by other members of the same religion, nor is such an inquiry appropriate for courts to make.26

Put another way, courts will give much deference toward individuals who strongly profess a particular religious belief. Therefore, a sincere disinclination to get the CVOID vaccine couched in religious belief may constitute a breach of section 2(a).

However, even a compelling section 2(a) challenge is still subject to analysis under the Oakes test. As summarized in Halsbury's Laws of Canada,

The accepted test for justification under s. 1 is the Oakes test. The Oakes test has two parts. First, it requires that the objective pursued by the limit be of sufficient importance as to warrant overriding the right. Second, the limit must be proportionate, which has three aspects: there must be a rational connection between the measures containing the limit and the objective pursued; the degree of infringement must be minimal; and there must be an overall proportionality between the deleterious and salutary effects of the measure.27

The Oakes test has been judicially considered thousands of times. However, it might be helpful to think of it less as a test and more of a broad consideration of whether a particular piece of legislation properly balances individual rights with *9 societal interests. As Justice LeBel pointed out in dissent in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v. Alberta,

In order to determine whether the measure falls within a range of reasonable options, courts must weigh the purpose against the extent of the infringement. They must look at the range of options that are available within the bounds of a democratic Constitution. A deeper analysis of the purpose is in order at this stage of the proportionality analysis. The stated objective is not an absolute and should not be treated as a given. Moreover, alternative solutions should not be evaluated on a standard of maximal consistency with the stated objective. An alternative measure might be legitimate even if the objective could no longer be obtained in its complete integrity. At this stage of the proportionality analysis, the overall objective of the s. 1 analysis remains constant: to preserve constitutional rights, by looking for a solution that will reach a better balance, even if it demands a more restricted understanding of the scope and efficacy of the objectives of the measure. In this sense, courts must execute a holistic proportionality analysis with different legal and analytical components, which remain tightly woven.28

It is clear that, in a holistic analysis, courts will take COVID (i.e., societal interests) seriously. For example, in Spencer v. Canada (Health),29 the federal government's previous quarantine requirement of having international travellers stay in a "COVID hotel" were not found to breach the Charter. It should be noted, however, that the manner in which the requirements were carried out in this case, specifically, failing to inform the applicant where the COVID hotel was located, did result in a Charter breach.30 Superficially, Spencer indicates that a section 1 analysis on the issue of a COVID vaccine mandate may tilt in favour of the government. At the same time, there is arguably a temporal element to the analysis. A mandate's reasonableness will wax or wane in concert with the pandemic itself. In other words, the issues of hospital capacity, the severity of COVID's health consequences, the extent to which a mandate violates someone's beliefs, and the relative threat that the unvaccinated pose to society, at any given time, may all influence whether a policy is considered a justified Charter breach. As such, a material change in those and other relevant factors at the time of the section 1 analysis will certainly affect the analysis and possibly determine the outcome.

*10 In summary, it is not guaranteed that the court's decision in Kotsopoulos would have been the same under a constitutional (as opposed to an administrative law) analysis. However, one may still reasonably conclude that the Superior Court would have readily recognized the public good of stopping a disease that is "particularly dangerous to the elderly." Moreover, there is a clear judicial willingness to uphold a legislative mandate, even if the regulation itself is flawed and the inconvenience imposed on the unvaccinated individual is substantial. There is also some support for the proposition that a COVID precaution that breaches the Charter may well be justifiable under the Oakes test given the magnitude of the public interests at stake. On the other hand, a COVID vaccine mandate that remains in place after the pandemic no longer necessitates that the unvaccinated regularly test themselves may encounter a section 2(a) challenge that will not be defeated by section 1.

(c) Mandates and School Pupils

Notwithstanding COVID's absence from the Immunization of School Pupils Act,31 judicial attitudes toward the province's use of the ISPA reveal a bench that is quite sympathetic to vaccine mandates as a means of safeguarding public health.32 In particular, section 3(1) of the Act requires parents to immunize their children against specific diseases designated by the province. Although exemptions based on religious/conscientious belief and medical grounds may be granted, a medical officer of health may override them. Indeed, a provincial medical officer may order a school operator to exclude unvaccinated pupils from its school(s) if there is an outbreak of a designated disease, an immediate risk of an outbreak of a designated disease, or the parents have failed to properly file the exemption on which they rely.33

