Although blockbuster rulings on the Affordable Care Act and same-sex marriage garnered the limelight in the U.S. Supreme Court's 2014-2015 term, the Supreme Court also addressed some more mundane procedural issues. Here are several opinions of interest to federal court practitioners.
Federal Tort Claim Act time limits are subject to equitable tolling. United States v. Wong, 135 S.Ct. 1625 (2014).
The Federal Tort Claims Act provides that a tort claim against the United States "shall be forever barred” unless the claimant meets two deadlines. First, a claim must be presented to the appropriate federal agency for administrative review "within two years after [the] claim accrues.” Second, if the agency denies the claim, the claimant must file suit in federal court "within six months” of the agency's denial. In this case, the claimant missed the filing deadline, but requested equitable tolling because she had a good reason for filing late. The district court dismissed her claim holding that, despite any justification for the delay, the time bar was jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling. The Ninth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court held that Federal Tort Claims Act time limits are subject to equitable tolling.
An order disposing of one of the discrete cases consolidated for multidistrict litigation pretrial proceedings qualifies as an appealable final decision. Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp., 135 S. Ct. 897 (2015).
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation established a multidistrict litigation for cases involving allegations that banks understated their borrowing costs, thereby depressing LIBOR and enabling banks to pay lower interest rates on financial instruments sold to investors. One of the consolidated actions raised the single claim that several banks, acting in concert, violated federal antitrust law. The district court granted the banks' motion to dismiss all antitrust claims. The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction because the district court had not disposed of all claims in the consolidated actions. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that the district court’s order dismissing the antitrust complaint was a final decision appealable under 28 USC §1291, which gives the courts of appeal jurisdiction of appeals from "all final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” The court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)––which permits district courts to authorize an immediate appeal of dispositive rulings on separate claims in a civil action raising multiple claims––did not apply to a single-claim action or to a multiple-claims action in which all of the claims had been finally decided. Likewise, 28 U.S.C. §1292(b)––which allows district courts to designate interlocutory orders not otherwise appealable for review––did not apply because the order dismissing the antitrust complaints was not interlocutory.
A notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold; the notice need not contain evidentiary submissions. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. LLC v. Owens, 130 S.Ct. 547 (2014).
A defendant seeking to remove a case from state to federal court must file in the federal forum a notice of removal "containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal.” 28 U.S.C. §1446(a). Owens filed a putative class action in Kansas state court seeking underpaid royalties under certain oil and gas leases. Dart removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, which gives federal courts jurisdiction over class action suits when the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(2). Dart's notice of removal alleged that the purported underpayments totaled over $8.2 million. Owens moved to remand the case to state court, asserting that the removal notice was deficient as a matter of law because it included no evidence proving that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million. The district court granted Owens' remand motion. The Tenth Circuit denied review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a removal notice need only plausibly allege––not detail proof of––the amount in controversy.
Rule 606(b) precludes a party from using a juror's affidavit about deliberations to obtain a new trial. Warger v. Shauers, 135 S.Ct. 521 (2014).
In a rare evidentiary ruling, the Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) precludes a party seeking a new trial from using one juror's affidavit of what another juror said in deliberations to demonstrate the other juror's dishonesty during voir dire. The case arose from a collision between Warger's motorcycle and Shauers' truck. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of Shauers, Warger filed a motion for new trial. In support of his motion, he submitted an affidavit from a juror which alleged that another juror had deliberately lied during voir dire. The district court refused to grant a new trial, holding that Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) barred the only evidence supporting the motion, the complaining juror's affidavit. That rule provides that "[d]uring an inquiry into the validity of a verdict,” evidence "about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations” is inadmissible. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that Rule 606(b) applies to juror testimony during a proceeding in which a party seeks to secure a new trial on the ground that a juror lied during voir dire.
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