President Trump Signs 4 Executive Orders To Deploy New Nuclear Reactors, Strengthen Supply Chain

President Donald Trump signed four separate executive orders (EOs) on May 23, 2025, intended to result in a quadrupling of U.S. nuclear energy capacity to 400 gigawatts (GW) by 2050, all while strengthening domestic fuel cycle infrastructure and achieving deployment of demonstration reactors as soon as next year. Three of the EOs seek to reform the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) while leveraging the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to streamline the licensing and construction process of new reactors, with a particular focus on advanced reactors. These EOs also seek to aid deployment of U.S.-developed reactor technology abroad. The fourth EO relates to improving fuel cycle infrastructure but largely calls for additional study and reports rather than immediate action. Each of the EOs is discussed further below in detail.

Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

The first of the EOs aimed at speeding reactor deployment orders the NRC to undergo reorganization while also overhauling its regulations with respect to reactor licensing. An underlying purpose of this EO is to direct the NRC to act in accordance with its revised mission statement following the Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy Act of 2024 (ADVANCE Act) to not unnecessarily burden energy deployment while still maintaining its safety mission.

Specifically, this EO directs the NRC to work with Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) to undertake a reorganization to align with the purpose of focusing NRC resources primarily on new reactor licensing. The order directs the NRC to undertake reductions in force while acknowledging that certain functions, namely new reactor licensing, may increase in size. It also directs the NRC to create a team of at least 20 officials to draft the new regulations discussed further below. The order also directs the NRC to reduce the personnel and functions of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) to the minimum necessary to meet its statutory obligations. The ACRS was created pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) and must review safety studies and facility license applications and advise the NRC on hazards of proposed or existing reactor facilities and the adequacy of proposed reactor safety standards.

Additionally, the EO directs the NRC to undertake several rulemakings that must be proposed within nine months and finalized within 18 months. Each of these rulemakings will be subject to the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and great care must be taken to ensure any resulting rules and licensing reviews conform to applicable statutory requirements.

Most notably, the NRC is directed to establish fixed deadlines for its evaluation and approval of reactor licenses and other reactor licensing activities. This shall include a deadline of no more than 18 months for a final decision on an application to construct and operate a new reactor of any type and no more than one year for a final decision on an application to continue to operate an existing reactor, with tolling allowed only in the event of an applicant failure. To facilitate quicker timelines, the NRC is directed to streamline its hearing process and revise its National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)-implementing regulations to reflect the 2023 amendments from the Fiscal Responsibility Act and Unleashing American Energy EO. The NRC's NEPA-implementing regulations currently direct NRC staff to "take account of the regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality published November 29, 1978" and have not been updated to reflect the 2023 statutory amendments.

The NRC is also directed to reconsider the reliance on the linear no-threshold (LNT) model for radiation exposure and instead implement determinate radiation limits. Despite previous acknowledgements by the NRC that the LNT model cannot be validated at low doses, during its last extensive multiyear review of LNT beginning in 2015, the NRC ultimately concluded in August 2021 that there is not yet enough evidence to rescind the LNT's assumptions. This recent review could present a litigation risk to any renewed effort to rescind the theory as the basis of radiological protection regulations.

Other actions directed by the EO include:

• establishing fixed caps on hourly fees for NRC reviews
• establishing an expedited pathway to approve reactor designs that have already been approved by the DOE or DOD, focusing only on new risks not evaluated by those agencies
• establishing a process for high-volume licensing of microreactors and modular reactors and considering whether certain reactors or components may be built under general licenses
• establishing stringent thresholds for when the NRC can demand changes after construction is underway
• reducing burdens in the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) and reactor security rules and focusing on credible risks
• revising reactor safety assessments to focus on credible, realistic risks
• reconsidering the license for which a renewed license remains effective – currently, renewed licenses for commercial reactors typically extend for 20 years but are capped by the AEA at 40 years

Reforming Nuclear Reactor Testing at the DOE

The second EO aims to increase the role of the DOE in deploying new reactor designs while reducing the NRC's role in this process. This order specifically seeks to facilitate construction of "qualified test reactors," defined as advanced reactors that are determined by the DOE to have sufficiently demonstrated from a financial backing and technical development standpoint that they may feasibly be operational within two years from the date of a substantially complete application. The order makes a blanket finding that any such reactors "over which the Department exercises sufficient control and that do not produce commercial electric power" are subject to the exemption from NRC licensing contained at 42 U.S.C. § 2140.

The EO establishes requirements for the DOE to facilitate qualified test reactor development both within and outside the national laboratory system. The DOE must take action to ensure its regulations and policies enable deployment of a qualified test reactor within two years of an application.

The order also requires establishment of a pilot program outside of the national laboratories and "shall" approve at least three pilot reactors with a goal of achieving criticality in each of the reactors by July 4, 2026.

Lastly, the DOE is directed to streamline its NEPA-implementing regulations and to identify potential categorical exclusions and alternative review procedures as allowed by NEPA.

