Key Takeaways
- President Trump signed four executive orders designed to speed up the approval processes for new nuclear reactors and to remove other barriers to developing the domestic supply of nuclear energy.
- One EO boosts domestic uranium conversion and enrichment to cut reliance on foreign sources and expands the nuclear energy workforce.
- Another EO mentions establishing a program to use nuclear energy in military installations and approve advanced reactors for critical infrastructure, such as artificial intelligence and data centers.
- The president's EOs emphasize expanding the nuclear fleet and could influence pending litigation against the Nuclear Regulatory Commission aimed at some of the same impediments.
President Donald Trump signed four executive orders (EOs) on May 23, 2025, related to nuclear energy—three of which seek to expedite approval processes for permitting new nuclear reactors. The EOs collectively aim to harness the resources of executive agencies and restrain their regulatory reach. Despite long-standing interest in nuclear energy as a reliable and emissions-free source of energy, the pace of both licensing new reactors and regulatory reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) has lagged, and supply chain interventions have failed. The NRC's process has delayed the anticipated deployment of advanced reactor technologies, such as small modular reactors (SMRs), frustrating the industry. The issuance of the EOs comes as litigation from both proponents and opponents of nuclear energy proceeds in federal courts, and the EOs are likely to be cited by litigants eager to bypass the NRC's normal (and cumbersome) channels for license approvals or regulatory reform by asking courts to streamline the process for approving new reactors.
Overview
The first EO, "Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission," seeks to reform the Commission, which is made up of five presidentially appointed members with staggered five-year terms.1 The EO criticizes the NRC's current process for authorizing and constructing nuclear reactors (stating that it has licensed few reactors between 1978 and today, during which only two reactors have gone into commercial operation) and characterizes the current NRC approach as excessively risk-averse.2 The EO seeks to reestablish the United States as a leader in nuclear energy by reforming the culture of, structure of, and regulations governing the NRC to facilitate "expeditious processing of licensing applications and the adoption of innovative technology."3 The EO directs the NRC to work with the Department of Organizational Efficiency (DOGE) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to revise NRC's regulations and guidance documents, with final regulations and guidance due within 18 months, and to undertake reductions in force at the agency. It further directs the NRC to revise its regulations under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in consultation with the Council on Environmental Quality.
In a second EO, "Reinvigorating the Nuclear Industrial Base," the president declared it the policy of the United States to "expedite and promote to the fullest possible extent the production and operation of nuclear energy."4 The EO recognizes that "the Nation's nuclear fuel cycle infrastructure has severely atrophied, leaving the United States heavily dependent on foreign sources of uranium as well as uranium enrichment and conversion services." Among the many initiatives in the EO, the secretary of energy is directed to work with the chair of the NRC and director of OMB to develop a plan to expand domestic uranium conversion capacity and enrichment capabilities sufficient to meet projected civilian and defense reactor needs for low enriched uranium; high enriched uranium; and high assay, low enriched uranium (HALEU).5 The EO also seeks to expand the nuclear energy workforce by increasing participation in nuclear-energy-related registered apprenticeships and career and technical education programs.6
In his third EO, "Deploying Advanced Nuclear Reactor Technologies for National Security," the president directs the secretary of defense to establish a program for utilization of nuclear energy ("installation energy" and "operational energy").7 The secretary of energy is directed to designate one or more sites owned or controlled by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for the use and deployment of advanced nuclear reactor technologies and to use all available legal authorities to site, approve, and authorize the design, construction, and operation of privately funded advanced nuclear reactor technologies to power artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure, other critical or national security needs, supply chain items, or on-site infrastructure.8 The same EO tasks the secretary of energy with identifying uranium and plutonium available for recycling or processing into nuclear fuel and endeavor to approve privately funded nuclear fuel recycling and reprocessing technologies.9 Finally, the secretary of state is directed to engage in various measures to promote American nuclear exports; for example, by leading negotiations and "aggressively" pursuing at least 20 new agreements under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) to access new markets in partner countries.
Finally, the president signed an EO titled "Reforming Nuclear Reactor Testing at the Department of Energy," intending to unlock the "revolutionary potential" of advanced reactors for new applications, such as supporting data centers, microchip manufacturing, petrochemical production, healthcare, desalination, hydrogen production, and other industries.