It is important to note that courts are loath to recognize exceptions other than those delineated in the ISPA. For example, in the family law case of Di Serio v. Di Serio,34 the father had "the right to participate in all the major decision making for matters regarding the health, education, religious and other extra-curricular activities regarding the children."35 Despite this right, the court rejected the father's opposition to vaccinating his children against the designated *11 diseases listed in the ISPA. In particular, the court found none of the ISPA's exemptions were available to the father because his "opposition to immunizations [was] couched exclusively in terms of health concerns and his view of what [was] in the children's best interests. There [was] not a hint of religious, conscientious, moral or even philosophical opposition to immunizations."36 Judicial reluctance to undermine the public policy thrust of the ISPA is also reflected in Justice Harper's comment in G. (C.M.) v. S. (D.W.)37 that "[e]ven with the exemption, the emphasis [of the ISPA] is on prevention by vaccination of disease outbreak."38 As such, mandates that emphasize vaccination as a means of prevention will not easily give rise to interpretations that seek to circumvent the mandate by a broad reading of its exceptions.

(d) Concluding Thoughts on the Government's Ability to Impose Vaccine Mandates

As demonstrated above, Ontario has taken an active approach with regard to vaccinating paramedics and school children. Notably, there are other examples of provincially imposed vaccine mandates; however, they have more limited relevance to the focus of this article.39 The case law discussed thus far should alert school boards to the fact that courts will respect legislative vaccine mandates that seek to prevent disease outbreak and protect the vulnerable. However, even if it can be assumed a mandate passes Charter scrutiny, care must be taken to also ensure its modes of execution do so as well. Lastly, to the extent that the legislature carves out exemptions for the unvaccinated, the courts are unlikely to engage in an overly broad reading of them.

Hence, it is almost certain that the discussed provincial vaccine mandate falls within legally acceptable parameters. Undoubtedly, the mandate's intention is the reduction of COVID, as well as the protection of the vulnerable. Moreover, staff disinclined to get jabbed still have the option to submit to regular antigen testing. As such, the likelihood that a court would strike down such a mandate, especially as dangerous variants of COVID continue to arise and spread, is minimal.

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1. Ontario, COVID-19: health and safety measures at schools, online: ( measures-schools?gclid=CjwKCAjw64eJBhAGEiwABr9o2FWqubUs0Vbg3vNO- rsZx7_tRGBGqG3t62_2_faqm5mVKxoCYaYQAvD_BwE&gclsrc=aw.ds).

2. Schools, as well as many other employers, are not subject to the September 2021 vaccine certificate requirement: see Ontario, News Release, "Ontario to Require Proof of Vaccination in Select Settings" (1 September 2021) online: (

3. Ontario, Ministry of Health, COVID-19 Fully Vaccinated Individuals: Case, Contact and Outbreak Management Interim Guidance, Version 3.0 (12 October 2021) online: ( at 3.

4. R.S.O. 1990, c. E.2.

5. Ontario, Ministry of Health, Instructions issued by the Office of the Chief Medical Officer of Health (7 September 2021) online: (

6. 2003 CarswellOnt 5963, 122 L.A.C. (4th) 366, [2003] O.L.A.A. No. 580 (Ont. Arb.).

7. Ibid. at para. 36.

8. UFCW, Local 333 and Paragon Protection Ltd. (Covid-19 Vaccination Policy), Re, 2021 CarswellOnt 16048 (Ont. Arb.) [Paragon].

9. Electrical Safety Authority and Power Workers' Union (ESA-P-24), Re, 2021 CarswellOnt 18219 (Ont. Arb.), additional reasons 2022 CarswellOnt 395 (Ont. Arb.) [ESA], online: (

10. Ibid. at para. 19.

11. Jeffrey Allen, "Ontario school boards call on province to institute mandatory COVID-19 vaccinations for staff", (13 August 2021) online: ( staff/).

12. See Ontario, Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Emergency Health Services Branch, Ambulance Service Communicable Disease Standards, Version 2.0 (1 August 2015) online: [emphasis added].

13. 2002 CarswellOnt 693, [2002] O.J. No. 715 (Ont. S.C.J.).

14. Ibid. at para. 1.

15. Ibid. at para. 11.

16. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].