Deploying Advanced Nuclear Reactor Technologies for National Security

The third EO seeks to leverage the military's energy needs to deploy new reactor technologies and to facilitate exports of U.S.-developed nuclear technologies abroad. First, the order directs the DOD through the Secretary of the U.S. Army to create a program of record for using nuclear energy to power both military installations and operational needs and deploy a nuclear reactor at a domestic military base or installation by Sept. 30, 2028. The order also directs the DOD to work with the DOE and U.S. Department of State to identify new regulations, legislation and international agreements needed to carry out this program.

Next, the order directs the DOE to take action to designate artificial intelligence (AI) data centers that are located at or operated in coordination with the DOE and related electrical infrastructure as critical defense facilities and to deploy advanced nuclear reactor technologies at one or more DOE sites. The order sets a goal of deploying the first reactor at a DOE site no later than 30 months from the date of the order (November 2027).

The order also directs the DOE to identify uranium and plutonium within its inventories that may be useful for nuclear fuel and to release at least 20 metric tons of high assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) for use by the private sector at a DOE-owned or controlled site for the purpose of powering AI infrastructure. In connection with the goal of ensuring long-term supply of HALEU, the order directs the DOE and DOD to site, approve and authorize the design, construction and operation of privately funded nuclear fuel recycling, reprocessing and reactor fuel fabrication technologies at DOE and DOD sites.

With respect to exports of U.S.-developed nuclear technologies, the order directs the State Department to pursue at least 20 new agreements under Section 123 of the AEA and to renegotiate existing agreements set to expire in the next decade in order to facilitate transfer of nuclear technologies abroad by private parties. The order directs all applicable agencies to expeditiously grant required export approvals. The order also includes a number of provisions to finance and otherwise support development of U.S. nuclear technologies abroad, including financing through the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, U.S. Trade and Development Agency and Export-Import Bank.

As with the other EOs, this order directs applicable agencies to leverage categorical exclusions to minimize the impact of NEPA reviews when carrying out the order's goals.

Reinvigorating the Nuclear Industrial Base

The final EO seeks to improve domestic fuel cycle infrastructure, including uranium enrichment and conversion, as well as waste recycling and disposal infrastructure. This order further seeks to fund nuclear power plants and develop a robust nuclear workforce. This EO includes a mix of immediate actions and additional studies and reporting on the substantial changes that would need to be made to U.S. nuclear waste statutory and regulatory regimes to achieve the EO's lofty aims.

The primary report directed by this order is a joint report by the DOE, DOD, U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), due within 240 days (Jan. 18, 2026) that covers various subjects around planning for and developing infrastructure to recycle, reprocess and dispose of spent nuclear fuel and high-level nuclear waste. This report is intended to set new policy and to identify regulatory and legislative changes needed to affect such policy.

Further, the DOE, NRC and OMB must develop a plan to expand domestic uranium conversion and enrichment capacity to meet projected domestic demand. The DOE must also halt the surplus plutonium dilute and dispose program and establish a program to make surplus plutonium available for use as nuclear fuel. The DOE, in consultation with the DOD, must update the DOE's excess uranium management policy to align with the goals of the order, while factoring in the need to modernize the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile. The DOE, in coordination with the U.S. Attorney General and Federal Trade Commission (FTC), must seek to enter voluntary agreements with nuclear energy companies under the Defense Production Act to procure low-enriched uranium and HALEU, including as needed by the U.S. government for national security purposes.

The DOE is also directed to prioritize work, particularly in the Loan Program Office, that will facilitate 5 GW of power uprates to existing reactors and ensure that 10 new large reactors are under construction by 2030. The DOE shall also consult with the DOD about the feasibility of restarting or repurposing closed nuclear plants to support military microgrid applications. The DOE is also directed to prioritize funding for qualified advanced nuclear reactor technologies.

Lastly, the order directs the U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Department of Labor to take various actions to prioritize nuclear education pathways and apprenticeships within existing programs and establish new training programs. The DOE is also directed to increase access to national labs for students studying nuclear engineering and related fields.

Conclusion

Taken together, the EOs chart an ambitious course to jump-start the U.S. nuclear energy industry. The orders focus primarily on rapid deployment of advanced nuclear reactors while also providing support and further study for other parts of the fuel cycle, including uranium conversion and enrichment along with waste reprocessing and recycling. Although the orders note current U.S. reliance on foreign sources of uranium and some of the proposed NRC reforms will benefit all stakeholders in the nuclear fuel cycle, direct support for domestic uranium recovery is notably absent from these orders.

These EOs build on the long-standing bipartisan support for nuclear deployment, including passage of the ADVANCE Act of 2024 and the HALEU Availability Program first authorized in the Energy Act of 2020. Ultimately, the success or failure of the goals of these orders will depend on how the orders are actually implemented. Some of the required actions are already in progress following last year's passage of the ADVANCE Act. Other actions will need to be started from scratch, and the applicable agencies will need to take great care to comply with applicable substantive statutes and the APA. Carefully crafting actions to survive potential litigation may create tension with the aggressive deadlines for action in the orders.