ARTICLE
2 October 2025

Junk Fees, Choice Of Law, And The Limits Of Chapter 93A: Mulani v. Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc.

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Greenberg Traurig, LLP

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On Sept. 23, 2025, Judge Mark Mastroianni of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued a decision in Mulani v. Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc., dismissing...
United States Massachusetts New York Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration

On Sept. 23, 2025, Judge Mark Mastroianni of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued a decision in Mulani v. Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc., dismissing all claims—including a Massachusetts Chapter 93A claim—in a proposed class action challenging alleged “junk fees” in online bus ticket sales. The opinion offers a clear reminder that while Chapter 93A remains a powerful tool for Massachusetts consumers, its reach does not extend without limit to transactions centered in other states.

Plaintiff Dinesh Mulani attempted to purchase bus tickets online through Peter Pan's website. Initially, the site advertised tickets at $11 each, but as he proceeded to checkout, additional “transaction fees” appeared, raising the total cost by $14. Mulani alleged that these hidden charges—classic “drip pricing”—violated multiple legal theories, including breach of contract, unjust enrichment, New York consumer protection statutes, and Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A. The plaintiffs sought to represent both a nationwide class and a New York subclass.

At the heart of the case was whether Mulani, a New York resident who bought tickets in New York for a trip departing from New York, could rely on Chapter 93A. The court began its analysis by recognizing that Chapter 93A and New York's General Business Law § 349 are not interchangeable. The statutes differ both in scope (Chapter 93A covers a broader range of unfair or unethical conduct) and in remedies (93A allows treble damages without a statutory cap, while New York caps treble damages at $1,000). That divergence created a “true conflict” of law.

Applying Massachusetts' functional choice-of-law approach and the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 148(2), the court weighed six factors, including where the misrepresentation was received, where reliance occurred, and where the parties were located, as follows:

  1. Mulani saw the ticket price in New York.
  2. He relied on the alleged misrepresentation in New York.
  3. The trip originated in New York.
  4. Payment was made in New York.
  5. Peter Pan is headquartered in Massachusetts and arguably made the misrepresentation in Massachusetts, but the court gave less weight to this factor in the context of internet transactions.

On balance, New York—not Massachusetts—had the “more significant relationship” to the dispute. The court emphasized that while Chapter 93A has no explicit territorial limits in its text, Massachusetts choice-of-law rules prevent its wholesale application to out-of-state transactions. In doing so, the opinion aligned with an “unbroken string” of cases declining to extend Chapter 93A to non-Massachusetts plaintiffs when another state's consumer protection law more directly governs the transaction. Accordingly, the court entered judgment on the pleadings for Peter Pan on Mulani's Chapter 93A claim.

Practitioner Takeaways

The decision underscores several key takeaways for practitioners:

  1. 93A Is Not Universal: Even though Chapter 93A is broad, federal courts applying Massachusetts choice-of-law rules frequently limit its application to consumers with a meaningful connection to Massachusetts. Plaintiffs from other states must often rely on their own state's statutes.
  2. Early Resolution of Choice-of-Law: Plaintiff argued that it was premature to conduct a choice-of-law analysis at the pleadings stage. The court disagreed, noting that where the complaint itself makes the relevant facts clear, courts may resolve choice-of-law questions on a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings.
  3. Multi-State Class Actions May Face Hurdles: For plaintiffs' class-action counsel, the case is another warning sign that nationwide class actions premised on Chapter 93A may not survive without strong ties to Massachusetts. Defense counsel, conversely, may consider leaning heavily on the Restatement § 148 framework to push for dismissal at the outset.

This case arrives amid heightened scrutiny of “junk fees” and “drip pricing” practices, both from regulators like the FTC and from private litigants. As we  noted in a prior post, the Massachusetts attorney general has adopted regulations concerning junk fees—violation of which may at least violate Chapter 93A, Section 2. For businesses, the case is an important reminder: location matters. Where the consumer interacts with the company—and not just where the company is headquartered—may determine which consumer protection statutes apply and whether treble damages under Chapter 93A are on the table.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

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