The four EOs come amid a resurging interest in nuclear energy generation, particularly as data centers increase the demand for power. NRC license applications can take years to process, and the delays have generated criticism from within and outside the industry. In 2024, the NRC proposed a rule that would streamline the permitting process using pre-prepared, generic environmental impact statements, which is on track to go into effect later this year.10 But reform through the normal regulatory process has not been rapid or comprehensive enough for many proponents of nuclear energy. A lawsuit recently filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas argues that the NRC has misread the scope of its authority under the AEA and that a correct interpretation of the statute would exempt a subset of SMRs (i.e., reactors that produce 20 megawatts or less) from its licensing requirements because those requirements apply only to facilities that use nuclear material "in such quantity as to be of significance to the common defense and security" or "in such manner as to affect the health and safety of the public."11 The agency's interpretation is embodied in a 1956 regulation defining what types of facilities meet the threshold for licensing.12
Demonstrating the broad range of needs nuclear energy can address, the plaintiffs in the Eastern District of Texas case assert that "SMRs are highly desirable power sources for hydraulic fracturing operations in the Permian Basin in Texas because SMRs can provide a large amount of electricity with a small footprint in remote locations, while also help alleviating demand on the state's ever-growing electric grid."13
Meanwhile, environmentalists continue to challenge approvals for license extensions for legacy reactors both individually and programmatically. Such extensions have also become common as the government, beginning during the Biden administration, has shown increasing willingness to extend licenses of operational lives in the nation's aging reactor fleet. To meet the pressing need for reliable energy and to feed the growing needs of the data center industry, states have extended or resuscitated the useful lives of large-scale fission reactors in Michigan (Palisades), California (Diablo Canyon), and Pennsylvania (Three Mile Island). These extensions reflect the need to act despite the delayed deployment of SMRs. In case of one such renewal, for Southern California's Diablo Canyon plant, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that "NRC's general prior acknowledgement that operation after 40 years may present unique age-degradation concerns" did not preclude the agency from using a less rigorous form of NEPA analysis (a categorical exclusion), where the plaintiffs presented no evidence of concerns unique to Diablo Canyon.14 The Ninth Circuit's decision acknowledged "[t]he high demands on electricity faced by Californians were caused by unexpected harms to power transmission capabilities by wildfires, the impacts of drought on hydropower, and increasingly frequent extreme heat events."15 The court upheld the Commission's finding that an exemption from regulatory deadlines was warranted.
A pending suit in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit takes programmatic aim at license extensions for older, larger reactors, challenging regulations issued by the NRC in 2024 that authorize facilities to continue in operation for up to an 80-year period (i.e., by allowing the generators to seek up to two 20-year license renewals from a 40-year license).16 The petitioner, an environmental nongovernmental organization, asserts that the new regulations violate the NEPA and Administrative Procedure Act because the agency's environmental analysis is "based on analyses of environmental impacts of reactor license renewal that are irrational, unreasonable, incomplete, unsupported, and arbitrary and capricious."17 The complaint alleges that the agency failed to adequately analyze (1) the increased risks posed by aging and deteriorating reactors and other equipment and (2) climate change impacts on reactor risk. The government is likely to argue in response that the identified impacts are environmental impacts on reactors, not environmental impacts of reactors and are therefore outside of NEPA's mandate.18 This argument would draw support from the Supreme Court's recently issued decision in Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, where the Supreme Court held that "the textually mandated focus of NEPA is the 'proposed action.'"19
During the public comment process for the license renewal regulation, the NRC addressed allegations of increased risk associated with aging reactors by saying that its ongoing regulatory oversight, through its AEA-based safety program for reactor maintenance, would sufficiently address reactor risk, obviating the need for separate analysis. Under the maintenance regulations, license renewal applicants must demonstrate that "the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the [current licensing basis] for the period of extended operation."20 This argument may be undercut by the recent policy change requiring a White House review of reactor safety rules, as well as efforts to reduce the agency's staff.21
Supply Chain Challenges: Uranium
Many advanced reactor designs will require advanced fuel, such as HALEU.22 DOE estimates that the domestic demand for HALEU could reach 50 metric tons per year by 2035.23 There are no commercial suppliers of such fuels in the United States—the main supplier globally is TENEX, a Russian state-owned company.24 The "Reinvigorating the Nuclear Industrial Base" EO acknowledges that nuclear generators should not have to seek uranium from countries with adverse strategic interests. Last year, Congress passed a ban on Russian uranium imports. Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act, Pub. L. No. 118-62, 138 Stat. 1022 (2024). In April 2025, DOE announced conditional commitments under the HALEU Availability Program to five U.S. nuclear developers to meet their near-term fuel needs.25
Conclusion
The president's recent EOs signal increased urgency to build out the nation's nuclear fleet and are likely to be cited in pending litigation challenging the NRC's regulatory programs. Whether and to what extent the EOs tip the scales in those challenges remains to be seen.