17. Above note 13 at para. 13 citing RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1994 CarswellQue 120F, 1994 CarswellQue 120, EYB 1994-28671, 54 C.P.R. (3d) 114, 111 D.L.R. (4th) 385, (sub nom. RJR-MacDonald Inc. c. Canada (Procureur général))

164 N.R. 1, 60 Q.A.C. 241, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, [1994] A.C.S. No. 17, [1994] S.C.J. No. 17 (S.C.C.) [RJR-MacDonald].

18. Above note 13 at para. 19 quoting RJR-MacDonald, above note 17 at para. 76.

19. Above note 13 at para. 21 [emphasis added].

20. Ibid. at para. 22 [emphasis added].

21. Ibid. at para. 23.

22. Ibid. at para. 26.

23. Above note 16.

24. Above note 13 at para. 5.

25. 1986 CarswellOnt 1012, 1986 CarswellOnt 141, EYB 1986-67595, 58 O.R. (2d) 442 (note), 30 C.C.C. (3d) 385, 55 C.R. (3d) 193, 35 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 87 C.L.L.C. 14,001, 28 C.R.R. 1, 71 N.R. 161, 19 O.A.C. 239, (sub nom. R. v. Edwards Books Art Ltd.) [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, [1986] S.C.J. No. 70 (S.C.C.) at para. 98 [emphasis added].

26. 2004 CSC 47, 2004 SCC 47, 2004 CarswellQue 1543, 2004 CarswellQue 1544, REJB 2004-66513, (sub nom. Syndicat Northcrest Amselem) 241 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 28 R.P.R. (4th) 1, 121 C.R.R. (2d) 189, 323 N.R. 59, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46 (S.C.C.) at para. 43 [emphasis added].

27. See Halsbury's Laws of Canada - Constitutional Law (Charter of Rights) (2019 Reissue) (Newman) III. Limitation of Rights 3. Reasonable Limits: The Oakes Test citing R. v. Oakes, 1986 CarswellOnt 95, 1986 CarswellOnt 1001, EYB 1986-67556, 53 O.R. (2d) 719 (note), 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 50 C.R. (3d) 1, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200, 19 C.R.R. 308, 65 N.R. 87, 14 O.A.C. 335, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7 (S.C.C.).

28. 2009 SCC 37, 2009 CarswellAlta 1094, 2009 CarswellAlta 1095, 460 A.R. 1, 9 Alta. L.R. (5th) 1, 310 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 81 M.V.R. (5th) 1, [2009] 9 W.W.R. 189, 194 C.R.R. (2d) 12, 390 N.R. 202, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567, 462 W.A.C. 1, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37 (S.C.C.) at para. 195 [emphasis added].

29. 2021 FC 621, 2021 CarswellNat 6605, 2021 CarswellNat 2124 (F.C.), additional reasons 2021 CarswellNat 5843 (F.C.).

30. Ibid. at paras. 180-187.

31. R.S.O. 1990, c. I.1 [ISPA].

32. See Eric M. Roher, "Ontario won't require student immunization against COVID-19", BLG Education Law Newsletter (Fall 2021); see also "Ontario won't include COVID-19 on list of mandatory immunizations, top doctor confirms", CBC News (28 October 2021) online: (,Ontario%20will%C20not%C20require%C20students%C20to%20-be%20vaccinated%20against%C20COVID,the%C20province's%C20top%C20doctor%20-say).

33. ISPA, above note 31, s. 12.

34. 2002 CarswellOnt 1963, 27 R.F.L. (5th) 38, [2002] O.T.C. 406, [2002] O.J. No. 5341 (Ont. S.C.J.).

35. Ibid. at para. 2.

36. Ibid. at para. 13.

37. 2015 ONSC 2201, 2015 CarswellOnt 5328, 58 R.F.L. (7th) 376, [2015] O.J. No. 1840 (Ont. S.C.J.).

38. Ibid. at para. 104.

39. See s. 57 of O. Reg. 137/15 under the Child Care and Early Years Act, 2014, S.O. 2014, c. 11, Schedule 1. See also s. 229(10) of O. Reg. 79/10 under the Long-Term Care Homes Act, S.O. 2007, c. 8. Arguably this falls short of an absolute mandate. The provision is as follows: "There must be a staff immunization program in accordance with evidence-based practices and, if there are none, in accordance with prevailing practices." As there is no caselaw interpretation, it is difficult to say what this means in practice.

Originally published by Thomson Reuters Canada Limited.

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