Footnotes
1. The Trump administration also recently reduced the NRC's autonomy by implementing a policy to require reactor safety rules to go first through the White House for review before being adopted by the NRC. Jeff Brufield, Trump tightens control of independent agency overseeing nuclear safety, NPR (May 9, 2025).
2. Exec. Order No. 14300, Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 90 Fed. Reg. 22587 (May 23, 2025), ("A myopic policy of minimizing even trivial risks ignores the reality that substitute forms of energy production also carry risk, such as pollution with potentially deleterious health effects.").
3. Id. at 3, 4, 5.
4.vExec. Order No. 14302, Reinvigorating the Nuclear Industrial Base, 90 Fed. Reg. 22595 (May 23, 2025).
5. Except in the case of its legal obligations to the State of South Carolina. Id. at § 3(c).
6. Id. at § 4(b).
7. Exec. Order No. 14299, Deploying Advanced Nuclear Reactor Technologies for National Security, 90 Fed. Reg. 22581 (May 23, 2025).
8. Id. at § 4. This order is directly aligned with DOE's April 2025, Request for Information (RFI) seeking information on opportunities to site AI infrastructure on DOE-owned or DOE-managed land assets. We break down the details of the RFI in this Update.
9. Id. at § 5.
10. New Nuclear Reactor Generic Environmental Impact Statement (NR GEIS), U.S.NRC, (last updated Feb. 24, 2025).
11. State of Texas et al. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, No. 6:24-cv-00507, Compl. ¶ 16 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2014(cc)) (December 30, 2024). The NRC's interpretation of its authority under the AEA is also presently before the Supreme Court of the United States in a case in which environmentalists and the State of Texas have challenged its authority to license the storage of radioactive waste. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n v. Texas, No. 23-1300 (Aug. 25, 2023).
12. Id. ¶ 21 (citing 10 C.F.R. § 50.2).
13. Compl. ¶ 5.
14. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. United States Nuclear Regul. Comm'n, 100 F.4th 1039, 1059 (9th Cir. 2024).
15. Id. at 1052.
16. Beyond Nuclear, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regul. Comm'n, No. 24-1318 (Oct. 7, 2024).
17. Pet. at 2.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i) (agency should prepare detailed statement for any major federal action of the "reasonably foreseeable environmental effects of the proposed agency action").
19. No. 23-975 (May 29, 2025), slip op. 16.
20. 10 C.F.R. § 54.21(a)(3).
21. See supra, n.1; E.O. 14300 § 4 (directing NRC to, in consultation with DOGE, reorganize agency and "undertake reductions in force in conjunction with this reorganization, though certain functions may increase in size consistent with the policies in this order, including those devoted to new reactor licensing.").
22. Paul Day, U.S. Ramps up advanced fuel production capabilities, Reuters, Feb. 16, 2023. These advanced nuclear energy reactor technologies require nuclear fuels with higher uranium enrichment levels. Most operating commercial nuclear reactors use uranium fuels enriched with the uranium isotope U-235. Reactors in the United States currently use fuels enriched to 3% to 5% U-235. Many advanced reactors will also use 3% to 5% enriched uranium for fuel, but some designs will require fuel enrichments of up to 20% U-235. HALEU is "uranium having an assay greater than 5.0 weight percent and less than 20.0 weight percent of the uranium-235 isotope." 42 U.S.C. § 16281(d)(4).
23. See What is High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU)?, Off. of Nuclear Energy (Dec. 3, 2024).
24. Dmitry Gorchakov, Enriched Uranium Fuels Russia's War Machine. But the US Still Imports It, Mar. 17, 2025.
25. U.S. Department of Energy to Distribute First Amounts of HALEU to U.S. Advanced Reactor Developers, U.S. Dep't Of Energy (Apr. 9, 2025).
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.
